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ABSTRACT 
JUSTIN D. MARTIN: News Consumption & Political Socialization  
Among Young, Urban Jordanians 
(Under the direction of Anne Johnston, Ph.D.) 
 
This study examined the associations between young urban Jordanians’ (N=321) news 
consumption patterns and their feelings toward the Jordanian and U.S. governments. 
Consumption of traditional news delivery formats (such as print newspapers, radio broadcasts, 
and interpersonal sources) was measured, as was reliance on new media formats such as blogs, 
text messaging, and podcasting. Young Jordanians’ assessments of the Jordanian and U.S. 
governments were operationalized as indices of political cynicism, political trust, and ratings of 
the U.S. government. News consumption variables were regressed on the political attitude scales, 
with media credibility included as a control variable. Young Jordanians in the sample rely mostly 
on TV news, newspapers, and interpersonal contacts for current events information. Just two of 
the news consumption variables, TV news use and reliance on interpersonal sources, were 
associated with political attitudes measured in the study; these variables negatively predicted 
feelings toward the U.S. government.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Jordan, it is not uncommon to see pictures of the country’s King, Abdullah II bin 
Hussein, everywhere.  Abdullah’s mug adorns the interior of every government office, school, 
most restaurants, and many shops.  Stickers emblazoned with the king’s face even grace the 
windows of many of Amman’s taxicabs. The Jordanian flag is nearly as ubiquitous as the King’s 
photograph.  In store windows and on billboards, T-shirts and bumper stickers across the 
country, the red, black, green and white flag can be seen. The Jordanian government and those 
who wish to be in its favor are constantly trying to remind people on the street that Jordan is a 
nation of which one should be proud.   
These efforts to endear Jordanians to representations of their king and their flag are 
components of a process called political socialization.  Political socialization is a process by 
which people come to form their political identities.  Broadly, political socialization is the 
construction of one’s political self (see Merelman, 1972, p.135), and the use of messages and 
symbols is a part of this construction.  In the case of pictures of King Abdullah II, it seems that 
Jordan’s government is trying, in a proactive way, to politically socialize its citizens to believe 
that the King is to be revered. For their part, Jordanian citizens displaying the king’s picture 
demonstrate that they have been politically socialized to believe that the king is worthy of 
respect (or at least deem it a wise professional decision to show support for the king). Political 
socialization involves much more than the presentation of national symbols, however. First 
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conceptualized by Hyman in 1959, political socialization was defined as an individual’s 
“learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated 
through various agencies of society” (p.25).  Formative school systems, peer groups, families, 
religious affiliations, and mass media systems are all “agents” of political socialization. Many of 
the assumptions in Hyman’s research go back to the writings in Plato’s Republic—such as the 
notion that societal forces can and should shape young generations of political participants—but 
Hyman provided a more official title and description of the process at a time when the world was 
gravely concerned with how young people are groomed to adhere to certain political values and 
behaviors. Hyman’s research put a strong emphasis on “learning” political norms and ideologies 
through society’s agents—reminiscent of, but predating, the social psychological focus of Albert 
Bandura’s (1963) social learning theory and the societal “lessons” described in the work of 
Gerbner (1970; 1977; 1998) in his articulations of cultivation analysis. This study focused on a 
specific societal agent—news media—and specifically on news consumption variables as they 
relate to political socialization measures. More precisely, this study examined news consumption 
and feelings toward the U.S. and Jordanian governments among 18 to 35 year-old Jordanians.   
 While political socialization research burgeoned in the decades following Hyman’s 
treatise, scholarship has predominantly focused on political socialization in the United States and 
Western Europe, according to Sapiro (2004). “A smattering of [political socialization] work 
covers other countries and international relations,” Sapiro wrote. “Clearly, we have learned too 
little about political socialization outside the United States” (p.5).  He claims that agents of 
political socialization such as family, school systems, and mass media differ from country to 
country in their structure and influence on political socialization outcome variables. Western 
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scholars whose research focus lies outside the U.S., Sapiro argues, should be encouraged to 
explore political socialization processes in the interest of cross-national understanding.  
Sapiro’s argument that relatively little is known about political socialization in 
developing countries applies especially to Arab countries, which American social scientists have 
traditionally avoided as a region of inquiry for proximity, security, linguistic, and other reasons. 
Little research has been published on political socialization in Arab countries (a noble exception 
being Farah and Kuroda, 1987), and virtually no research has been published on political 
socialization processes in Jordan.   
One well-done study by Nisbet, Nisbet, Scheufele and Shanahan (2004) examined TV 
use and views toward the United States among a multinational sample of citizens in nine Muslim 
countries that included Jordan, but the results were reported in the aggregate, so data from Arab 
countries in the sample (Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia) were 
lumped together in omnibus scores with data from Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Indonesia. The 
study, although a welcome addition to the small corpus of literature on news consumption and 
political attitudes in Arab-Muslim countries, tells us little in terms of country-by-country 
political socialization processes.  The authors did find compelling evidence, though, that 
Muslims’ television use (entertainment content was not distinguished from news) was negatively 
associated with views toward the United States, a finding that is important to remember for the 
current study.  
If political socialization is important in the minds of American and Western European 
social scientists for the purposes of understanding formation of political identity and the political 
orientations that individuals quilt over the course of their lifetimes, then such processes should 
also be worth exploring in developing countries around the world.  Jordan, for example, which is 
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considered a moderate Arab nation, should interest Western researchers and policymakers 
wishing to understand how Jordanian citizens come to hold political, social, and religious views 
that are more moderate than some other countries in the Arab-Muslim world. And if we were to 
agree that news consumption is potentially associated with political socialization variables, 
Jordanian news consumption, too, is worthy of examination. One underlying claim of this study 
is that political socialization processes in a county like Jordan matter and are worth studying. A 
second underlying claim is that news consumption in Jordan may be associated with political 
socialization variables and, therefore, also warrants scholarly attention.   
In order to set the stage for this study, the following introductory information and review 
of the literature will attempt to do several things. Broadly, the review of literature will describe 
the Jordanian political system and where the press fits in this system. While few researchers have 
studied news consumption patterns or their political correlates among Jordanians, there exists a 
sizeable body of literature on the political system in Jordan, as well as a substantial amount of 
descriptive literature discussing what living in Jordan is like for news consumers and creators. 
This literature is reviewed.  
Next, political socialization literature is examined, particularly when the framework is 
applied to mass communication research. A history of political socialization research is provided, 
including the role of mass communication scholars in this chronology, and strengths and 
weaknesses of this corpus of literature are outlined. Finally, political socialization is specifically 
discussed in the context of Jordan, and examples of governmental attempts to socialize citizens 
to the monarchy are provided.  This literature will guide the formation of research questions and 
the operationalization of dependent variables.        
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Jordan and Its Media Environment 
 Jordan is a moderate Arab country with many facets that make it ripe for mass 
communication and political socialization research. First, and most importantly, Jordan is an 
Arab country that permits Western scholars to conduct original survey research, which is not the 
case in Saudi Arabia, Algeria, or Syria. In terms of its mass media system, Jordan is a country 
that monitors its domestic news producers to a certain extent but does not censor or block the 
importation of foreign news outlets, including stories from American news organizations. The 
country’s media landscape, therefore, is far more diverse than some of the more autocratic 
regimes in the Arab world.  
What follows in the next few sections is a brief country description of Jordan in terms of 
politics and population, trailed by an in-depth analysis of the country’s modern news media 
environment. Gerbner (1977) wrote that to understand the associations between media use 
variables and important cultural indicators, one must first examine the possibilities and 
constraints of a given culture’s media system. A discussion of such abilities and limitations of 
Jordan’s politics and press system is where we begin.  
The Kingdom of Jordan       
Jordan is a small Arab country of just over six million people (CIA Factbook, 2007), 
situated between Syria, Israel, the West Bank, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.  Its borders and name 
(Transjordan) were determined in 1921 by the British Mandate that followed World War I and 
existed until 1946, when Transjordan was granted full independence (Alon, 2006).  Leaders 
forming the new government named their country simply “Jordan.” Considered the most 
moderate Arab country in some circles in the U.S. and Western Europe as well as a peaceful 
buffer between contiguous regional troublemakers, Jordan has carefully navigated its way 
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through many threatening events in its short history. The country has mostly managed to skirt the 
Arab-Israeli wars of the 20th Century, competing Soviet and U.S. interests during the Cold War, 
two U.S. campaigns in Iraq, and the often unpredictable actions of its Arab neighbors and Israel.   
Jordan’s leadership is the main reason for these successes. Research suggests that, by 
most regional comparisons, Jordan has enjoyed pragmatic leadership that has guided the nation 
through no small number of Middle Eastern conflicts and has ushered in important economic 
reforms (see Ryan, 2002).  But liberalization and modernization of Jordan’s democratic 
institutions—the press for the purposes of this paper—have been less quick in coming.  The late 
King Hussein, who ascended to the throne in 1953 after his grandfather was shot and his father 
was deemed mentally incompetent to rule the country, ruled Jordan until his death in 1999 
(Ryan, 2002).  Somewhat of a moderate pragmatist, Hussein extended full diplomatic relations to 
Israel in 1994 and was the first leader in the Arab world to sign a free trade agreement with the 
United States.  Hussein was regarded well by many people in the United States, partly because of 
his marriage in the 1970s to an American woman named Lisa Halaby, who later took the name 
Queen Noor (Noor, 2003).  Very popular in Jordan but not without faults and enemies, Hussein 
survived several attempts on his life during his half-century reign (Glain, 2003).  
Weakened by cancer, Hussein declared on his deathbed in 1999 that his second eldest 
son, Abdullah, would be the next king of Jordan, despite the fact that Abdullah’s older brother 
had long been the heir in line to govern (Rogers & Smith, 2004). So far, Hussein’s choice in 
Abdullah seems to have been a decent one.  Like his father, Abdullah has had to walk a tightrope 
above his region’s many perils.  Since acceding the throne, Abdullah has governed through the 
second Palestinian intifada, the ongoing war in Iraq, the Lebanese-Israeli war of 2006, internal 
wars between the Palestinian political parties Hamas and Fatah, and the Israeli construction of a 
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security fence carving up Israel proper and the West Bank.  As roughly 56 percent of the 
population in Jordan is Palestinian Arabs, issues of Palestinians living under Israeli control 
deeply affect stability and the political climate in Jordan.  
In ruling Jordan as these neighboring conflicts threatened regional stability, Abdullah’s 
major domestic strategy has involved economic reforms and attempts to make Jordan a more 
visible element in the global economy (George, 2005).  Abdullah has tried to strengthen Jordan’s 
technology sector (Ryan, 2006) and has crafted an aggressive campaign to privatize many of the 
country’s bureaucratic sectors.  In addition, Abdullah has constructed an economy focused 
largely on export-oriented growth (Dew & Wallace, 2004), as Jordanian products are sold to the 
growing number of nations with which the king has heightened trade relationships.  As a result 
of some of these reforms, the GDP in Jordan has been growing at or around six percent over each 
of the last few years, and the national debt has fallen substantially.  
Despite his relative successes in riding out regional wars and implementing important 
economic reforms, however, Abdullah has presided over major economic challenges during his 
tenure.  Unemployment in Jordan is currently 15 percent, according to conservative estimates 
provided by the Jordanian government, while the 2007 CIA Factbook suggests that 30 percent is 
a more accurate figure.  Approximately 14 percent of the population lives below the international 
poverty line, and upward mobility in Jordan remains elusive to the impoverished.  Inflation in 
Jordan is high—and has expanded as the country has absorbed over half a million refugees of the 
Iraq war (Black, 2007). A people with few natural resources prior to the war, Jordanians are 
suffering from weakening public services and resources as their country attempts to endure a 
rapid population increase of more than 15 percent.   
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With these pressing economic problems as their primary concerns, King Abdullah and his 
government have equivocated on many of the political and institutional reforms, that were 
promised after the king’s coronation in 1999.  Such vacillating is evident in a discussion of the 
Jordanian press. King Abdullah has not liberalized the Jordanian press at the same pace he has 
attempted to liberalize the economy.  Throughout his rule, the press has remained under the 
partial control of the Jordanian government, and few permanent steps toward greater press 
autonomy have been traversed.  The same was true during the rule of his father, Hussein. 
Jordanian press restrictions during the 1980s and 1990s ebbed and flowed according to the 
political needs of the government (Najjaf, 1998).  Periodically throughout these two decades, 
occasional causes for hope, such as across-the-board civil liberties reforms in 1989 were only to 
disappoint, as the government would fail to enact many of its promises.    
With that said, however, the press in Jordan is not a dark institution that exists only to 
extol the virtues of the government. Jordanian reporters do from time to time uncover scandals, 
expose corruption, and challenge public policy directives.  In these ways, the Jordanian press is a 
model for a number of other countries in the Arab world whose press systems are indeed dark 
institutions.  Still, the professional limits of journalists, editors and publishers in Jordan are real 
ones that must be taken into account in any transparent discussion of news reporting in Jordan.  
The Jordanian Press 
In 2005 Jon Alterman wrote that “we know shockingly little about what the people of the 
Middle East watch, and how they interpret that information” (p.207).  This is still true.  While 
research on journalism across the globe has, according to Loffelholz & Weaver (2008), increased 
dramatically in the last few decades, their otherwise comprehensive book, Global Journalism 
Research contains not a single chapter discussing journalism research in an Arab or Muslim 
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country.  In fact, the edited volume is tremendously Western-centric, with contributing authors 
mostly discussing contemporary journalism research in North American and Western European 
countries.   
One of a very few studies ever authored on media consumption patterns of Jordanians 
was published by the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University a half century 
ago (Stycos, 1958). While Stycos reported some interesting findings, such as that Palestinians 
living in Jordan consumed much more news and demonstrated far greater needs for orientation 
than did indigenous Jordanians, his research is so outdated that it did not even assess television 
use. Examining patterns of contemporary news consumption in Jordan is one way to help address 
a void in the scholarly literature of journalism and mass communication research in the Arab 
world.  
Jordan is a country ripe for mass media research, as it is one of the more progressive and 
educated countries in the region with the highest literacy rate—just over 91 percent—in the 
entire Arab world (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2005).  Historically, the press in Jordan has 
been tightly monitored by the government, although press reforms in 1989 improved 
circumstances somewhat (Wolfsfeld, Khouri & Peri, 2002).  This follows the trend identified by 
Weaver (1998), who claimed that, in the 1980s and 1990s, journalists in countries governed by 
authoritarian regimes began playing a more visible role in critiquing governmental decisions and 
promoting pro-social ideals.   
Since Abdullah II succeeded his father in 1999, the government in Jordan has taken a few 
measures to expand press freedom. Supporters of the king and some outside observers point to a 
handful of press reforms approved by Abdullah in the last decade.  In reversing some of the 
impediments to journalists imposed in the 1993 and 1997 press and publications laws (see Lucas, 
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2005, for details about these restrictive bills), for example, the Jordanian parliament has lowered 
the amount of financial capital required to launch a new publication in Jordan and has eliminated 
the requirement that all Jordanian journalists belong to the Journalists’ Union, according to 
Mellor (2005).1    
The 2007 press and publications law also made it more difficult for the Jordanian 
government to summarily shut down printing presses of vociferous publications (Freedom 
House, 2008).  Measures such as these have led to the success of the new opposition paper al-
Ghad (Arabic for “tomorrow”), which has recently become one of the most popular daily 
publications in the country.  Other opposition papers have emerged, including the growing 
presence of a tabloid press that, despite its penchant for sensationalism, is a possible sign of 
journalistic liberalization in Jordan, according to Jones (2002).   
However, despite journalistic optimism that may arise from a relativistic comparison of 
Jordan to its neighbors, Jordan still has a way to go, and Abdullah’s record on press reforms is 
ultimately mixed. Despite liberalizing the press in some areas, the kingdom has receded in 
others. For example, the king established in the last few years what are called “media free 
zones,” where foreign and regional outlets such as Reuters and pan-Arab outlets can operate 
censorship free and tax free (Mellor).  However, the freedoms enjoyed by foreign news 
organizations in the media zones have not been extended to journalists working for domestic 
news outlets, a fact that creates strong resentment among Jordanian news practitioners.  
The government may not despotically dominate its press system as do the regimes in 
Libya and Syria, but these countries may be among the poorest points of comparison. Some 
critics note that the press in Jordan is too closely watched by the government to be labeled 
“free.” Many reporters and editors face the threat of heavy fines for a number of different 
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offenses, such as defaming Islam or inciting sectarian strife (“Jordanian parliament endorses 
change to controversial press law,” 2007).  Such fines may be as steep as $40,000 (Freedom 
House, 2008), nearly nine times Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product per capita (CIA Factbook, 
Jordan, 2008).   
The Mukhabarat, Jordan’s version of the CIA, monitors press activities and is known for 
placing spies in positions at prominent media outlets. According to Freedom House (2007), some 
Jordanian editors and journalists complain repeatedly of governmental prior restraints, claiming 
intelligence forces have contacted them prior to a story’s publication, promising punishments 
unless the story is shelved.  Such charges have been leveled by other human rights organizations, 
too, accusing Jordanian police of intimidating and beating reporters who refuse to budge when 
told to disperse from the periphery of controversial public events (IRIN, 2007).   
The government also reneged on its promise to abolish prison sentences for vocal 
journalists. In 2007, the parliament promised to obviate prison sentences for Jordanian reporters 
who violate the sensibilities of government officials or other power brokers, and signed a law 
doing so (BBC, 2007), although it did not take the government long to break this promise. In 
March 2008, five Jordanian journalists were each sentenced to three months in prison for crimes 
of “defamation” and contempt of court (Reuters, 2008).  Jordanian judges can easily dole out 
“contempt of court” sentences when Jordanian law protects journalists from incarceration.  Also, 
the 2007 press and publication law still permits prison sentences of up to three years for 
journalists who directly criticize the king or royal family (Freedom House, 2008).  
When considering any of the progress Jordan has made in terms of press liberalization, 
one should remember that the country is still designated a police state by many researchers who 
point out that journalists’ limitations in the kingdom are far short of acceptable.  Despite some 
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domestic political and journalistic reforms passed by the government in the last ten years, 
Choucair-Vizoso (2006) argues that the fundamental power structure in Jordan’s government has 
remained unchanged. Power does not lie with the elected house of lower parliament, the citizenry 
or the press—nor has it ever, argues Choucair-Vizoso—but instead rests with the royal court and 
state intelligence forces.  
George (2005, p.xi) cautions that although journalism in Jordan is often “lively and 
diverse,” and that “the media are free only within the constraints of a series of overlapping and 
vaguely-worded laws that ban all criticism of the king.” In George’s view, Jordan’s somewhat 
lively and diverse press with a number of differing viewpoints should not be mistaken as a free 
and autonomous news system.  Journalists in Jordan do not have it easy; they must walk a 
precarious line, simultaneously avoiding obvious pro-government reportage that alienates them 
from Jordanian news consumers, and discordant news coverage that can be punishable when too 
critical of the king’s official policies (Wolfsfeld, Alimi & Kailani, 2007).  
Despite the fact that Jordanian news media offer a somewhat diverse range of opinions 
when compared with other Arab states, international human rights group Freedom House 
classifies the press system in Jordan as “not free,” and argues that the Jordanian press needs 
much more autonomy from the government (Freedom House, 2006).  Journalistic criticism of 
King Abdullah or any other members of the royal family is expressly and emphatically 
forbidden, as is impugning the armed forces or criticizing Jordan’s relationships with certain 
countries (Freedom House, 2007). While the organization ranks Jordan among the top three Arab 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa in terms of press liberties, the country performs 
poorly by global comparison; Jordan is ranked 128th in the world and is tied with Cambodia and 
Pakistan.  
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Ultimately, scholars of media in the Arab-Muslim world usually give Jordan a favorable 
ranking among its regional peers, but at the same time recognize the fact that progress is still 
needed. William Rugh (2004), for example, lauds the pluralistic nature of debate in many 
Jordanian newspapers, but he also describes Jordan as having a “transitional” press system, one 
at a crossroads facing either a path toward greater press liberalization or one in the direction of 
more government control.    
While the Jordanian government places numerous restrictions on its country’s news 
creators, the country’s news consumers have an easier time. If Jordanians grow tired of their 
government-cleansed domestic news, they enjoy a number of journalistic alternatives. News 
consumption patterns and news access in Jordan are now discussed in order to shed light on the 
media elements found in many Jordanians’ media diets.   
News Access and Consumption in Jordan 
Among the goals of this project was to measure the degree to which Jordanians rely on 
foreign and domestic news outlets, and to examine the association such reliance has on opinions 
of the U.S. and Jordanian governments. With these goals in mind, this section will first discuss 
four specific genres of news media in Jordan, starting with print newspapers and televised news 
broadcasts, which represent the two main vehicles for Jordanians’ news information.  Next, radio 
news programs and Internet news will be discussed. Finally, a section on foreign news outlets 
available in Jordan (such as the French newspaper Le Monde or BBC television broadcasts) is 
provided.   
While general news consumption and newspaper consumption in particular have been 
steadily falling in recent years in the United States (see Meyer, 2004), the decline has been less 
precipitous in developing countries such as Jordan.  In the absence of some of the emerging 
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electronic technologies enjoyed in the U.S. and Western Europe, Jordanians are still avid 
consumers of news in the traditional sense. One example of this is the success of one Jordanian 
daily newspaper, al-Ghad, which will be discussed below.  The paper has 35,000 subscribers in a 
country of roughly 6 million.  This would be the equivalent of an American newspaper boasting 
approximately 1.75 million at-home subscribers, something that none—including The New York 
Times and USA Today—do (note: the number of al-Ghad subscribers is 35,000; total average 
circulation figures for the newspaper are not known). By just picking up a daily newspaper in 
Jordan one can feel the vivacity of the print media industry; Jordanian newspapers are much 
heavier than American dailies, containing far more news and advertising than the increasingly 
gossamer print copies of the Washington Post, Miami Herald, and Chicago Tribune.  
While Wolfsfeld, Khouri & Peri (2002) argued that the Jordanian press suffers from low 
levels of credibility, unclear journalistic standards and inadequate training, which is true, 
Jordanian news consumers still have a growing plurality of news outlets from which to choose, 
particularly in the digital age. Despite the Jordanian government’s common resistance to 
liberalizing the country’s press system, the media landscape in Jordan appears increasingly 
diverse.  
 Cafes in Amman are frequently packed with vocal men holding a newspaper with one 
hand and gesticulating with the other, while intermittently pointing to a news show broadcast on 
a mounted TV (Martin, personal observation, spring 2006).  Minus the television, such scenes 
are not unlike those held in Western 18th Century coffeehouses fueled by the newspapers of the 
time.  Papers such as The Spectator and the Tatler, writes Mackie (1998, p.16), spurred “debate 
that was highly oral and social rather than textual and academic, and coffeehouses were the chief 
sites of this debate.” The point here is not to liken Jordanian public discourse to Western habits 
15 
of centuries past, but to emphasize the fact that Jordanians are active news consumers who 
openly debate current issues. Andoni (1995, p.25), for example, wrote that “the journalistic 
culture [in Jordan] is part of the dominating culture in the country,” in arguing how important a 
role current events information plays in the lives of Jordanians.    
It is not uncommon to see newsstands in Jordan sold out of the country’s most popular 
newspapers around lunchtime. Newspapers and TV and radio newscasts play important roles in 
the lives of many Jordanians (Martin, personal observation, spring 2006).  The phrase “the Arab 
street” that some Western pundits use as a moniker for Arab public opinion does not exist 
without reason, and some scholars (see Lynch, 2003) conceptualize the “Arab street” as the 
public sphere in which Arabs discuss current events affecting the Arab world as well as other 
regions. Lynch attributes the ongoing discussion of pan-Arab and global politics in the Arab 
street to the rise of transnational Arab television and print media, such as al-Jazeera or the pan-
Arab newspaper ah-Sharq al-Awsat. Current events in the Arab world are often dissected in 
public discussions among friends, family, or passersby in reaction to provocative news.  
Jordanians, avid news consumers and discussants, are no exception.  For these reasons, the 
questionnaire for this study includes items asking respondents if they learn news information 
from interpersonal sources, such as friends and family members.   
Print News in Jordan  
Although the history of the print press in Jordan is quite short, Jordanians are enthusiastic 
news readers. The most prominent Arabic daily newspapers in Jordan are al-Ra’i and al-Ghad. 
Al-Ra’i, Arabic for “the opinion,” was founded in 1971 and is majority-owned by the Jordanian 
government.  Al-Ra’i also publishes The Jordan Times, Jordan’s English-language daily 
newspaper (al-Shalabi & Mahafthah, 2005). Both of these outlets are known as at least partial 
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government mouthpieces that typically do not challenge the directives of the prime minister or 
parliament. Al-Ghad, on the other hand, is Jordan’s first independent and privately owned daily 
paper (Arab Press Network, 2006), and exhibits far less reverence toward the Jordanian 
parliament and other powerful institutions than do the country’s other daily papers (Martin, 
2005).  The paper is threatening to overtake al-Ra’i as the most popular daily news publication in 
Jordan, boasting more than 35,000 subscribers in a country of 6 million, according to the Arab 
Press Network.  Al-Ghad (Arabic for “tomorrow”) is also more critical of some foreign countries 
than are government-owned news publications in Jordan.  Al-Ghad is, for example, much more 
hostile to Israel than is al-Ra’i, as the former frequently expresses disapproval of the Jordanian 
government’s relationship with that country.   
Al-Ghad is written with a young educated audience in mind, covering controversial issues 
of education, gender, the government’s democratic shortfalls, and some sensitive foreign policy 
matters, according to Fattah (2005).  Fattah notes that al-Ghad frequently publishes verbatim 
letters from the Israeli ambassador to Jordan in order to highlight the two countries’ cozy 
relationship, something other Jordanian newspapers are very reluctant to do.  While al-Ghad is 
privately owned, the editorial independence of the paper is sometimes questioned, due to the fact 
that the owner, Mohamed Allayan, is married to a relative of the king.   
A third Arabic daily newspaper, al-dustour (meaning “constitution” or “charter”), is 
somewhere between al-Ra’i and al-Ghad in terms of autonomy and opposition to the 
government.  While not as loyal to the Jordanian government as al-Ra’i, al-dustour is also not 
quite similar to al-Ghad in terms of its vocal individualism.  Founded in 1967, al-dustour is the 
oldest operating daily newspaper in the country and, like al-Ra’i, the paper is partially owned by 
the government.  Al-dustour tends to be more academic in tone and publishes more ponderous 
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political analyses than does al-Rai, according to al-Shalabi and Mahafthah (2005).  In addition to 
their print product, all of the major daily newspapers in Jordan offer Web sites. 
Daily newspapers, however, are not the only print news publications in Jordan. 
According to Adam Jones (2002), since the early 1990s, Jordan has seen the rise of a tabloid 
press, sensational in its reportage but very eager to chronicle the government’s shortcomings as 
well as discuss sensitive topics like sex and Islam.  Jones cites the presence of a tabloid press in 
Jordan as evidence that the country is making strides in terms of press liberalization, although he 
notes that the government in Amman still strong-arms the press. An example of this oversight of 
tabloids was evident in 2006, when Jordanian officials removed two editors from the Shihan 
tabloid for republishing a series of Danish newspaper cartoons lampooning the prophet 
Muhammad (“Jordan editors face lawsuit,” 2006).  Still, Jones recognizes that the existence of 
tabloid newspapers in Jordan is a positive indicator of the fact that the country’s press system is 
leaving behind some of its more staid and loyalist traditions.   
While Jordanians are fairly avid newspaper consumers, based on some of the subscription 
figures available for papers such as al-Ghad, there is little evidence to suggest that print news 
magazines enjoy the same success.  This is likely due to cost, as magazines in the country can 
often cost as much as those in the U.S. Jordan Business magazine, for example, an English 
publication catering to foreign businessmen and highly educated Jordanians, costs about as much 
as Forbes magazine at any American newsstand. Weekly news magazines such as Newsweek and 
Time are available in Arabic, but again, the cost of these publications is often too high for many 
Jordanians.  To be sure, print magazines do sell in Jordan, evidenced by the fact that bookstores 
and newsstands offer them (“Emerging Jordan,” 2005).  But print magazines do not seem to be 
nearly as large a component of Jordanians’ media diets as are print newspapers.  
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Broadcast news in Jordan 
 Domestic television in Jordan has a history of state ownership, marginal quality, (Ayish, 
1989) and limited offerings. Gher and Amin reported in 1999 that Jordan had just seven TV 
stations, a number which has not changed much in the last decade. The most prominent of these 
television stations is the government-controlled Jordan Television, launched in 1968 (Gress 
1973).  The network offers general entertainment and news programs at various times of the day, 
much like a Jordanian NBC, but with no autonomy from government.  Jordan TV is paired with 
the country’s government-owned radio network, and the tandem is known as JRTV (Jordanian 
Radio and Television).   
JRTV’s Web site claims the conglomerate “caters to local and Pan Arab viewers, offering 
a transparent and diversified cultural Infotainment Television and Radio services [sic] in a 
civilized Islamic view” (JRTV, 2008).  The extent to which Jordan TV is “diversified” and 
“transparent,” however, is subject to a wide variety of opinions and, for those that disagree, pan-
Arab satellite networks can be more appealing.  Straubhaar (2007) feels that television producers 
in government-run broadcast systems still have some levels of autonomy in what they create, 
because these individuals will always push the boundaries of their superiors to some extent. 
Regardless of whether Jordanian producers do, in fact, attempt to broadcast information beyond 
the borders set by the government, many Jordanian news consumers turned years ago to 
broadcast networks of neighboring states and beyond.   
 Like citizens in a number of other Arab countries, Jordanians get much of their televised 
news via satellite from networks stationed outside the country.  More than half of the households 
in Jordan now have satellite dishes accessing dozens to hundreds of channels from other Arab 
countries and around the world (Sakr, 2007).  Many Jordanians get their TV news from the pan-
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Arab satellite networks founded in the 1990s, such as the Qatari channel al-Jazeera and the Saudi 
Arabian al-Arabiya.  “These services,” writes Muhammad Ayish (2002, p.138), “have brought to 
Arab homes not only a wider range of program choices, but also new public affairs genres that 
seem to shape television journalism practices on Arab world television.” In many Arab countries, 
these more vocal networks with higher production quality trump the often stodgy, government-
filtered news that pervades many state-run networks in Jordan and Egypt. Jordanians who watch 
al-Jazeera get a very different picture of their government’s policies than those tuning in to 
Jordan Television.  The Jordanian government is often at odds with the Qatari network, recalling 
its ambassador from Doha in 2002 and shutting down al-Jazeera’s news bureau in Amman 
because of talk-show comments made about the Jordanian royal family (Martin, 2002).  
Networks like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya are not, however, entirely autonomous. These stations 
are owned by the Qatari and Saudi Arabian governments.  They tend to be quite critical of, say, 
the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes, but much less critical of their own governments.  
 Despite the disparity in viewership and content between Jordanian television 
programming and that of pan-Arab networks, some recent developments indicate that Jordanian 
TV may soon diversify through private network ownership.  As of late, not all television and 
radio programming in Jordan is broadcast by the government or other Arab countries. In 2002, 
the King dissolved Jordan’s overbearing Ministry of Information, replacing it with the Higher 
Media Council, an organization charged with the task of encouraging domestic and international 
investment in independent Jordanian media (Sakr, 2007).  And although the Council has had a 
number of bureaucratic problems and has not realized its full potential in terms of encouraging 
media development, it is not simply a bulwark of the “old guard,” as the Information Ministry 
was.   
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In 2003, the year after the Higher Media Council was formed, the Jordanian government 
officially capitulated its decades-old monopoly on domestic TV and radio broadcasts (Freedom 
House, 2007), and in 2004 the newly created Audiovisual Licensing Authority began granting 
permits for private TV and radio stations.  The startup costs for private TV stations in Jordan 
remain out of reach even for highly solvent entrepreneurs in Jordan, but the possibility for 
private TV news is no longer implausible.   
The inception of new radio stations, though, is expanding.  Sakr reports that, by 2006, the 
Higher Media Council had granted licenses for fourteen new private radio stations, a substantial 
number given the country’s erstwhile monopoly on broadcasting.  Web radio has expanded as 
well.  Daoud Kuttab, a journalism professor from al-Quds University, recently founded Radio 
AmmanNet, an independent community radio station based solely online (Pintak, 2007).  By 
broadcasting only online, Kuttab circumvents government restrictions and is not forced to 
acquire a broadcast permit from the Higher Media Council.  
So far, though, private radio in Jordan has fared better than private TV enterprises, which 
haven’t really fared at all. The founder of al-Ghad, the Jordanian daily newspaper discussed 
above, recently acquired a license and purchased the equipment necessary to launch an 
independent TV station. At a cost of 20 million Jordanian Dinars, or about U.S. $28 million, 
Mohamed Allayan founded ATV (al-Ghad TV) in June 2007, Jordan’s first independent 
television network (Maaluf, 2007).  The network had secured the format rights for a number of 
Western entertainment programs, such as The Price is Right and Boss Swap, and was in the 
process of constructing a news agenda of interest to Jordanian viewers (Sakr, 2007).  Freedom 
House reported in 2008, however, that the station’s launch had been blocked by the government.  
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Access to International and Online News in Jordan 
Despite ongoing challenges that Jordanian journalists face, the average Jordanian news 
consumer fares much better, largely due to the fact that foreign—including American and 
European—news outlets have a visible presence throughout the country.  Jordanians seem to be 
active consumers of news from other countries.  Van Tubergen and Boyd (1986) found this to be 
the case when they conducted a media-use study among Jordanians in the 1980s, long before 
Internet communication technologies arrived in Jordan, and concluded that Jordanians in their 
sample garnered news information from many different sources, including American sources.  
This is still the case today, as Jordanians can easily access international news from both 
online and print sources. Ali (2006) found that international news stories on Jordanian TV and 
radio stations were more common than any other news topics, including stories about sports and 
domestic politics.  The weekly news magazines Time and Newsweek, for example, can be 
purchased at many newsstands in large cities like Amman and Irbid in both English and Arabic.  
Jordanians with access to satellite television—a percentage of the population that is quite high 
even among poorer citizens (Rugh, 2004)—are able to watch CNN and BBC news networks in 
Arabic and English, something many Jordanians do quite often (Mellor, 2005, p.6).  
Unlike countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran, the Jordanian government does 
not censor foreign publications and, according to Reporters without Borders (2006), Jordan is not 
known for censoring or blocking Web sites containing anti-government material. Each year, 
Reporters without Borders publishes a list of countries they feel are “enemies of the Internet” in 
terms of online censorship, and Jordan is not among them.  So far, the Jordanian government has 
not attempted to block Internet content, including sexually and politically provocative material.  
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The government has arrested a number of Jordanian bloggers and other online communicators 
for publishing incendiary speech online, but for the most part foreign content is left alone.  
Among Jordanians with Internet access, international news sources are often quite 
popular. CNN and BBC have highly popular online news sites in Arabic.  CNN draws more than 
300,000 unique visitors each month to its Arabic outfit, while BBC Arabic attracts more than 1.5 
million (Carvajal, 2006), although these figures represent Web users throughout the Arab world, 
not only those in Jordan. Jordan is, however, the most literate country in the Arab world, so, 
presumably, Jordanians are among those Arabs reading Western news in Arabic online.  Google 
News, Al-Hurra2, Reuters, BBC, and CNN all provide versions of their Web site in Arabic.  
Google offers a pan-Arab version of its news page that culls news stories from Arabic 
publications around the world, while the other three outlets generate their own news content in 
Arabic.  The first major western news organization to publish an Arabic Web site was BBC, as 
BBCarabic.com existed before September 11, 2001.  In 2002, CNN followed with its Arabic 
Web site, Arabic.CNN.com (Quinn, 2001), trailed by Google in 2006 (Moussa, 2006).  
All of these media outlets are available in Jordan, to some.  Disparity in Internet 
connectivity is a major issue in Jordan and many other Arab countries.  Yemen is the Arab 
country with the least Internet connectivity, and the UAE is the most connected Arab nation 
(Rahman, 2007), while Jordan is somewhere in between.  Internet connectivity in Arab countries, 
however, is difficult to measure and poorly defined, evidenced by a number of vague reports.  
The 2008 CIA Factbook, for example, reported that about 13 percent of Jordanians are “Internet 
users,” but noted that an Internet user could be someone who “accesses the Internet at least 
several times a week,” or “those who access it only once within a period of several months.”  
The CIA’s measure does not distinguish, then, between Jordanians with high-speed, in-home 
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broadband connections and those who visit Internet cafes a few times a week.  Other estimates of 
Internet access and users in Jordan vary, from 11 percent (Freedom House, 2007) to less explicit 
numbers of “Internet penetration” under 20 percent (Mofleh, Wanous & Strachan, 2007).  
Such broad assessments of Web access are among the problems with measuring the so-
called “digital divide” in developing countries, as it is often conceptualized in terms of those who 
have a computer and those who do not.  Warschauer (2003) argues that the digital divide is more 
of a “digital continuum,” on which news consumers may have different levels of Internet 
connectivity.  Wealthy Jordanians may, for example, have in-home broadband access, full 
Internet capabilities on their i-Phones, and a celeritous connection at their offices.  Middle-class 
Jordanians, on the other hand, may have a decent Internet connection at work and dial-up 
services at home, but no Internet capabilities on their mobile phones.   
By just about any measure, though, Jordan is one of the less connected countries in the 
world, and is one of the moderately connected countries of the Middle East.  Many of the Arab 
Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE—are ahead of Jordan in terms of Internet 
infrastructure.  Internet connectivity is improving in Jordan, however; in 2007, the government 
began selling Jordanian college students highly subsidized laptops (Mofleh et al., 2007), with 
which they can hop online at Amman’s growing number of wireless hotspots. Varying levels of 
Internet access among Jordanians is something this study addresses, as young Jordanians were 
asked detailed questions about their online news consumption habits.  
This study targeted young Jordanians for a number of reasons. First, young people 
represent a sizeable majority in the Arab world. Two thirds of the more than 300 million people 
in the Arab world are under the age of 30 (Baltaji, 2008). Arab countries such as Egypt and 
Jordan are struggling to cope with rapidly expanding populations while subsisting on finite 
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resources. Unemployment, political discontent and social disaffection run high among young 
people in the Arab world, who feel their leaders have not provided them with opportunities to 
improve their lives (Martin & Al-Bahlani, 2008).  And while both Arab and non-Arab journalists 
have chronicled this disaffection in their news copy from time to time, social scientists have only 
begun to study its origins and consequences.  
Additionally, this study focused on young Arabs because they are the demographic 
utilizing new communication technologies in Middle Eastern countries, particularly to receive 
political information and to support political causes. Just after the 2008 U.S. presidential 
election, a Jerusalem Post (Kuttab, 2008) article told the story of a young Palestinian in Gaza 
who would wait for the rolling electric blackouts in his neighborhood to end and would log on to 
Skype to call voters in Ohio and Pennsylvania and encourage them to vote for Barack Obama.  
Young Arabs are avid text message senders, and text messaging in the Arab world is common 
not only for social connections but also for political organizing. “Text messaging,” wrote Coll in 
The Washington Post (2005), “is the new tool of the political underground” in the Arab Gulf.  
The Los Angeles Times also reported this year the popularity of social networking site Facebook 
among disaffected Arab youth in Egypt, who have used the Web site to organize demonstrations 
against the government of President Hosni Mubarak (Mansour, 2008).  
It is for these reasons that this study focused on the news consumption patterns of young 
people. Young people represent the Arab majority, and they are using and consuming both new 
and old media for political ends. This study, though, is not only descriptive in nature, for it 
attempted more than an assessment of young urban Jordanians’ patterns of news consumption. 
This study also concerned political attitudes associated with young Jordanians’ news reliance. 
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The next segment discusses political socialization processes in Jordan and Jordanian news media 
as potential socializing agents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Perhaps the main reason mass communication scholars spend so much time and effort 
researching mass media messages is because they believe that exposure to such messages is 
associated with variance in human thought and behavior (McQuail, 1994, stressed this 
argument).  Mass communication scholars often concern themselves with ways in which mass 
media messages are associated with certain worldviews.  The current study involved such 
concerns, as political socialization was explored by examining the association between young 
Jordanians’ news consumption and feelings toward two governments.  
Political Socialization  
Political socialization, originally conceptualized in the 1950s, generated scores of related 
studies until the late 1970s, when research on the concept tapered off somewhat (see Niemi & 
Hepburn, 1995; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002). However, political socialization research remains 
widely cited today in political science literature and continues to generate new research on the 
ways in which citizens form political worldviews. Indeed, despite a decrease in the 1980s in the 
number of social science studies published under the aegis of “political socialization,” the 
framework would undergo revitalization in the 1990s and 2000s, as some researchers 
reexamined political socialization processes in a post-Cold War world in which nations were 
beginning to form their new political beings. Conceptualizing political development as an 
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ongoing formative process in a given society, as we will see, still has appeal to many social 
scientists.  
 Political socialization involves the shaping of an individual’s role, over time, in a 
political system. The survival of political regimes depends on the loyalty of the governed to pay 
taxes, abide by laws, vote, and refrain from popular rebellion, and so governments—as well as 
other political and social systems—employ a number of strategies to socialize individuals to 
politics and consensual governance (Graber, 2006).  Herbert H. Hyman, whose book Political 
Socialization (1959, p.25) gave name to this process, defined it as an individual’s “learning of 
social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of 
society.”   
Political socialization essentially embodies the ways in which individuals’ political 
worldview is shaped—a worldview that involves anything from patterns of political participation 
and voting, to views on government, democracy, and feelings toward specific regimes and 
administrations. (In some cases, there are labels for such a political worldview, such as an 
authoritarian worldview discussed in Adorno et al.’s The Authoritarian Personality [see below]. 
Otherwise, a political “worldview” is a rather amorphous term which can represent a number of 
different assessments—including designations from ideology [liberal, conservative, moderate] to 
party identification [libertarian, republican], political knowledge levels [informed, less informed] 
or, in the case of the current study, political attitudes [cynical, distrusting]).   
As we will see, though, early studies on political socialization/political worldview 
formation largely ignored the role of mass media in socializing processes. This is curious, 
because an interest in politically socializing influences stemmed at least partly from the Nazis’ 
ability to socialize young people to a devastating social order in the 1930s and 1940s, via 
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carefully crafted mass communication messages and propaganda. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson & Sanford’s landmark work The Authoritarian Personality (1950), for example, was 
concerned with the origins of anti-semitism and fascism in Hitler’s Germany. Adorno and 
Frenkel-Brunswik were themselves Germans who fled Hitler’s regime in the 1940s and wanted 
to know more about how fascist political personalities are formed.  Hirsch (1988) recounts that 
Hitler’s methods of politically socializing young Germans was a comprehensive scheme 
involving public education, teacher training, and carefully tailored classroom materials (i.e., 
mass communication messages) designed to malign and dehumanize minorities. Still, early 
political socialization research focused on the influence of societal agents such as family and 
schools, but not the mass communication messages distributed by those agents to children.   
Hyman similarly argued that the family, schools, and peer networks are the main forces 
that shape a person’s political outlook over time, largely ignoring media as a socializing 
institution.  A person exposed to certain political influences over time is, Hyman maintains, 
“likely to exhibit certain persistent behavior apart from transient stimulation in his contemporary 
environment,” (p.25).  The “persistent” component is an important aspect of Hyman’s definition: 
the notion that political socialization results in relatively stable attitudes which cannot typically 
be altered by exposure to ephemeral, countervailing information. Perhaps one of the more 
parsimonious and lucid definitions of political socialization comes from Sigel (1965, p.1), who 
wrote that the process “refers to the learning process by which the political norms and behaviors 
acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to generation.” 
Like Gerbner’s (1970) conceptualization of long-term television exposure in cultivation 
analyses, political socialization patterns develop over time and are not particularly vulnerable to 
day-to-day stimuli. Political socialization is essentially the cultivation of an individual’s political 
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outlook by a number of societal agents over time.  Other early researchers of political 
socialization similarly argued that the process is long-term and begins at a young age (see 
Patrick, 1968; Dawson & Prewitt, 1969). Political socialization is conceptualized as a continuous 
process throughout an individual’s lifetime.  This longevity component of political socialization 
will become more important later as the methods by which mass communication scholars have 
measured political socialization are discussed.   
Political socialization research is particularly useful to the current study, which examined 
young Jordanians’ news consumption patterns and their opinions of the U.S. government as well 
as their own.  Hyman envisioned political socialization as a relatively stable phenomenon, 
invulnerable to transient, environmental stimulation.  Opinions of one’s government are likely 
more lasting than, say, one’s current-events knowledge—an oft-used measure of political 
socialization. In fact, one could argue that an individual’s overall opinion of their government is 
a measure of political socialization in the classic sense.  That American school children recite the 
pledge of allegiance and learn in classrooms containing pictures of Lincoln and Washington 
represents efforts to convince young people that the United States is a good country worth 
standing up for.  A citizen’s views of his or her government are among the purest manifestations 
of political socialization.   
Three Forms of Political Socialization Research 
In discussing the first two decades of political socialization research, Atkin (1981) 
discusses three different ways in which the early literature defined and measured the concept: 1) 
cognitively; 2) affectively; and 3) behaviorally. Researchers examining cognitive elements of 
political socialization have measured factual political knowledge, current-events knowledge, and 
other forms of political awareness.   Affective measurements of political socialization are 
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emotional assessments such as feelings toward political actors, parties, government institutions, 
and interest in public affairs.  Behavioral measures of political socialization generally consist of 
interpersonal communication of politics and participation in politics or voting.  
The first two categories, cognitive and affective, are relevant to the discussion of the 
shortcomings of mass communication research on political socialization.  Cognitive measures 
represent the way many mass communication researchers have approached, somewhat errantly, 
studies of political socialization.  These are the measures that do not, for the most part, satisfy 
Hyman’s criteria that political socialization is a stable concept.  The second genre of political 
socialization research, affective measures, involves greater attention to Hyman’s stability 
criteria, as ratings of political institutions and parties are, presumably, less capricious than 
measures of political knowledge.   
It is this affective domain—feelings toward political institutions—that the current study 
examined, as the association between young Jordanians’ news consumption patterns and feelings 
toward the Jordanian and U.S. governments is explored.  Opinions of one’s government and of a 
foreign power are phenomena closely linked to many of the repeatedly cited definitions of 
political socialization.  Unlike their levels of current-events knowledge, Jordanians’ levels of 
support for the Jordanian government have likely developed over time and may be firmly rooted 
and defiant to fleeting, contrary stimuli.  This is where the current study differs from much of the 
literature on mass media and political socialization.  Instead of measuring a protean variable of 
interest, such as political knowledge or activity in one political campaign, this study is concerned 
with feelings about governments, which ostensibly do not fluctuate as much due to transient 
environmental stimuli.   
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Mass Communication & Political Socialization 
Most of the early writings on political socialization treated potential mass media 
influences on political development as an afterthought (Atkin, 1981; Graber, 2006). Early studies 
tended to focus on family, school systems, and peer networks as the main societal agents of 
political socialization.  Citing Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet’s seminal book The People’s 
Choice (1948), in which a “two-step flow” of mass communication effects was proposed, 
whereby a relatively small number of opinion leaders communicate the contents of media 
messages to a larger majority, Hyman implied that mass media messages do not play a major, 
direct role in political socialization processes.  Dawson and Prewitt (1969), too, cite the two-step 
flow of mass communication content from opinion leaders to the masses as evidence that familial 
institutions, as well as schools and peers, are more potent in the processes of political 
socialization.  They also claim that any political socialization messages that mass media do 
communicate originated from other agencies such as the family or public education systems.  
Langton and Jennings (1968) also relegated mass media variables to a passive role in the 
political socialization process, as media use was treated as a dependent variable and an actual 
measure of political socialization predicted by participation in high school civics curricula.  This 
secondary role for mass media in the conceptualization of political socialization would continue 
until the early 1970s, when news media began to receive recognition as important forces in 
American political socialization.  By this time, social scientists were beginning to doubt the roles 
of family and school as the main agents of political socialization, and researchers started 
including media use variables in explanations of variation in political socialization processes 
(Kraus & Davis, 1976).  
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Despite Hyman’s apparent resistance to the idea that mass media play a major role in 
political socialization, the politically socializing effects of media messages were eventually 
discussed by the light of his work in 1970. In a survey of adolescents in Wisconsin schools, 
Chaffee, Ward, and Tipton (1970) were among the first mass communication scholars to 
specifically discuss the politically socializing potential of mass media, and wrote that “analyses 
of the agencies of political socialization generally relegate the mass media to a secondary role at 
best” (p.647), behind the influences of parents, schools, and friends. Their study was correlative 
in nature, not experimental, but Chaffee et al. deserve some credit for arguing the case for media 
use variables as correlates, if not predictors of, models of political socialization processes.   
  In their study of media use and political socialization among junior and senior high 
school students, Chaffee et al. found that young people’s mass media use—particularly 
newspaper consumption—was positively associated with political knowledge and political 
activity (i.e. political campaigning).  They argue that news media do have political socialization 
potential and, therefore, should be considered in serious discussions of politically socializing 
agents.  Atkin (1981) also argued that mass media, particularly news media, wield significant 
power in political socialization processes and merit, therefore, scholarly attention.  
Since the publication of Chaffee et al.’s study, a considerable number of mass 
communication and political science scholars have researched associations between news 
consumption and political socialization measures. Garramone and Atkin (1986) identified 
politically socializing effects of news after concluding that exposure to TV news broadcasts and 
print newspaper use were strong predictors of political knowledge among adolescents.  They 
operationalized political socialization as current-events knowledge and “fundamental political 
knowledge,” or knowledge about the American political system.  Ultimately, many social 
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scientists studying political socialization processes now take mass media variables into 
consideration when developing predictive models. “Research in the 1970s,” wrote Graber (2006, 
p.11), “finally established that the media play a crucial role in political socialization.”   
Shortcomings of Research on Mass Communication & Political Socialization 
Much of the research on the associations between news consumption and political 
socialization is somewhat problematic due to the ways political socialization variables have been 
operationalized.  Atkin reported that a large number of studies of media and political 
socialization focus on “pre-adult stages of learning” (p.300) and on political or current events 
knowledge and political interest as the outcome variables.  Indeed, some of Atkin’s own research 
falls into this category, as he and Garramone (1986) examined knowledge of political issues 
among adolescents (see also Atkin & Gantz, 1978). Tan (1980) similarly studied the association 
between mass media use and political knowledge, campaign participation, and interpersonal 
political discussions.   
The tendency to equate political socialization with current-events knowledge or political 
knowledge is not just common among mass communication researchers; in general, political 
socialization researchers have focused their efforts on political knowledge, which is partly due to 
the fact that that many researchers have studied political socialization among children and 
adolescents (see Ehman, 1980; Kiousis, McDevitt & Wu, 2005), and political knowledge 
measures are easier to administer to young people than are more complex assessments.  A great 
deal of American scholarship on political socialization processes in general—not just those 
concerned with mass media influences as predictor variables—has also examined outcome 
variables such as partisan affiliations and voting behavior, to the exclusion of more static and 
complex phenomena such as political identity (Sapiro, 2004).  
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Such studies, while presenting interesting findings on news consumption as a predictor of 
political knowledge and other important outcome variables, do not satisfy a key component of 
Hyman and others’ definitions of political socialization: the relative stability of the phenomenon.  
Hyman and other early political socialization researchers, such as Patrick (1968) and Dawson et 
al. (1969), argue that political socialization is a fairly steady phenomenon, resistant to 
occasional, dissonant stimulation.  An individual’s current-events knowledge can differ from 
week to week—even day to day—depending on his or her recent levels of news attention.  
Operationalizing political socialization through political knowledge variables is also 
problematic when considering another aspect of common definitions of political socialization: 
affinitive feelings toward a political system. Political socialization agents are often described as 
forces that socialize someone to or against a certain political system.  Recall Sigel (1965, p.1), 
for example, who defined political socialization as a process by which the political norms and 
behaviors “acceptable to an ongoing political system” are transmitted from generation to 
generation” [italics mine].  Political knowledge variables do not capture a person’s feelings 
toward a political system. Conceivably, an individual may be highly knowledgeable about the 
American political system, but may not think very highly of it. An anarchist, for example, may 
know quite a bit about the workings of a certain political system.  Conversely, someone may 
possess little factual knowledge of political or current events, but may be highly socialized to 
American laws and government.   
Chaffee, Nass & Yang (1990) commit this indiscretion by operationalizing the political 
socialization of Korean-American immigrants as their knowledge of American politics.  We have 
no way of knowing if political knowledge among these immigrants is at all predictive of their 
affinitive feelings toward the American political system.  Korean-American immigrants with 
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high levels of knowledge of the political system may be not at all supportive of American 
government. More on the mark in their exploration of political socialization among young people 
are Conway, Wyckoff, Feldbaum, and Ahern (1981), who measured news consumption variables 
as predictors of support for the electoral system, support for the two-party system, in addition to 
political knowledge and political participation variables.  Conway et al. did not find direct effects 
of news consumption on political system support, but their subjects were also schoolchildren, 
who may not yet have developed feelings toward the two-party political system.  
Political knowledge, therefore, while an important element of political participation, may 
not be the best operationalization of political socialization, as it is a phenomenon that has the 
capacity to fluctuate substantially and may not measure affinitive socialization to a political 
system.  To be sure, factual political knowledge is, on some level, a component of political 
socialization, but for researchers to broadly claim they are conducting a study on political 
socialization when they are measuring only vacillating concepts is misleading.  These same 
researchers frequently define political socialization as a gradual, long-term process. Claiming 
that a seventh-grader’s level of political knowledge represents a measurement of the extent to 
which she is politically socialized is suspect.  Chaffee et al. (1970) operationalized political 
socialization in this way when they examined media use among junior high and high school 
students. Their outcome variables of interest were political knowledge and political campaigning 
activity.  
The temptation to use political knowledge measures in studies of political socialization is 
understandable.  Political or current events knowledge measures are widespread, fairly easy to 
administer and interpret, and they are usually highly associated with news consumption 
variables. For similar reasons, interest in politics is often used as a measure of political 
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socialization. News consumption variables are also associated in strong ways with measures of 
political interest.  An individuals’ interest in politics, however, may be ephemeral and 
susceptible to the transient stimulation Hyman claimed does not greatly affect political 
socialization.  
An American voter may be highly interested in politics during a U.S. presidential 
campaign, not because she has been politically socialized over the years to be interested in 
politics in a general sense, but because she becomes more attentive to politics during a  national 
election. Now, this person may have been politically socialized over the course of her life to 
believe that presidential elections are important and therefore worthy of attention, but this is a 
very specific form of political socialization, and if a researcher is interested in examining 
political socialization to presidential elections, he or she needs to say this.   
More Contemporary Research on Media & Political Socialization 
Despite leveling all of these criticisms at mass communication scholars who have studied 
political socialization in sometimes problematic ways, I must acknowledge that, when political 
socialization research resurged in the 1990s and 2000s, the operationalization of dependent 
variables improved somewhat. Researchers appear less likely to focus exclusively on political 
knowledge or candidate preference. Instead, as we will see, some scholars were more likely to 
examine outcomes such as political authoritarianism, tolerance for divergent viewpoints, and 
interest in expressing political opinions in conversations with other people.  
Also laudably, political socialization researchers have begun to explore politically 
socializing agents in a greater variety of cultural and national contexts. Undoubtedly, some 
reasons for such internationalization are due to the greater ease in communicating across nations 
and cultures in the information age and the greater travel mobility that has characterized the post-
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Cold War world. Still, the efforts of political socialization scholars to better internationalize their 
scholarly corpus is noteworthy and commendable (see Chaffee et al., 1997 for a good example of 
a political socialization researcher who, in previous years, focused mainly on political 
socialization processes in the United States but, during the recent resurgence, internationalized 
the scope of inquiry).  
The Recent Resurgence in Media & Political Socialization Research 
 While the late 1970s and 1980s saw a decline in the number of social science researchers 
who used political socialization as a framework to guide their research, there was somewhat of a 
return to the framework in the 1990s and 2000s (Dudley & Gitelson, 2002). One reason for this 
was that some scholars were interested in studying political learning processes in developing 
nations with new political systems in the post-Cold War era (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995).  Other 
scholars, such as Michael McDevitt (see McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002), seemed to recognize that 
examining the formation of citizens’ political selves became even more interesting and 
important, if complicated, in the information age. More modern research has been, in some 
cases, marked by a number of methodological and operational improvements. Namely, recent 
scholarship on mass media and political socialization has been characterized by discussions of 
new media forms such as news Web sites and blogs, more stable operationalizations of outcome 
variables, and a greater number of studies examining media and political socialization around the 
world.  
Political scientists and mass communication scholars have begun studying political 
socialization processes anew in the digital age. In 2009, the journal Political Communication 
published a special issue on “Communication and Political Socialization.” The issue addressed, 
among other topics, the role of media and political socialization outcomes in the digital media 
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age.  Pasek, Kenski, Romer & Jamieson (2006) studied the impact of new media use on civic 
engagement, finding that overall Internet use is associated with greater levels of civic 
participation, a finding that counters many of the arguments Robert Putnam (2001) made 
regarding technological isolation in his widely cited book Bowling Alone. Similarly, Romer, 
Jamieson and Pasek (2009) found that informational Internet use (i.e. use of the Internet for non-
entertainment purposes) was positively associated with civic engagement among a national 
sample of 1,800 adolescents and young adults. (See also Shah, McLeod & Lee, 2009, for an 
exploration of media use variables, including Internet news consumption, on political 
participation, political consumerism and civic participation).   
Similarly, Lee (2006) studied the relationship between college students’ Internet use and 
feelings of political efficacy, finding that online news consumption was strongly associated with 
internal political efficacy, a kind of political self confidence.  Dunsmore and Lagos (2008) 
studied the politically socializing effects on high school students of producing a news video 
segment, research that has important applications to emerging trends in citizen journalism. 
Increasingly, researchers interested in political socialization processes are applying their research 
framework to forms of electronic and new media.  
 Not only has recent scholarship begun to examine new media forms and political 
socialization outcomes, but it has also included more research sites outside the U.S. and Western 
Europe. Chaffee, Murdochowicz and Galperin (1997), for example, studied the relationship 
between local newspaper use and political tolerance and support for democracy among 5th and 6th 
grade Argentines. Newspaper use was tested experimentally in this study. Students baseline 
political attitudes were measured prior to the implementation of a newspaper in education 
program. Newspaper use was found to increase political tolerance and support for democratic 
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ideals.  In another international study, Kim & Johnson (2006) surveyed Internet use and political 
socialization outcomes among Koreans prior to a major national election. They found that 
reliance on independent, Web-based newspapers was a better predictor of political interest and 
political involvement than was reliance on print newspapers. Liebes (1992) studied television 
viewing and political socialization variables in Israeli families.  
 Perhaps more important than either a focus on new media influence on political 
socialization measures or more examples of international research on media as politically 
socializing agents, communication scholars conducting recent political socialization research 
have begun measuring more stable outcome variables. Pfau, Moy & Szabo (2001), for example, 
measured the associations between television entertainment and news viewing on feelings 
toward the federal government and the executive branch. These are just the kind of affinitive 
outcome variables Sigel (1965) was referring to when he discussed political beliefs “acceptable 
to a political system.”  
Eyal et al. (2006) studied the relationship between viewing of violent TV content and 
“aggressive” political opinions, such as feelings toward vigilantism and how society should deal 
with criminals. Pasek et al. (2006) were concerned with media use and civic engagement 
(membership in a civic group, volunteering). Chaffee et al. (1997) measured the association 
between adolescents’ participation in a civics program containing news-consumption activities 
and levels of political tolerance. Again, these are, mostly, stable political outcome variables to 
which Sigel referred and that go beyond mere assessments of political knowledge.  
Despite methodological and operational improvements in some of the contemporary 
scholarship on mass media and political socialization, however, it is important to point out that 
not all the research in these areas has contributed to the gains. Eveland, McLeod & Horowitz 
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(1998; see also Niemi & Junn, 1998), for example, operationalized political knowledge as their 
lone political socialization outcome variable, perpetuating some of the main problems in media 
and political socialization research from the 1970s and 1980s. Political socialization outcomes 
should not be loosely defined as any plus or minus change in levels of any political variable, 
such as recall of political facts or interest in political information. Based on oft-cited scholarly 
research defining political socialization processes, prosocial or antisocial outcome variables 
seem to be more fitting and appropriate. 
While no research in the new and somewhat improved wave of contemporary scholarship 
on media and political socialization looks into related processes in Jordan or other Arab 
countries, there are still a number of examples of how mass communication messages are 
disseminated in Jordan for the purpose of politically socializing the populace to certain ideals. 
While political socialization processes in Jordan have yet to be explored, a number of examples 
of mass media messages and political socialization programs in the country can be identified.   
Political Socialization & Mass Communication in Jordan 
In Jordan, as in most countries in which news media are at least partially controlled by 
the state, the press is supposed by the government to play a role in political socialization. 
Presumably, the main reasons governments exert power over media practitioners (other than lust 
for fiscal profits from media, which are often fleeting in developing countries) is to control the 
perceived effects of political messages on the governed and to maintain popular support for 
political leaders.  Jordan is certainly no exception.  PETRA, Jordan’s state news agency, for 
example, is a news copy generator on which most of the country’s daily newspapers consistently 
rely, and one that rarely strays from government positions.    
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The demographic makeup of the country may make political socialization processes 
essential for the survival of the monarchy. Approximately 56 percent of Jordanian residents are 
of Palestinian descent (Ryan, 2002), many of whom view their stints in Jordan as temporary until 
the formation of a Palestinian state.   Another 14-16 percent of residents are Iraqi refugees from 
the second U.S.-led war in the Arabian Peninsula (Black, 2007).  Without mechanisms in place 
to socialize residents in Jordan to the country’s political system and to the monarchy, the 
government’s legitimacy and authority would be in doubt.   
While the press in Jordan does not exist solely as a loyalist pawn of the government—
after all, journalists have some freedom to criticize government ministries or resolutions passed 
by parliament and to identify national problems—political socialization efforts in Jordanian 
media outlets are not hard to identify.  The most obvious examples involve coverage of the 
Jordanian king and royal family.  The king is always referred to in news stories as “His Majesty 
King Abdullah II” and usually greets morning newspaper readers above the fold and on page 
one, smiling in a favorable photograph.  His wife, the beautiful Queen Rania al-Abdullah, is 
often pictured with him.  The al-Ra’i newspaper has a permanent, stylish picture of Abdullah and 
Rania on its homepage, below which is a permanent link to the king’s official Web site (al-Ra’i, 
2008).  Negative news of the king is almost never published, and Jordanian editors who violate 
this code go to prison.   
Use of mass media messages for other purposes of political socialization exists in Jordan, 
too, and one needs to look no further than the “Jordan First” campaign to identify attempts at 
mass political socialization.  The “Jordan First” campaign was unveiled by the country’s Foreign 
Ministry in October 2002 in order to convince Jordanians to put the country above all other 
interests. According to King Abdullah, the campaign was an effort to encourage Jordanians to 
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put the interests of the country ahead of pan-Arab interests. “Jordan First,” the King said when 
the campaign was introduced, was created to “mold Jordanian men and women in a unified 
social fiber that promotes their sense of loyalty to their homeland, and pride in Jordanian, Arab 
and Islamic identity” (Basu, 2002).  The King’s statement harkens back to the early definitions 
of political socialization of Hyman and others that describe politically socializing processes as 
long-lasting influences that orient a people to a certain political system. The Jordan First 
campaign was created to shore up support for the monarchy and other powerful elites and, as 
political scientist Curtis Ryan (2004, p.58) argues, “Jordan First” may amount to little more than 
a “regime security first campaign.”   
Mass media messages were a central part of the Jordan First public relations campaign. 
Emad Hajjaj, political cartoonist for the al-Ghad newspaper and one of the most popular 
cartoonists in the Arab world, was conscripted to draw trendy logos for the operation. One such 
logo pictures two interlocking fists and forearms in the geographical shape of the country and 
decorated with the colors of the Jordanian flag. Please see Figure 1 for an illustration of this 
image.  
(Insert figure 1 about here) 
This emblem became particularly widespread in Jordan after al-Qaida suicide bombers 
killed 60 people at three Amman hotels in November 2005.  The government also purchased 
billboard advertisements throughout Amman emblazoned with some of Hajjaj’s emblems, 
including one such billboard in the center of one of the capital’s busiest intersections.     
Anecdotal evidence speculating about the politically socializing role Jordanian news 
media play, however, does not represent a sufficient discussion of political socialization in that 
country. Are news media in Jordan a politically socializing force? Are media campaigns such as 
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the Jordan First initiative associated with support for the Jordanian government? Is consumption 
of news from domestic sources versus international outlets associated with greater animosity 
toward outside (such as American) governments? No one is privileged to answer such questions, 
as political socialization processes in Arab states have gone grossly understudied since Hyman 
introduced the concept in the 1950s. Empirical research on political socialization processes in 
Jordan and other states is needed in order to begin to address such questions.  
While one may assume that Jordanian mass media help socialize Jordanians to domestic 
politics, this is not a foregone conclusion, and certainly the strength of such an association is not 
either.  Scholars should not presume that the Jordanian press functions as a political socialization 
mechanism in the same ways as it does in other developing countries or in Western countries.  Of 
course, the current study does not explore the efficacy of the Jordan First campaign nor the 
monarchy’s specific efforts to swell its levels of public support, but instead broadly examines 
news consumption and popular opinions of government. This study is a step toward a greater 
understanding of mass communication and political socialization processes in an important Arab 
country.   
Research on news consumption and political socialization in Arab countries is needed for 
the purposes of greater global, comparative understanding. Dawson & Prewitt (1969) wrote that, 
although political socialization may have some universal characteristics, political socialization 
undoubtedly differs from one country to another. A more complete understanding of processes of 
political socialization demands an investigation of such processes in more of the world’s corners, 
especially those outside the U.S. and Western Europe.   
Some of the reasons our understanding of media and political socialization may benefit 
from surveying Jordanians relate to some of the core assumptions of media and political 
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socialization processes. First, one of assumptions, dare I say conclusions, of media and political 
socialization research since the 1970s and 1980s is that media influences are an important agent 
in political socialization processes, right alongside families, peers, and educational systems.  
Graber (2006) maintained that mass communication research in the 1970s and 1980s 
“established” media influences as important politically socializing agents.  But the 
“establishment” that Graber discusses mostly refers to political socialization processes in the 
United States. The simple truth is that political communication scholars do not know whether 
media use plays as important a role in political socialization processes throughout the world as it 
does in the United States. Particularly in Eastern countries like Jordan in which family and peer 
networks are often more close-knit than in the United States (Nydell, 2006), reliance on 
interpersonal sources for information may trump the influence of mass media. The near-universal 
nature of Graber’s assumption—that media reliance can help explain the formation of political 
identity—demands that we conduct media and political socialization research in a more universal 
fashion.   
McLeod and Blumler (1987) called this theoretical liberalism the problem of “false 
universality,” or at least dubious universality, in which theoretical propositions are pre-supposed 
to hold across time and across all cultural contexts. The universality of agenda setting or 
cultivation hypotheses in non-Western countries has been demonstrated to a much larger extent 
than has the hypothesis that media influences match familial or social influences in the formation 
of political dispositions. It is for this reason that some non-mass communication researchers 
studying political socialization processes outside the Western world still, to this day, ignore 
media use variables in their analyses (see Leung, 2006 for example, who explored “schooling” 
factors influencing political socialization of secondary students in Hong Kong, but excluded 
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mass media variables). Thus, the universality of Graber’s assumption is not necessarily ingrained 
in the minds of all political socialization researchers outside media and communication 
disciplines. In a small way, the results of the current study will either counter or support the 
theoretical universality assumed in Graber’s statement. That is, her statement will be supported if 
media use variables in the sample are associated with political attitudes at levels equal or greater 
than the interpersonal measures used in the study.  
Additionally, since political socialization was, and still is, largely demonstrated through 
surveying young people in a political system, this study is a good starting point for political 
socialization research in an Arab country. While it is true that political socialization takes place 
across the life span, not just among the young, most of the theorizing about political socialization 
processes, including the roles mass media play, have capped examinations of the political 
attitudes of young people. So, while political socialization research should certainly not be 
limited to studies of young people, it might be out of place to begin an initial theoretical 
exploration of media and political socialization processes in Jordan by surveying, say, older 
news consumers. For this reason, the current study surveys news use and political attitudes 
among the age demographic from which political socialization assumptions have largely been 
drawn.  
Overall, the above review of literature on the Jordanian press system and media and 
political socialization research attempted to outline the media environment in Jordan, including 
press laws, journalistic limitations, and news choices available to Jordanian news consumers, and 
also to discuss political socialization scholarship, laying the foundation for a related study in an 
Arab country. Visibly absent in the literature is contemporary survey research assessing news 
consumption among Jordanians.  For this reason, the first two research questions deal strictly 
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with news consumption patterns. In terms of political socialization, the findings from the 
literature also seem to indicate that the most appropriate political socialization outcome variables 
would not be constructs such as political knowledge or political interest, but more seemingly 
stable variables such as political trust and political cynicism. Research questions three and four 
deal with these variables.   
Research Questions 
The main questions this study asked are found below.  After each item is a brief 
paragraph describing the question and discussing its place in this study.   
RQ1: On what news formats do young Jordanians primarily rely for news information? 
What are the patterns of reliance on newspapers, magazines, televised news, radio, online news 
outlets, blogs, podcasts, cell phone text messages and interpersonal sources for information?  
This first question was the project’s starting point and was answered by gauging 
respondents’ reliance on a wide array of news media, including but not limited to newspapers, 
satellite television channels, radio, electronic newspapers, blogs, and cellular phone text 
messages.  Respondents were asked which media they rely on for news information (newspapers 
vs. radio broadcasts) and were also be asked to specify which outlets they access (al-Ghad vs. 
Voice of Amman radio, e.g.) 
In a developing country, it is presumed that many citizens rely on print newspapers for 
much of their media diets, but it is also possible that Middle Eastern citizens are increasingly 
accessing electronic news sources in both Arabic and English.  This first question assesses the 
accuracy of these suspicions. 
RQ2: How much foreign and domestic news do young Jordanians generally consume? 
For each of the media forms listed in Research Question 1 (newspapers, magazines, television, 
47 
radio, online communication), how much of the news content, by respondents’ estimation, 
involves domestic versus international events?  
Evidence suggests news audiences in Arab countries are more likely than Americans to 
consume international news, whether from domestic or foreign news outlets (Mellor, 2005).  In 
many cases, it is safer for journalists in autocratic regimes to cover and criticize the governments 
of foreign countries than their own.  This question examined levels of foreign and domestic news 
young Jordanians attend to.     
RQ3: How is news consumption among young Jordanians related to feelings toward the 
governments of Jordan and the United States? Specifically:  
RQ3(a): Is reliance on newspapers, magazines, radio, television, interpersonal sources 
and the Internet for news independently associated with variance of measures of political 
cynicism?  
RQ3(b): Is reliance on newspapers, magazines, radio, television, interpersonal sources 
and the Internet for news independently associated with variance of measures of political trust?  
RQ3(c): Is reliance on newspapers, magazines, radio, television, interpersonal sources 
and the Internet for news independently associated with variance of feelings toward the U.S. 
government?  
American policy makers have long tried to understand the provenance of sentiments 
toward the U.S. among Arabs.  This question partly addressed this need, as it pertains to news 
consumption.  A lot has been made of falling global opinions of the United States in the last 
several years, and of restoring perceptions of the United States among peoples of the world. As 
the United States tries to continue its role as a world leader, to gain or regain the trust of foreign 
nations, to contribute to global political cooperation, and to resolve assorted international 
48 
conflicts, it is important for the country to have a substantial cache of affinitive capital among 
the people of the world. These are the reasons research question three is being asked. The 
opinions people of the world harbor for the United States play a major role in the country’s 
ability to achieve many of its highest goals.  
Wanta et al. (2004) found that news coverage of foreign nations had the capacity to 
dramatically affect news consumers’ feelings toward those nations and, for this reason, this 
research question asked, “of the media forms upon which Jordanians rely for international news 
information, which media are most associated with sentiments toward the United States?” 
This research question also involves associations between Jordanian news consumption 
and attitudes toward Jordanian leadership. “Is television news consumption associated with 
young Jordanians’ opinions of the Jordanian government?” is the nature of the question 
addressed here.    
RQ4: Which demographic variables, if any, are associated with both young Jordanians’ 
news consumption and feelings toward the U.S. & Jordanian governments? Specifically, are any 
of the demographic variables (age, gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality and education) 
significantly associated with political trust, political cynicism and feelings toward the U.S. 
government?   
This question examined the association of education, age, ethnicity, religion and gender 
with the political socialization measures. These variables were employed as control variables in 
multiple regression models examining the partial associations between news consumption and 
political attitude variables.  
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RQ5: Do the correlations between news consumption and political cynicism, political 
trust and feelings toward the U.S. government change when media credibility is included as a 
control variable?   
Respondents were asked to identify the extent to which they trust the accuracy of the 
information provided by Jordanian and foreign news sources.  Scale items come from Meyer’s 
(2004) chapter on media credibility in his book, The Vanishing Newspaper, and were assessed on 
a seven-point scale. Mellor (2005) claims that trust of mass media in Arab countries is a serious 
issue and it should be considered in examinations of journalism in the Arab world.  Jordanians 
may read al-Ghad daily but may not have the same faith a Manhattan reader of the New York 
Times places in that publication.  
Presumably, levels of media credibility may moderate the association between news 
consumption patterns and political socialization outcomes. The concern here is that a young 
person may read a Jordanian print newspaper every day, but if she is skeptical of the 
newspaper’s credibility, the newspaper’s association with some outcome variables may be 
somewhat diminished. Druckman (2001), for example, found that framing effects of newspaper 
exposure were much more likely when experiment participants believed the newspaper content 
to which they were exposed came from a credible source. Holding media credibility constant, 
then, may make some of the relationships between news consumption and political attitudes ore 
clear.   
  
CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
In order to answer the research questions posed in this study, a pen and paper survey 
measuring news consumption and political attitudes was administered to 321 18-35 year olds in 
Amman, Jordan. The survey was available in both Arabic and English. In cases when a 
respondent was illiterate, (s)he was asked to complete the survey orally. Intercept sampling in 
eight districts around Amman was employed to reach and recruit respondents. I traveled to 
public places (public thoroughfares, sidewalks, shopping centers, cafes, parks) and in each of the 
eight districts approached potential respondents. Please see Appendices D and E, respectively, 
for English and Arabic versions of the recruitment script used when potential respondents were 
approached.   
Intercept sampling has been a common method of sampling harder-to-reach populations 
and urban groups since the late 1970s (Sudman, 1980; Bush & Hair, 1985).  It is particularly 
popular in marketing and consumer research, as private research firms often make inquiries of 
customers in department stores and shopping malls (see Yoo, et al., 2007). Intercept sampling is 
often attractive in developing countries where, Seligson (2005) points out, face-to-face surveying 
is often the most favored method of data collection.   
Intercept sampling was used for a number of reasons, some of which relate to security, 
others to financial and time constraints.  While random-digit dialing in Jordan would be possible 
in order to reach some respondents on both land telephones and mobile phones, very few 
Jordanians are accustomed to being contacted by telephone for the purposes of public opinion 
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research (D3 Systems analyst Karl Feld, personal communication, August 19, 2008).  Their 
skepticism toward the researcher, especially when contacted by a Western-accented Arabic 
speaker by telephone, could have potentially been a fatal barrier to this project.  Another problem 
of telephone surveys in developing countries involves the ubiquity of mobile phones as opposed 
to land telephones.  Due to government taxes and weak telecommunication infrastructure, many 
citizens of developing nations use mobile phones that charge a fee per minute of domestic use. 
Many Jordanians are neither willing nor able to afford to complete a survey when contacted on 
their mobile phones.   
An online survey, too, would present problems. Just 13-20 percent of the population in 
Jordan has consistent Internet access (Freedom House, 2007). Ghashghai & Lewis (2002) note 
that, although there are places in the Middle East where levels of Internet access are high, most 
of the region lags behind other regions in terms of Internet connectivity.  Aside from the 
problems of the digital divide, attempting to conduct this project via e-mail could also be 
prohibitive for reasons of recipient skepticism as well as the fact that e-mail lists would be 
extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain. 
 While non-probability sampling is, for a number of reasons, not the most desirable way to 
collect data from a population, there is scholarly precedence for non-random data collection in 
Middle Eastern countries due to many of the challenges mentioned above. Clark (2006) surveyed 
55 political scientists who have conducted research among human populations in Middle Eastern 
countries, 89 percent of whom relied at least partly on non-probability sampling methods such as 
snowball sampling or chain referral sampling. Similarly, Tessler and Nachtwey (1998) collected 
public opinion samples from Kuwait and Egypt, both of which were nonrandom in nature. When 
sampling in developing countries, scholars sometimes have to settle for non-probability data due 
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to financial or security constraints. Kousha & Mohseni (2000) collected a large non-probability 
sample of Iranians using snowball sampling methods, assessing their levels of happiness and 
general life satisfaction.  
Reynolds, Simintiras and Diamontopoulos (2002) claim that the most common criticism 
of international survey research involves the non-random characteristics of data collection 
procedures.  However, they also write that strict probability sampling in developing countries is 
often a luxury afforded a small number of researchers (such as heavily funded organizations like 
the IMF and World Bank), and non-probability methods are often the only course of data 
collection for scholars with slimmer research coffers.  Data collection for this study yielded to 
some of the financial and practical limitations involved in collecting data in a country like 
Jordan.   
Intercept sampling in a developing country introduced a number of issues that had to be 
addressed in this study. First was the issue of group responses. A potential bias in surveying in 
Arab countries involves group responses, in which survey respondents collaborate with friends 
or relatives to answer questionnaire items. Farah (1987) found that group responses to survey 
questions were common in Arab countries, which are more community-oriented than some 
Western cultures. She found, for example, that when survey researchers interviewed respondents 
in Arab countries, friends or family members of the respondent would blurt out responses, 
thereby contaminating some of the data she collected. In most cases, I tried to intercept single 
individuals or those in pairs. This greatly reduced, and virtually eliminated, the problem of group 
responses. In a few cases, respondents in pairs started to collaborate and compare answers on the 
survey. In this case, I kindly asked them to complete the survey without deliberating with their 
companion.   
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Another issue involved including refugees in the study. More than two million Iraqi 
refugees are living outside Iraq in the Middle East, primarily in Jordan and Syria. Jordan has 
absorbed more than 700,000 of these refugees, according to the Institute for the Study of 
International Migration at Georgetown University (Fagen, 2007), increasing the country’s total 
population by more than 17 percent. A few of the respondents in my survey (6 persons) were 
Iraqi immigrants or refugees. As they are for the most part at this time a permanent portion of the 
Jordanian population, I included them in the survey.  Immigrants and refugees from other 
countries who are permanent residents in Jordan were included, too, including individuals from 
Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Kurdistan, and Armenia.   
Lastly, two major geopolitical events transpired during data collection in Jordan. For the 
first two weeks of data collection, the Israeli-Hamas war was being fought in the Gaza Strip. The 
reality of current events in the Middle East, though, is that there are often environmental stimuli 
in the form of political or military conflicts in the region. Such stimuli are more of a political 
constant than an exception.  Sadly, the Middle East is a region in which there has been armed 
conflict of one kind or another going on for much of the last 60-plus years, and this is one of the 
reasons some social scientists choose to study the region’s characteristics. While it is possible 
that the war could have affected Jordanians’ feelings toward the U.S.—with whom they associate 
Israel’s military might and actions—it seems less likely that the conflict would have altered or 
affected Jordanians ratings of their country’s government and politicians. Still, the war in Gaza 
was an elevation of violence even for the tragic Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and I must disclose 
the possibility that the war could have influenced ratings of the U.S. government.  
The second major geopolitical event involved the inauguration of U.S. President Barack 
Obama, which came in the middle of data collection efforts.  Twelve days of the overall data 
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collection were prior to Barack Obama’s inauguration, and 13 days of data collection fell after. 
In order to determine whether the change in presidential administrations had any immediate 
impact on Jordanians’ ratings of the U.S. government (the variables related to which made no 
mention of the words “president” or “administration”), independent samples t-tests were 
conducted for the three outcome variables of interest (political trust, political cynicism, and 
feelings toward the U.S. government) to compare pre and post inaugural scores. Respondents’ 
pre/post inaugural scores on the political trust [t(313)= 1.36, p=.175 (two-tailed)], political 
cynicism [t(311)= - 1.79, p=.074 (two-tailed)], and ratings of the U.S. government [t(309)= - 
1.27, p=.206 (two-tailed)] scales did not differ significantly. Prior to data collection, the main 
concern regarding pre-post inaugural scores was in terms of ratings of the U.S. government. The 
independent-samples t-test reported here suggests that the inaugural of Barack Obama did not 
immediately influence respondents’ ratings of the United States.   
Instrument and Variables 
The questionnaire was a paper survey available in Arabic and English, although just three 
individuals opted to complete the survey in the latter language. The survey contained a total of 
73 questions on nine sheets of paper, and took anywhere from 10-18 minutes to complete. Data 
were collected in January 2009. Please see appendices D and E, respectively, for English and 
Arabic versions of the survey.   
 Prior to the beginning of formal data collection, the English and Arabic versions of the 
survey tool were tested among Arabs in Chapel Hill, North Carolina and Amman. A handful of 
native Arabic speakers were asked to proof the survey in either Arabic or English and to provide 
feedback on the survey tool and identify any errors (translational, grammatical, or otherwise) 
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they noticed. Based on their recommendations, the survey tool was tweaked for a few minor 
issues related to clarity and grammar.    
Independent variables in this study consisted of news consumption measures (or news 
attention measures) and, as such, yielded self-report data vulnerable to problems commonly 
associated with behavioral self-assessments, such as impression management and recall errors. 
However, news consumption/attention variables have been shown to be useful, valid variables 
when used to measure “general attention to broad, enduring categories of news,” (Chaffee & 
Schleuder, 1986, p.102).   
The initial survey questions assessed respondents’ media reliance, and included broad 
items such as, “On average, how many days each week do you read a printed newspaper?” as 
well as much more specific questions like, “How often do you read news on the Web?” or “Do 
you ever receive current events news through text messages on a mobile phone?”  News 
consumption items included questions involving traditional media, such as newspapers and 
television news broadcasts, but also assessed use of more contemporary media, such as blogs and 
podcasting.   
 The second main function of the survey tool was to gauge young respondents’ feelings 
toward Jordanian and U.S. governments, and items doing so were in the form of Likert-scales, as 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with statements like, “I feel 
confident in the government’s ability to run its national programs.” Regression models were used 
to determine the extent to which patterns of news consumption are associated with assessments 
of government.  In addition to these variables, respondents were asked to report a number of 
demographic indicators, such as age, sex, education level, religion and ethnicity (Palestinian, 
Jordanian, or Armenian, for example).   
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News Consumption Variables 
Variables in this study measuring news consumption might better be described as “news 
attention variables,” for one cannot be certain through self-reports that someone who is attending 
to a news outlet (i.e. sitting near a television broadcasting news content) is consuming that 
content.  As Chaffee and Schleuder (1986) noted, news attention variables have been shown to 
be sound predictors of many different outcome variables when used broadly. Asking someone 
how many days each week he or she reads financial news in the newspaper is, for example, a 
better use of media attention variables than is, say, asking him or her how much attention he/she 
pays to news coverage of inflation.  
Overall news consumption/attention variables in this study assessed reliance on a wide 
variety of media. News consumption was largely assessed using three main questions:  
1) Initially, respondents were asked how many days each week they access a certain media 
format (read print newspapers, read print magazines, watch televised news, listen to news over 
the radio, read news online, access blogs, receive news text messages, and download podcasts);  
2) Respondents were asked to report how much time they typically spend accessing a format 
each time they utilize it; 3) Respondents were asked to specifically list their top three news 
outlets (Al-Jazeera, CNN, BBC for TV, e.g.) for each format.  
Additionally, respondents were asked to indicate whether specific outlets they access are 
English-language news sources or are in Arabic, and were asked to try to quantify the amount of 
news they access from each media format, on average, that deals with domestic events in Jordan 
and how much news involves events from outside the country.  In order to add a bit of context to 
the discussion of quantitative data collected in this study, the questionnaire also contained open-
ended questions involving news use. Two questions (“In your own words, please explain how 
57 
news plays--or does not play--a role in your everyday life,” and “Do you feel the need to learn 
about news and current events on a daily basis? Why or why not?”) were positioned toward the 
end of the survey, just prior to the demographic questions. Some of the responses to these 
questions are used to provide context during the discussion of findings for the news consumption 
measures.  
Print Outlets. Respondents were first asked to indicate how many days in an average 
week they read a print newspaper(s) or magazine. Next, respondents were asked how much time 
they usually spend reading a print newspaper or magazine on a typical day. They were then 
asked which three newspapers and which three magazines, if any, they read the most, listed in 
order from most often to less often. They were asked if the paper is a daily or weekly publication 
(or, in the case of magazines, monthly or quarterly). Respondents were asked if the publication is 
in English or Arabic.  
To assess international news attention, respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 
one to ten how much of the content they read in print newspapers and, separately, in print 
magazines, is news about the country of Jordan. Respondents were told that a response of 
“seven” would indicate that approximately 70 percent of the news they read in print newspapers 
is predominantly about domestic events, while thirty percent is about events in other countries. 
This question was repeated for each media genre (broadcast, online) respondents reported 
attending to.  
Traditional Broadcast Outlets. Respondents were asked to indicate how many days in the 
average week they watch televised news and listen to radio news. They were then asked how 
long they typically spend watching televised news broadcasts each time they access them.  They 
were asked to specify which three TV networks and which three radio networks they watch/listen 
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to the most. They were also asked if they watch or listen to these broadcasts in English or Arabic. 
Respondents were also asked to indicate, on a one-to-ten scale, the amount of domestic televised 
and radio news they consume as opposed to news of other countries.  
Online & Wireless Outlets. Respondents were asked if they ever access news online or 
via mobile devices, such as cell phones and iPods, and how frequently and how long they 
typically access news in each format. They were asked to list the top three Web sites, top three 
blogs, and top three news sites from which they receive text messages/podcasts (if any). They 
were asked if these sources are published or broadcast in English or Arabic. Again, respondents 
were asked to indicate on a scale of ten how much of the news they consume in these various 
digital formats involves events in Jordan as opposed to news from other countries.  
Interpersonal Variables. Respondents were asked how frequently they learn news 
information from friends and family. The interpersonal items included on the questionnaire were 
the following four questions: 1) How often would you say you learn about news information 
from speaking with friends?; 2) How often would you say you learn about news information 
from speaking with family/relatives?; 3) How often would you say you learn about news 
information by communicating with friends online?; 4) How often would you say you learn 
about news information by communicating with family/relatives online? These interpersonal 
items were adapted from those used on political communication questionnaires by researchers of 
the Uvote project, a consortium of researchers from more than 30 colleges and universities who 
measure news consumption and political attitudes among young people in the U.S. each major 
election cycle (see Tedesco, McKinney & Kaid, 2007 for a description of Uvote data collection 
processes during the 2004 presidential campaign). Cronbach’s alpha for these four items was .70.  
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Governmental Assessment Variables 
 The second major set of variables assessed respondents’ feelings toward the Jordanian 
and U.S. governments.  More specifically, measures of political cynicism, government trust, and 
ratings of the U.S. government evaluated young Jordanians’ feelings toward their own 
government and that of the United States. Political scientists, concerned with what a cynical, 
distrusting public means for participatory democracy, have been examining political cynicism 
and governmental trust since the 1960s (see Agger, Goldstein & Pearl, 1961, for a good example 
of one of these early studies). Cynicism “saps the public's confidence in politics and government, 
and encourages the assumption that what we see is not what it seems” (Cappella & Jamieson, 
1996, p.72). In addition to the political cynicism and political trust measures, respondents were 
asked one open-ended question (“In your own words, please explain how you feel about 
politics,”) in order to help provide some context in the discussion of the quantitative data 
collected in this study. Some of the respondents’ answers to this question are included in the 
discussion of this study’s findings.  
 Political Cynicism. The first set of government-assessment variables were used to 
measure respondents’ feelings toward the Jordanian government.  Scale items were adapted from 
political cynicism variables used by the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center in its 
National Election Studies. These variables have been used by political scientists and political 
communication scholars to assess political cynicism in a variety of settings (Banwart, 2007). 
Respondents were asked to agree/disagree with the following three statements on a seven-point 
scale: 1) Whether I vote or not has no influence on what politicians do; 2) People like me have a 
say about what the government does; 3) One never knows what governmental officials are 
thinking.   
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 Political Trust. To measure respondents’ trust in the Jordanian government, four items 
from the National Election Studies and one from Lock, Shapiro and Jacobs (1999) were included 
on the survey tool and assessed on a seven-point scale: 1) Most of the time I feel the government 
is doing what is right; 2) One cannot always trust what governmental officials say; 3) One can be 
confident that politicians will always do the right thing; 4) I feel the government generally uses 
the money we pay in taxes for the right things. The fifth item comes from Lock et al. in their 
national survey of Americans’ trust in government: 5) In general, I feel confident in the 
government's ability to run its national programs.   
 Feelings Toward the U.S. Government. In order to assess respondents’ feelings toward 
the U.S. government, this study employed an ethnocentrism scale that was originally designed to 
assess Americans’ feelings toward the United States. The concept of ethnocentrism was 
developed more than a hundred years ago (by Sumner, 1906), and is usually defined as viewing 
other cultures, usually negatively, through the lens of one’s own.  It is often described as one’s 
bias toward one’s own culture or country and a bias against (or rejection of) another country. 
Measures of ethnocentrism, then, are useful political socialization outcome variables. The Jordan 
First campaign, which aims to increase nationalism and politically socialize Jordanian residents 
and citizens to the country’s interests, was also, in effect, an effort to strengthen Jordanians’ 
levels of ethnocentrism. The campaign was implemented to increase Jordanians’ preference (or 
bias) for their country over others.  
While the scale used in the current study was developed in order to assess Americans’ 
levels of ethnocentrism, it is also useful in assessing the views other people around the world 
hold toward the United States. The items measuring young Jordanians’ levels of ethnocentrism 
allow for implicit comparisons between the U.S. and Jordanian governments. Some of the items, 
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for example, directly compare support for the United States to other countries of the world. One 
such item asked respondents to agree/disagree with the following statement: “Countries really 
should use the United States as a role model.”  
The items were adapted from a scale developed by Neuliep & McCroskey (1997), which 
includes the following five items assessed on seven-point scales: 1) Other countries should 
model themselves after the United States; 2) The United States is a poor example of how to run a 
country; 3) Countries really should use the United States as a role model; 4) The United States 
government would be better if it were more like other governments; 5) The United States 
government could learn a lot about how to function from other countries in the world.    
Media Assessment Variables 
 Media Credibility. Research on media trust/credibility usually assesses the degrees to 
which news consumers believe a medium or outlet is, among other things, factually accurate, 
concerned about the community, and trusted to provide objective information (see, for example, 
Kiousis, 2001; Meyer, 1988). Respondents were asked to agree/disagree with four broad 
statements about media credibility: 1) I feel that information I receive from Jordanian news 
sources is factually accurate; 2) I would say that I trust Jordanian news outlets that I access; 3) I 
feel that information I receive from news sources outside Jordan is factually accurate; 4) I would 
say that I trust foreign news sources that I access.  
Demographic Variables 
Respondents were asked to report a number of demographic indicators, such as age, 
gender, ethnicity (Palestinian, Transjordanian, Armenian), nationality (holder of a Jordanian or 
Iraqi passport or identity card, Palestinian identity card holder, Egyptian immigrant worker, etc.), 
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religion (Christian, Muslim, other) and education levels (no high school diploma, high school 
diploma, college degree, master’s degree, terminal degree).  
Survey Procedures 
Data collection took place over the course of 25 days (three days in each district except 
Sweileh, where sampling lasted four days) in January 2009.  Approximately 12-16 surveys were 
administered each day, and completion took respondents between 10-18 minutes. On the 
morning of each sampling day, I traveled to the main pedestrian hub of a given district. From this 
pedestrian hub, I spanned out to other areas and side streets in an attempt to cover as much 
ground in each district as possible. According to a pedometer I wore while sampling, I walked 
approximately 116 miles during the 25 days of sampling, an average of just over 4.5 miles/day. 
In all districts, I sampled both pedestrians as well as workers/employees at various businesses, in 
an attempt to include not just those Jordanians with time and resources to stroll and shop. This 
ensured that varying numbers of young service employees, businesspersons, delivery men, 
unemployed individuals, transients, shoppers and browsers were included in the sample.  
Making my way through thoroughfares, alongside outdoor cafes, and down sidewalks 
and mall corridors, I approached young individuals, introduced myself and summarized the 
project in Arabic, and asked them to participate in the survey. When respondents agreed to 
participate, they were given an IRB “factsheet,” which included my contact information, as well 
as that of the UNC IRB office. This information was provided in both Arabic and English. Please 
see Appendix A for this bilingual factsheet. Respondents were asked to give consent to 
participate orally and signatures were not collected, in an attempt to include in the study 
Jordanians who might not have felt comfortable providing their names. No financial or other 
incentives were given to respondents.  
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When individuals refused to participate, a number of their characteristics and reasons for 
refusing were documented on a demographic half-sheet which included the district in which I 
approached them, gender, approximate age, nationality when they provided it, and the reason 
they would not or could not complete the survey. For example, when a young man with an 
approximate age of 20 declined to complete the survey, I documented his gender, approximate 
age, and the date and location of the refusal. Also, I documented ineligible participants. When I 
approached, for example, a few individuals who agreed to participate but were younger than 18, I 
terminated the survey and recorded their ineligibility. Refusal patterns will be discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter.    
After each interaction—regardless of whether it resulted in a completed questionnaire or 
a refusal—I continued to walk down the street/thoroughfare/mall corridor until I came across 
another Jordanian appearing to fall in the requisite age range. In an attempt to avoid group 
responses that can be problematic for survey researchers in Arab countries, I attempted to 
approach individuals who were alone or with just one other person. This ultimately lengthened 
the time needed to collect 321 surveys, but it virtually eliminated the problem of group response.  
Districts 
 I intercept sampled respondents from a number of districts in the Jordanian capital. Eight 
areas were selected for reasons of religious, economic, and ethnic diversity: Shmeisani 
(Amman’s banking and financial district), Jebel Webdeh (a highly Christian, urban area in 
central Amman); Abdoun (one of the city’s most upscale districts); Jebel Amman (a densely 
populated, middle class neighborhood in central Amman): Sweifiyah (a less-central 
neighborhood near the Amman airport; Sweileh (a neighborhood near the University of Jordan 
teeming with young people) Abdali/Wast al-Balid (downtown, a working/lower class 
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neighborhood containing mostly service industry jobs, which also features Amman’s major bus 
depot and transportation hub) and al-Rabieh.  For geographical representations of these areas 
please see the attached map of Amman (Appendix B).   
A Word on Sample Quotas and Weighting  
While quotas were not used in the strict sense, that is, I did not demand that women 
represent exactly 49 percent of the sample, I did monitor the demographics of the sample each 
day I collected data in Jordan in order to be sure that the sample did not over-represent males, 
East Bank Jordanians, Muslims, or individuals at one end of the age spectrum. Table 4, discussed 
in the following chapter, reports the demographics of the survey and compares them to Jordanian 
census data. For the most part, acceptable demographic figures were reached in the natural 
course of the survey. The one exception to this was numbers of women, which were a bit low 
(about 40 percent female) during the first half of data collection. Because of this, I stepped up 
recruitment of women during the last 13 days of data collection, after which female 
representation increased to more than 47 percent.  
Stycos (1958) used quotas in his examination of news consumption behavior in Jordan in 
the 1950s, as he sampled Palestinians and indigenous Jordanians using non-probability methods. 
Ultimately, the percentages of demographic groups in a sample can, and should, be compared to 
census data or other national survey data, and major departures from national figures (gender 
representation, for example) can be addressed through statistical weighting, when appropriate.  
While some survey researchers point out that weighting intercept sample data in certain 
ways can improve data quality (see Sudman, 1980, for a lengthy discussion of weighting 
intercept samples) I decided not to weight the current sample. There are a number of reasons for 
this. First, a number of the characteristics in the current sample come quite close to population 
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statistics for Amman or for the country as a whole. More than 47 percent of the respondents in 
the sample are female, while Jordanian census data reports that 48.6 of the population of Amman 
is female. Eighty-six percent of the sample is Jordanian citizens, and Jordanian census data 
reports that 88.8 percent of Amman’s residents are Jordanian citizens. Also, the sample data 
come rather close to national figures in terms of religious breakdown.  These figures will be 
discussed further in the following chapter.  
That leaves one major demographic variable, ethnicity, that could possibility be weighted 
to slightly improve the quality of the dataset. Palestinians, representing 41 percent of the sample, 
are reported to represent around 50-60 percent of the population of the country (see Lust-Okar, 
2006; Nydell, 2006, Ryan, 2002).  While the percentage of Palestinians obtained in the sample is 
not too far off the national average, these data could be weighted slightly to enhance Palestinian 
representation. Above, though, I write that Palestinians are “reported to represent” about 50-plus 
percent of the population, because Jordanian census data for this demographic could not be 
found. Official figures for Palestinians and Transjordanians in Jordan are not available (Lust-
Okar, 2006). Presumably, this is due to the fact that the Jordanian monarchy, Hashemite in its 
lineage, does not wish to publicly point out the fact that the progeny of its ancestors are 
outnumbered in Jordan by ethnic Palestinians. I decided to not weight the data for ethnicity since 
the anchor to which the weights would be affixed could not be strictly identified.  
Assessing the Validity of the Political Socialization Scales  
While it would be convenient to assume that the dependent variables of interest in this 
study—political trust, political cynicism, and U.S. government ratings—can be measured equally 
well in Jordan as they are in the United States, this is not necessarily the case. One of the greatest 
challenges to survey research involves lack of clarity on the survey tool (see Groves, 1987; 
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Iyengar, 1983), and this is particularly true in international survey research (Seligson, 2005).  
“Any study of political communication processes in an internationally comparative setting,” 
wrote Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (2006, p.5), “must consider the differences in political structures and 
processes in political culture” One cannot be sure, therefore, that the cynicism, trust and U.S. 
government rating scales discussed above, which have been demonstrated to be reliable and valid 
in Western settings, will measure phenomena with similar validity in an Arab country (one might 
expect, though, that Neuliep & McCroskey’s, 1997, ethnocentrism scale, created for the purposes 
of intercultural comparison, would present fewer problems in international survey research than 
political cynicism or political trust).  
There are a number of ways to assess the utility of the indices used in the current study. 
First, I used post-hoc analyses to evaluate the validity and reliability of the measures. Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients for the political trust, political cynicism, and U.S. government rating scales 
were .79, .52, and .69, respectively. When the item “The U.S. government would be better off if 
were more like other governments in the world” is removed, however, Cronbach’s coefficient 
increases to .703. The U.S. government rating index and political trust scale used appear to have 
acceptable levels of internal consistency, while the political cynicism index does not. Even when 
variables comprising the political cynicism scale are systematically removed one at a time and 
reliability is recalculated, Cronbach’s coefficient does not exceed .52. This scale appears to not 
be the most appropriate index for measuring political cynicism among young people in Jordan.   
Another way to assess the reliability and validity of the political cynicism and political 
trust scales is to correlate them. Some existing research suggests that political cynicism and 
political trust are related to one another (see, for example, a discussion by Citrin & Luks, 2001), 
and are negatively associated. Pearson’s correlation coefficient for these two scales was 
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significant r(310)= - .24, p<.001 (two-tailed). Presumably, these two scales would have been 
more strongly correlated if the political cynicism scale had approached accepted levels of 
internal consistency (usually .70). 
  
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Sample 
This study was a survey of news consumption and political attitudes among 321 young 
people in Jordan.  Respondents were approached in eight districts of the Jordanian capital and 
asked to complete a paper and pen questionnaire in either Arabic or English. Data were collected 
between January 8 and February 1, 2009.  
Response Rate. A total of 402 individuals were asked to participate, and 321 of them 
completed the survey. This is an overall response rate of 79.9 percent. Table 1 reports 
recruitment statistics across the sampling districts. Lamentably, due to a labeling error, some 
recruitment characteristics for two districts, Abdoun and Abdali, can not be reported.  Twelve 
questionnaires from Abdali were mislabeled as being from Abdoun, and the specific 
questionnaires that were mislabeled could not be determined. Sample sizes in each of the 
districts ranged from 38 to 44 respondents. Overall, response rates for women (83.1 percent) 
were somewhat higher than those for men (77.2 percent).  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 Refusal patterns by district are detailed in Table 2. A total of 81 individuals, 50 men and 
31 women, declined to take the survey. Numbers of refusals ranged from two to 25 across the 
districts. Sweileh, a university neighborhood in northwest Amman, had the highest number of 
refusals, while Jebel Amman, a middle class neighborhood in central Amman, had the fewest. 
While the age of individuals who declined to complete the survey was approximated, not 
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measured more accurately by self-reports, the approximate average age of refusing persons was 
around 23.   
After declining to take the questionnaire, the 81 individuals who refused were asked to 
give a reason why. The most common reasons for refusal were “Not interested” (38 percent); 
“Too busy” (24 percent); “Did not live in Jordan” (14 percent); “Working” (8.5 percent); 
“Illiterate and did not wish to take survey orally” (6 percent); and respondent fatigue/attrition (5 
percent).  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Demographics. The survey predominantly consisted of males (52.6 percent), East Bank 
Jordanians (49.5 percent) vs. Palestinians (41.7 percent), Muslims (89.4 percent) vs. Christians 
(10.6), Jordanian citizens (85.9 percent) as opposed to Palestinian identity card holders (7.5 
percent) or Iraqi citizens (2 percent), and educated individuals (30 percent have high school 
diplomas, 57 percent claimed to have finished college3, and 5.3 percent have graduate training of 
some kind). Respondents had a median age of 23 years. Table 3 lists complete demographic 
figures.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Table 4 compares some of these demographic figures to Jordanian census data. As Table 
4 indicates, most respondent demographics quite closely mirror population statistics. Women 
comprise 48.6 percent of the population in Amman, and 47.4 of the sample in the current study.  
About 86 percent of respondents are Jordanian citizens, while 89 percent of the population in 
Amman has Jordanian citizenship. In terms of religion, 89.4 percent of respondents are Muslim, 
while around 92 percent of Jordanians nationwide are Muslim (figures for religion in Amman 
alone could not be found).  
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The only demographic that differs substantially from population figures is ethnicity. 
Palestinians in Jordan comprise around 50-60 percent of residents in the country are Palestinian 
(see Ryan, 2002; Lust-Okar, 2006; Nydell, 2006). However, official reports on ethnicity from the 
Jordanian government are not forthcoming, as the government does not wish to remind its 
constituents that ethnic Palestinians outnumber East Bank Jordanians (which includes the 
Hashemite monarchy that rules the country).   
Percentages of Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians are not assessed in Jordanian 
census data and are not available in Jordan Department of Statistics’ reports. Conventional 
scholarship, however, typically reports that slightly over half of Jordan’s residents are ethnic 
Palestinians (this figure, however, as well as the percentage of East Bank Jordanians, would fall 
by several points were a census taken today, due to the more than 700,000 Iraqi refugees now 
living in Jordan).  While ethnic Palestinians seem slightly underrepresented and East Bank 
Jordanians somewhat overrepresented, the decision was made not to weight the data in terms of 
ethnicity since more precise population figures could not be found.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
News Consumption Patterns 
 To answer the first two research questions involving young Jordanians’ news use, 
descriptive statistics and frequencies are mostly reported, enumerating news consumption trends 
across the sample. Research question one asked what news formats young Jordanians primarily 
rely on for news information, specifically the patterns of reliance on newspapers, magazines, 
televised news, radio, online news outlets, blogs, podcasts, cell phone text messages and 
interpersonal sources. The short answer to this question is that young Jordanians in the sample 
are likely to access TV news broadcasts and print newspapers more than other news formats. 
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News consumption patterns across the sample, however, are much more complex than this. The 
findings are discussed below, starting with newspaper use. Table 5 reports overall news 
consumption patterns across the various media formats.  
Print Newspaper Use 
Print newspapers may be endangered in the U.S., but they seem much more vivacious in 
Jordan. The vast majority of respondents in the sample read a daily newspaper at least once 
weekly. On average, young people in the sample reported reading a newspaper about three times 
each week for about 30 minutes each occasion.  About seven in ten newspapers respondents 
listed are published daily, while 30 percent are weeklies. The vast majority of newspapers listed 
are published in Arabic, and fewer than half of the stories respondents read in newspapers focus 
on events inside Jordan.   
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 Table 6 enumerates the top news sources for each media format.  Al-Ra’i, al-dustour and 
al-Ghad. Jordan’s most circulated dailies, were the most frequently listed papers. Al-Ra’i, the 
most widely circulated paper in the country, appears out in front among some young readers, 
while al-Ghad and al-Dustour are essentially tied for second place. Of the remaining six top ten 
newspapers, four of them (al-Waseet, al-Medina al-Mumtaz and Shihan) are weekly newspapers. 
Al-Waseet is a free weekly newspaper, often included as an insert in the al-Ghad newspaper, 
which is heavy on advertisements and little else. Nonetheless, roughly one quarter of newspaper 
readers in the sample listed al-Waseet as one of the three main newspapers they peruse. Other 
top newspapers named include al-Arab al-Yawm, Jordan’s lowest circulation Arabic daily; The 
Jordan Times, the country’s English daily; and al-Quds, a Palestinian daily newspaper published 
in Jerusalem and the largest circulation newspaper in the Palestinian territories.   
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(Insert Table 6 about here) 
Print Magazine Use 
 Around eight in ten respondents reported reading a print magazine(s) at least once a 
month. On average, respondents reported reading print magazines nearly four times each month 
for about an hour each occasion. Most magazines read by respondents are published in Arabic, 
and an estimated one-fifth of magazine stories focus on issues/events in Jordan.   
 Table 6 lists the main magazines most commonly named by respondents. Specific 
magazines listed tend to be fashion, music, or entertainment publications. The most frequently 
listed magazine, Layalina, for example, is a weekly Arabic magazine published in Kuwait which 
could be termed the “People magazine of the Arab world.” It focuses on fashion, society, and 
pictorials from high-end social gatherings. Rotana is a more news-oriented magazine targeting 
young Arabs, focusing on employment and academics, as well as pop culture.  
 Sayidaty magazine is an art, fashion and entertainment magazine mainly targeting 
women.  Zahrat al-Khaleej, too, is a women’s magazine published by the Abu Dhabi Media 
Company. Its Web site touts it as the “number one [magazine] in women’s lifestyle across the 
region.”  Haya is an entertainment magazine published by the Dubai-based MBC television 
conglomerate. Other magazines rounding out the top ten include Viva, a high end fashion 
magazine (Kate Moss graced a recent cover) published in Dubai; Laha, Arabic for “For Her,” 
focuses on some women’s interests, including family life, female employment trends, fashion, 
art, and women’s health; Jurs, details could not be found on this magazine; Living Well, whose 
Web site claims to be “Jordan’s best-selling lifestyle magazine,” focuses on social and cultural 
trends, including fashion and high society; and JO magazine, a pan-interest outlet published in 
Jordan, focusing mostly on Jordanian entertainment, politics, economics and culture.  
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Televised News Consumption 
 Television news use was by far the most common form of news consumption among 
young people in the sample. Nearly 97 percent of respondents reported that they watch televised 
news at least once each week. On average, respondents reported watching the news 5.34 days 
every week, for about 45 minutes each time. Roughly nine in ten TV news networks listed are 
broadcast in Arabic, and respondents reported that around 24 percent of the news stories they see 
on TV focus on events in Jordan.  
 Table 6 lists the top television networks that respondents reported.  Most respondents rely 
on al-Jazeera, the Qatari-run network, followed by two networks run out of the UAE: al-Arabiya 
and MBC. The latter offers entertainment as well as news. Jordan TV, the government’s main 
TV station, came in fourth, followed by the Lebanese militant group Hizballah’s network al-
Manar and Hamas militants’ al-Aqsa TV. Finishing off the top ten are Rotana, an Arabic music 
network similar to MTV or VH1, and three Western news outlets: CNN, BBC, and BBC Arabic.  
Radio News Consumption 
 Although not as robust as television news use, radio news consumption was still 
substantial. Eighty-one percent of respondents indicated that they listen to radio news broadcasts 
at least once each week. Respondents listen to radio broadcasts about 3.15 times each week for 
around 24 minutes each occasion. Nearly all of the radio stations listed are broadcast in Arabic, 
and around 40 percent of radio stories focus on events in Jordan as opposed to other countries.  
 Most of the top radio stations listed by respondents are pop music stations that sandwich 
news briefs and DJ-directed talk between song broadcasts. Fan FM, Rotana, Amman FM, Amn 
FM, Mazaj, Radio Sawa—the U.S. government’s Arabic pop music and news station—and Sawt 
al-Ghad are all primarily music networks which also offer news segments and some talk radio.  
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Other networks rounding out the top ten include BBC Arabic radio and Hayat FM, an Islamic 
radio network offering religious music and news, Quranic recitations, and discussions of 
contemporary Islamic issues.   
Internet News Use  
 While fewer respondents in the sample access news online than in print newspapers, 
television or radio, this figure is significantly higher than any of the numbers assessing Internet 
“penetration” or Internet “users” in Jordan. Recall that most estimates of Jordanian Internet “use” 
or “access” are between 14 and 20 percent (Mofleh et al.). Two-thirds of respondents reported 
accessing news online at least once each week. The average respondent consumes online news 
2.75 times each week for around 60 minutes each occasion. Fewer online sources are published 
in Arabic (77 percent) than any other media format assessed in this study. In addition to 
traditional online news sites, 9 percent of respondents who access news online at least once 
weekly reported that blogs are among the sites they visit. Far fewer respondents who consume 
news online reported accessing news Web sites via a handheld device like a Blackberry or 
iPhone (less than three percent of Internet news consumers).   
 Among specific online news outlets listed by respondents, al-Jazeera reigns, just as it 
does in the TV arena. Beside this Arabic household name, though, a substantial number of 
Western news outlets top the list of most-visited sites among respondents, including Yahoo!, 
Facebook, BBC Arabic, CNN [in English], and MSN—Hotmail. Another news portal, Google 
News Arabic, is American in its ownership and management, but guides users to stories from 
mostly non-Western news sources. The remaining top online news sites listed include the sites of 
two print newspapers, al-Rai and al-Ghad, and one television network, al-Arabiya.  
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Text Messages & Podcasting 
 A substantial percentage of respondents (more than one in ten) reported receiving news 
information via SMS text messages. Most of the news texts were either in Arabic or a 
combination of Arabic and English, and around 38 percent of messages focus on events in 
Jordan. Anecdotally, a number of respondents mentioned while completing the survey that they 
receive Jordan weather updates from their cell phone providers in the form of text messages. 
Most respondents who reported receiving news via texts named their cell phone companies as the 
provenance of the texts; Zain, Orange and Umnia are all cell service providers. About a fifth of 
news text receivers reported that they receive news texts from al-Jazeera or other news 
organizations.  
 Fewer respondents reported news podcast use (6 percent) than news text consumption, 
and they estimated that around 86 percent of podcasts they download are in Arabic as opposed to 
English. According to respondents, just 9 percent of podcasts they access focus on events in 
Jordan. It is important to note here that a handful of respondents reporting podcasting use listed 
iTunes as the source of news, so it was not possible in every case to derive the specific news 
organization providing the podcast. The iTunes program allows users to download free of charge 
podcasts of BBC Arabic’s radio broadcasts, but iTunes itself is not the progenitor of this content.  
Interpersonal Sources 
 Table 7 details respondents’ reliance on interpersonal sources for news information. 
Among respondents in the current sample, interpersonal sources seem to be a mainstay origin of 
news information. Nearly 70 percent of respondents report that they learn current events 
information from their friends either two or three times weekly or everyday, while 71.4 percent 
report learning news information from relatives with the same frequency. Respondents rely much 
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less on news information from friends (28.2 percent either two or three times weekly or daily) 
and family (32.2) received online, but online reception of news from friends and relatives is still 
robust enough to be considered in this study’s regression models exploring the associations 
between news consumption variables and political socialization outcomes.  Cronbach’s alpha for 
these four items was .70.   
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
Domestic vs. Foreign News Consumption 
 Research question two concerned the amounts of foreign vs. domestic news young 
Jordanians generally consume. Table 5 reports percentages of respondents’ estimations of the 
domestic-centric vs. foreign-focused news they consume. Overall, Jordanians sampled tend to 
access more news information about events outside their country than news covering topics 
within Jordan. Via all media formats explored in this study, Jordanians consume more news 
focusing on foreign events/issues than goings on in their own country.  The percentage of stories 
focusing on Jordan ranged from as low as 9 percent for podcasts and as high as 42 percent for 
print newspapers. In between were radio (40 percent), SMS text messages (37.9), Internet news 
stories (25), TV (24), and print magazines (22.2).  
 Jordan is a small country that generates less news than its regional neighbors, especially 
Egypt, Israel and Lebanon and, perhaps for this reason, much of the news to which respondents 
are exposed, and to which they expose themselves, predominantly focuses on events/issues in 
other countries.     
Political Attitudes 
Tables 8 and 9 present respondents’ reported levels of political trust, political cynicism, 
and feelings toward the U.S. government (in the form of the ethnocentrism scale). Table 8 
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reports omnibus figures for the political socialization indexes, as well as reports the index scores 
across gender and ethnicity. Also in Table 8 are found respondents’ assessments of foreign and 
domestic media credibility. Table 9 offers item-by-item summaries for each item in the three 
indexes. A number of the items in all three scales—the trust, cynicism, and U.S. government 
ratings indexes—were reverse coded in order to make descriptive statistics for the scales 
meaningful.   
Initially, frequencies and descriptive statistics are provided for the political socialization 
variables, and t-tests and ANOVA procedures are provided at times examining the differences in 
these political attitudes across various demographic groups in the sample (men/women, 
Palestinians/Jordanians). Following the presentation of descriptive statistics is a discussion of the 
regression models which examined the associations between media use and political attitudes.   
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
Political Cynicism 
 The mean of the political cynicism score across the sample was 4.63 (SD=1.28). Figure 2 
provides a histogram mapping the frequencies of scores on the political cynicism index.  The 
appearance of the histogram, as well as skewness and kurtosis figures for the political cynicism 
index suggest that the variable is normally distributed.   
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
There were three items included in the survey assessing levels of political cynicism. 
Results suggest low levels of confidence in participatory politics and in the motives of 
government officials. Table 9 reports that more than 52 percent of respondents in the sample 
agree (“agree somewhat,” “agree,” or “strongly agree”) with the statement “Whether I vote or 
not has no influence on what politicians do.” Just 39.6 percent of respondents agreed with the 
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assertion that “People like me have a say about what the government does.” Even more cynical 
were views toward the motivation of government officials; nearly 69 percent of respondents 
agreed that “one never knows what governmental officials are thinking.” Table 9 reports means 
and standard deviations of the political cynicism scale items.   
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
 Due to the fact that gender and ethnicity (Palestinian vs. Jordanian) are two of the 
greatest demographic concerns regarding survey research in Jordan, the political socialization 
variables in this study were briefly examined for differences across gender and ethnicity 
categories. Table 8 reports these differences. In terms of gender, men appear to have 
significantly lower levels of political cynicism (M=4.42) than women (4.87) [t(311)= -3.10, p= 
.002]. On ethnicity, we see that Palestinians in the sample reported slightly higher levels of 
cynicism (4.70) than either Jordanians (4.61) or other Arabs (4.38)—i.e. Jordanian residents of, 
say, Syrian, Egyptian, or Yemeni descent. One-way ANOVA analysis suggests, though, that the 
differences in political cynicism scores among Palestinians and Jordanians do not differ 
significantly F(2, 302) = .635, p = .53. 
 As previously stated, the political cynicism scale used in this study was not internally 
consistent according to Cronbach’s alpha, suggesting that the scale, while highly valid in U.S. 
survey research, may not be the best index of political cynicism in Jordan. Thus, composite 
scores of the index should be considered with caution. In an attempt to assess each of the three 
items in the scale with the hope of identifying problematic items, each item was correlated with 
scores on the political trust index. We know from prior research that political trust is strongly 
and negatively correlated with political cynicism. If any of the items in the political cynicism 
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scale correlate negatively and highly with political trust, then, they may still be useful in 
assessing political cynicism in Jordan or other Arab countries in future research.  
 Among the three items in the political cynicism scale, just one (“People like me have a 
say about what the government does”) was significantly correlated with scores on the political 
trust index p(315)= .32, p < .001 (two-tailed).  This item, then, may still be measuring a political 
cynicism construct similar to that assessed by the original scale in the U.S.  In Jordan, and 
perhaps other Arab countries, this item, along with two to four other measures of political 
cynicism, might better assess a singular construct of political disaffection.   
Political Trust 
The mean of the political trust index across the sample was 4.14 (SD=1.14). Figure 3 
presents a histogram diagramming frequencies of political trust scores. While the distribution 
may appear somewhat leptokurtic in shape, skewness and kurtosis figures suggest that the data 
are well within the realm of assumed normality.  
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
As shown in Table 9, respondents tended to agree with statements such as “Most of the 
time I feel the government is doing what is right,” (55.5 percent agreed somewhat, agreed, or 
strongly agreed), “One cannot always trust what government officials say,” (51.9), “I’m 
confident in the government’s ability to run it’s national programs” (56.4), and tended to agree 
less with statements like, “I feel the government generally uses the money we pay in taxes for the 
right things,” (45.0) and “One can be confident that politicians will always do the right thing,” 
(32.6).  Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .79 
Respondents tended to agree more with statements extolling the virtues of the 
government as a whole (such as “Most of the time I feel the government is doing what is right”) 
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and disagree with statements praising individuals in the government (“One can be confident that 
politicians will always do the right thing,” and “One cannot always trust what governmental 
officials say”). There will be more discussion of this trend in the next chapter, but for now 
suffice it to say that respondents in the sample generally reported confidence in an amorphous 
government, but less so in personified “officials.”  
Females reported significantly lower levels of political trust (M=3.98) than did men (4.3) 
t(313) = 2.43, p=.016.  Palestinians reported much lower levels of political trust (3.77) than did 
East Bank Jordanians (4.45) or other Arabs in the sample (4.17). One-way ANOVA analysis 
suggests that scores on the political trust scale differ significantly across the ethnic groups [F(2, 
312) = 14.01, p <.001], and Tukey’s HSD post-hoc comparison test indicates that only 
Palestinians and Jordanians differ significantly in their reported levels of political trust.  
Feelings toward the U.S. Government 
Respondents’ average score on the U.S. government ratings scale assessing views toward 
the U.S. government was 4.77 (SD=1.26). Figure 4 is a histogram mapping respondents’ scores 
on this index. The distribution is somewhat leptokurtic and bimodal. Bimodal distributions for 
variables assessing political attitudes often indicate that respondents’ feelings toward a political 
institution or actor are divided and polarized. This appears to be the case in terms of young 
Jordanians’ feelings toward the U.S. However, both modes are either at the median of the scale 
or above it, which helps account for the mean of 4.77—well above the scales median of 4.00—
suggesting that respondents’ feelings toward the U.S. lean more negative than positive. 
Skewness and kurtosis figures, while confirming the fact that the U.S. government ratings 
distribution is not as normally distributed as the political cynicism and political trust indices, 
indicated that scores on the U.S. government rating scale are sufficiently normal.  
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(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
As a score of seven on this scale represents highly negative feelings toward the U.S., 
respondents reported more negative scores on this scale than either political cynicism (4.63) or 
political trust (4.14) scale, the latter of which was right around the median of the scale.  It should 
be recalled that, in order to improve the scale’s measure of internal consistency, one item (“The 
U.S. government would be better off if were more like other governments in the world”) was 
dropped from the scale. So the average of 4.77 reported above includes only the remaining four 
scale items. Cronbach’s alpha for these four remaining items was .703.  
There was substantial agreement among respondents with statements such as “The U.S. 
government could learn a lot about how to function from other countries in the world,” (62.1 
percent agreed somewhat, agreed, or strongly agreed), “The U.S. government would be better off 
if it were more like other governments around the world,” (58.4 percent) and tended to disagree 
with assertions like “Countries really should use the U.S. as a role model,” (just 23.0 agreed 
somewhat, agreed, or strongly agreed) and “Other countries should model themselves after the 
U.S.” (25.9 percent). There was less consensus on one item, “The U.S. is a poor example of how 
to run a country” (52.8 percent). It would appear that while respondents do not believe that other 
governments around the world should emulate the U.S. and that the U.S. would do better to take 
some cues from other countries, there is less agreement over whether the U.S. is a successfully 
run country.  In fact, with this latter item, 47.1 percent either disagreed or expressed neutrality.  
Concerning gender, there were no statistical differences on the U.S. government ratings 
scale between men (M=4.80) and women (4.74) [t(309)=.424 , p=.67.], nor were there any 
significant differences between Palestinians (4.92) Jordanians (4.66) or other Arabs in the sample 
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(4.82); F(2, 300) = 1.65, p = .194. Across much of the demographic board, feelings toward the 
U.S. government leaned negative.  
Media Credibility 
Recall that there were four items on the questionnaire measuring media credibility: two 
assessing credibility of domestic news sources and two the credibility of foreign outlets. Overall 
the one-to-seven disagree-agree scale, levels of media credibility came out largely in the 
affirmative: “I feel that information I receive from Jordanian news sources is factually accurate,” 
M = 4.65; “I would say that I trust Jordanian news outlets that I access,” M = 4.81; “I feel that 
information I receive from news sources outside Jordan is factually accurate,” M = 5.31; “I 
would say that I trust foreign news sources that I access,” M = 4.57.  Young Jordanians in the 
sample are apparently much more confident in the factual accuracy of foreign news sources than 
those from within their country. A paired samples t-test indicated that means of respondents 
confidence in the factual accuracy of foreign and domestic news sources (5.31 and 4.65, 
respectively) differ dramatically t(317)=5.75, p< .001 (two-tailed).   
However, despite the fact that respondents rate the factual accuracy of foreign news 
sources over their own domestic outlets, they reported that they trust Jordanian sources in the 
general sense (4.81) more than foreign media (4.57). The paired sample t-test comparing these 
two items approached significance [t(317)=1.88, p=.062 (two-tailed)] but did not reach the .05 
significance threshold. Overall, though, respondents tended to agree with the items asserting the 
accuracy and trustworthiness of news sources, both foreign and domestic, that they access. 
Scores on each of the four items was greater than the median (4.00) of the seven-point scale.  
According to one-way ANOVA tests, media credibility differed significantly across 
ethnic groups F(2, 315) = 5.92, p = .003, and Tukey post-hoc comparison tests indicate that only 
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Palestinians and Jordanians differ in credibility scores. Media credibility did not differ 
significantly according to gender.  
Taken together, the four scale items assessing media credibility do not demonstrate 
acceptable levels of internal consistency according to Cronbach’s alpha (.443). For this reason, 
one of the items assessing ratings of foreign news sources (“I feel that information I receive from 
news sources outside Jordan is factually accurate”) was not included in the index used to answer 
research question five, which asked if the regression models exploring the relationship between 
news consumption and political attitudes would change in some way after media credibility is 
controlled. The two items assessing credibility of domestic sources were included in the models 
predicting political cynicism and political trust, and these items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .90.  
However, in the regression model predicting ratings of the U.S. government, one of the 
scale items assessing credibility of foreign media (“I would say that I trust foreign media outlets 
that I access”) was included as the media credibility predictor. It seemed to make sense that, 
when examining predictors of feelings toward a foreign government, we might include an 
assessment of foreign media credibility as opposed to domestic media credibility. Just to be sure 
this was not a mistake, domestic media credibility was included in a trial run of the regression 
model predicting ratings of the U.S. government, and results suggested that it was not a 
significant predictor of scores on the scale and did not change the overall model much. The item 
measuring foreign media credibility included in the model, however, was, as we will see, 
significantly associated with U.S. government ratings.   
Associations Between News Consumption & Political Socialization Variables 
To answer research questions three and four, regression models were first run with the 
demographic variables (age, ethnicity, sex, education, nationality and religion) and the news 
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consumption variables (newspaper, magazine, TV, radio, and Internet use, and reliance on 
interpersonal sources) regressed on each of the three outcome variables of interest: political 
cynicism, political trust and ratings of the U.S. government. Next, to answer research question 
five, the same models were run again, only this time including media credibility.  The two 
models were then compared.  
So, in other words, all of the demographic variables and news consumption variables 
were entered into a single model predicting each political socialization variable. Then, media 
credibility was added in order to determine if trust in news outlets changed any of the 
relationships. In the model predicting political trust, for example, the six demographic variables 
and six news use variables were included in a single model, after which the same model was 
repeated with the addition of media credibility.  
For the regression models reported below, media use variables were calculated by 
multiplying the number of days a respondent reported using a particular media format by the 
number of minutes they reported using that format each occasion. Thus, an individual who 
reported reading a print newspaper three times each week for an estimated 20 minutes each time 
would have been assigned a score of 60 for newspaper use. This same computation was 
conducted for all of the news consumption variables used in the regression analyses.  Normal 
probability plots for all three political socialization variables (political cynicism, political trust, 
U.S. government ratings) suggested that the residuals of the variables are normally distributed.  
As for the demographic variables, citizenship was coded as either Jordanian citizen or 
non-Jordanian citizen, ethnicity was coded as either Palestinian or Jordanian descent, and 
religion was coded as either Christian or Muslim. Education was entered into the model as a 
continuous variable, with respondents assigned a number of one through five based on the five 
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possible education categories reported on the questionnaire (no high school, high school 
graduate, college graduate, master’s degree, terminal degree).  
Standardized Betas 
Standardized betas are reported in the regression models, instead of the unstandardized b, 
or slope, because, due to the scale of the news consumption variables (minutes per week of news 
consumption in a certain format), many of the unstandardized slopes were infinitesimally small. 
For example, newspaper consumption, calculated by multiplying the number of days each week 
respondents read a paper by the number of minutes they reported reading the newspaper each 
occasion, ranged from 0 total minutes for some respondents to 1,260 for another.  
Newspaper use, then, had an extremely small reported slope in the models predicting the 
outcome variables, as an increase in one minute of newspaper use resulted in infinitesimally 
small changes in the dependent variables. For this reason, the standardized betas are reported to 
more easily convey the slopes of the news consumption and demographic variables. 
Standardized betas represent the average increase in the dependent variable for each one standard 
deviation increase in the independent variable, when other variables in the model are held 
constant.  
Multicollinearity Among the News Consumption Variables   
In some cases, multicollinearity, or high statistical associations among predictor variables 
in a regression model, can confound interpretations of partial correlations and make it harder to 
see what is really going on. In order to test multicollinearity among the news consumption 
variables, Cronbach’s alpha was used to determine if the news consumption scales are measuring 
one, underlying construct of news consumption. They do not appear to be. Cronbach’s alpha 
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coefficient was .33, suggesting that news consumption variables in the current sample are 
measuring discrete behaviors.  
Multicollinearity among the predictor variables used in the regression models does not 
appear to be an issue. We would expect news consumption variables to correlate with one 
another (people who frequently read news magazines may also read a daily newspaper, e.g.), and 
some of them do, but not so much as to suggest that one cannot parse out their individual 
associations with the political socialization variables. In a correlation matrix of the news 
consumption variables, none of the correlations among the variables exceeded .25.  
Political Cynicism 
 Table 10 reports standardized betas and significance values for the regression models 
predicting political cynicism with demographic variables and news consumption scores. The two 
models reported are identical except that the second model includes media credibility as a 
predictor variable. Again, this goes back to the research of Druckman (2001), who argued that 
source credibility can play a role in the relationship between news exposure and certain outcome 
variables, and that credibility should be included in more studies on media influence.  In an Arab 
country, one in which many media outlets are partly or wholly operated by the government, 
media credibility could moderate some of the associations between news consumption and 
political socialization outcomes.  
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
 In the first model, we see that none of the news consumption variables are significantly 
associated with political cynicism. In terms of demographic predictors, gender appears to be the 
variable associated the most strongly with political cynicism. This reconfirms the results of the 
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independent samples t-test reported earlier, indicating that women reported significantly higher 
levels of political cynicism than men.  
 In the second regression model, which includes media credibility, there is very little 
change. Gender is still a significant predictor of political cynicism and, again, none of the news 
consumption variables are significantly associated with the outcome variable. The standardized 
betas for the news consumption variables record some minor changes, but none substantial 
enough to reverse the conclusion of their non-influence. The lone change in the model is the 
significant jump in R² resulting from media credibility’s contribution.  
 In this model, domestic media credibility is the variable most significantly associated 
with political cynicism, and the association is negative. This is intuitive; after all, we might 
expect that Jordanians who rate highly the credibility of domestic news sources—most of which 
are at least partly owned by the government—would also demonstrate lower levels of cynicism 
toward their government.  In terms of the predictors of political cynicism considered here, media 
credibility appears to be the main variable driving the model’s total R².  The total R² in the first 
model, .102, increases to .136 after media credibility is added to the model.    
Political Trust 
 Table 11 reports standardized betas for the two models predicting political trust. Just as 
no news consumption variables predicted political cynicism, none of the news consumption 
variables are significantly associated with political trust, and this does not change when media 
credibility is added to the model. The only variables significantly associated with political trust 
are gender, ethnicity, and media credibility. Women and Palestinians report much lower levels of 
political trust than men or Jordanians, respectively.  
(Insert Table 11 about here) 
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 Media credibility is highly associated with levels of political trust, and the association is 
positive. Respondents reporting high levels of faith in domestic news sources also tend to report 
elevated levels of political trust.  This association is intuitive; we might expect individuals 
reporting high levels of faith in domestic news sources to also report elevated levels of political 
trust, and this finding logically follows the negative association between media credibility and 
political cynicism reported earlier. The second model’s total R² jumps quite a bit following the 
inclusion of media credibility. The presence of media credibility in the model, though, does not 
alter much else.    
Feelings toward the U.S. government 
 Table 12 reports the standardized betas for the two models predicting U.S. government 
ratings. In the first model, none of the demographic variables are significantly associated with 
ratings of U.S. government. As for the news consumption variables, just one item, television 
news use, is significantly associated with feelings toward the U.S. government. Respondents 
reporting high levels of television news consumption also tend to report more negative views of 
the U.S. government. This association does not change when media credibility is added to the 
model. The type one error rate (i.e. the obtained p-value) for the association between television 
use and feelings toward the U.S., though, more than doubles after media credibility is included in 
the model. This is likely because television news consumption correlates significantly, albeit 
weakly [r(281)= -.133, p= .026], with media credibility, and the amount of unique variance in 
U.S. government ratings explained by television news consumption decreases when media 
credibility is included in the model.  
(Insert Table 12 about here) 
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 In the second model, reliance on interpersonal sources for news information is 
significantly associated with feelings toward the U.S. government. Respondents reporting greater 
reliance on relatives and friends for news information tend to report more negative views toward 
the U.S. government.   
 Just as in the models predicting political cynicism and political trust, media credibility is 
significantly associated with the independent variable in the model predicting U.S. government 
ratings. And again, the relationship here is intuitive. Respondents reporting high levels of trust in 
foreign media outlets also tended to report more favorable evaluations of the U.S. It is important 
to remember, though, that media credibility is included in these models only as a control and to 
increase statistical clarity. It is not inferred from these models that respondents’ faith in media 
sources they access is a potential cause of favorable ratings of the Jordanian or U.S. 
governments, only that the two are strongly related. Indeed, it would seem more intuitive to infer 
the reverse--that strong feelings toward foreign governments help predict ratings of the 
credibility of foreign news sources. Neither of these directional associations is being inferred 
here, however. It is only advised that media credibility be considered when researchers use news 
use variables to predict political attitudes.  
 The fact that the p values for both television news consumption and interpersonal reliance 
change somewhat after media credibility is included in the model justifies credibility’s inclusion 
in models exploring the relationship between news consumption and political socialization 
outcomes. For the most part, media credibility does not alter the vast majority of associations 
reported in the regression outputs, so we may focus primarily on the second models predicting 
the political socialization variables—i.e. those models including all of the variables of interest. 
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Still, some evidence exists here that it may be wise not to exclude media credibility from models 
exploring the association between news use and political opinions.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 This dissertation set out to explore news consumption patterns and political socialization 
variables among young people in Jordan. Specifically, this study sought to quantify young 
Jordanians news reliance patterns and examine the association between news consumption and 
political cynicism, political trust, and feelings toward the U.S. government. Were I approached 
by someone on the street and asked to plainly summarize the findings of this study in one 
sentence, I would reply that “By virtually all measures, young Jordanians in the sample are avid 
news consumers, but are especially reliant on print newspapers, television and interpersonal 
sources, and the latter two variables are the only measures associated with respondents’ political 
attitudes measured in the study.”   
The findings presented here, however, have many more implications in terms of our 
knowledge of Arabs’ news consumption and the relationship between news use and political 
socialization outcomes. While Alterman (2005) complained that we know “shockingly” little 
about news consumption in the Middle East, we may know a bit more now.  And in response to 
Sapiro’s (2004) lamentation that political scientists have not added much to our understanding of 
political socialization processes in other countries, this study has a modest contribution to make 
on behalf of Jordan. Below is a discussion elaborating on the findings of this study in terms of 
news consumption patterns, political attitudes, and the relationship between these variables. In 
addition to a discussion of the numerical findings in this study, some respondents’ answers to 
open-ended questions on politics and news are provided to add a bit of context.  
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News Consumption 
 Andoni (1995) was right.  Journalism and news consumption do seem to be parts of the 
“dominant culture” in Jordan, even among young people. In an age when news consumption 
among young people in developed countries is waning (see Jarvis, 2009), news use among young 
Jordanians in the sample seems comparatively strong. One 20 year-old respondent, answering the 
open-ended question involving the central role of news in her life, wrote that “[Arabs] are 
influenced by the news a lot, it saddens us, it makes us happy, makes us feel a presence that 
pushes us forward or discourages us.” Another respondent wrote that he follows the news 
“because I am a part of this world, and it's important for me to stay updated about every detail in 
this world.” 
Jordanians in the sample reported strong consumption levels for traditional media 
(newspapers, magazines, TV, radio), as well as interpersonal sources and online news. 
Respondents’ news consumption patterns do not seem to follow David Mindich’s (2005, p.2) 
proclamation that “young people [under 40] have abandoned traditional news.”  In fact, 
respondents tended to be most reliant on two traditional news sources (television, newspaper) 
and one ultra-traditional source of information: interpersonal contacts.  And not only are news 
consumers sampled in the current study younger than forty, they are much younger; half of all 
respondents are younger than 23.  
When considered, respondents’ reliance on TV, newspapers and interpersonal sources for 
information is not that surprising.  Regarding televised news, scholars of Arab media have for 
some time recognized the primacy of Arab satellite TV news over other media formats. The 
“CNN effect” discussed in the 1990s, for example, involving the role that international television 
news plays in forming defense and diplomacy policies, has given birth to the “Al-Jazeera 
93 
Effect,” a term used to describe the powerful role that televised news plays in the Arab world 
(Nisbet, Nisbet, Scheufele & Shanahan, 2004).  And the ubiquity of satellite dishes in the Arab 
world has made pan-Arab television news available to many individuals regardless of financial 
status (Rugh, 2004).  
As for newspapers, Arabs find broadsheet dailies readily available and generally 
affordable, which no doubt contributed to the fact that nearly 27 percent of respondents reported 
that they read a print newspaper five days a week or more. The “vanishing” newspaper that 
Meyer (2004) correctly identifies in the U.S. does not seem to be evaporating at the same pace in 
Jordan.  Jordan has the highest literacy rate in the Arab world, and many of its literate young 
people appear to be regularly accessing print newspapers. In Arab countries where the press is 
allowed to thrive, the newspaper industry can be quite vibrant. Mellor (2005) reported that print 
newspapers have burgeoned in Iraq following Saddam’s ouster.  Jordan’s first privately owned 
and edgy daily newspaper, al-Ghad, for example, has the highest subscription rates of any 
newspaper in the country. This is not to say that as Internet connectivity in Jordan increases 
consumption of the country’s print publications will not fall, but only to point out that print 
newspapers in Jordan do not seem to be suffering greatly from the circulatory anemia plaguing 
newspaper industries in many other countries.   
In addition to newspapers and television, respondents also reported very heavy reliance 
on interpersonal sources (family and friends) for current events information. “If there is not 
enough time for me to watch the TV or read the papers,” wrote one woman in the sample, “I ask 
my friends if they know of the events of the day.” Roughly 84 percent of respondents reported 
learning news information from friends at least once each week, and roughly the same 
percentage of respondents reported learning news each week from relatives.  
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This, too, is not necessarily a surprising finding. Eastern cultures are much more 
communally minded and family oriented than many Western societies (Nisbett, 2003). Nydell 
(2006, p.71) wrote that “Arab society is built around the extended family system,” and that most 
Arabs feel strong connections with both immediate and secondary relatives. Many Arabs will 
live with extended relatives through adolescence and into adulthood, even after marrying. The 
finding that young Jordanians rely heavily on friends and family for news about the world, then, 
is not groundbreaking, but it should remind scholars conducting news consumption research in 
Arab countries to include measures of interpersonal news reliance in their questionnaires.  
As for specific news outlets respondents use, overall, Jordanians report that they get their 
news from outlets outside Jordan, and these outlets come from a wide variety of locations. The 
short answer to the question, “What kinds of news sources are young Jordanians using?,” is that 
they are primarily accessing multi-national news organizations headquartered in other countries. 
Most of these foreign news organizations are from other Arab countries, but a number come 
from the U.K. and the U.S.  With the exception of newspapers and radio stations, the majority of 
news outlets listed for each media format originate in countries other than Jordan.  It was from 
these media formats, newspapers and radio, that respondents reported acquiring the greatest 
amount of domestic news coverage (around 42 percent of newspaper and 40 percent of radio 
stories focus on events in Jordan).  
That Jordanians most-cited news organizations are foreign, along with the fact that 
respondents reported accessing more foreign than domestic news in each media format, supports 
Mellor’s (2005) assertion that many Arabs are more likely to receive news about pan-Arab issues 
and foreign affairs than they are news about events and problems in their own countries. Many 
respondents, when asked to describe the role that n
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foreign news. “News plays a very important role in our lives,” wrote one woman, “for it is the 
window from which we view other countries.”  
The fact that Jordanians are heavy consumers of foreign affairs news is not necessarily 
surprising; Jordan is a small country that may not generate as much domestic news as some other 
Arab countries. In order to fill a broadsheet newspaper with coverage of newsworthy events, 
then, it appears that Jordanian editors are forced to publish large amounts of coverage of events 
in other countries.  
The potential result, then, is that Jordanians may be more informed about international 
affairs than residents of larger countries. This may be a good thing, but there is also a downside;  
if consumption of print newspapers—the medium from which respondents claim to learn the 
most domestic/local news—falls precipitously in Jordan as it has done in many other countries, 
Jordanians may begin to know less and less about events in their own country and more about 
international affairs.  
It may be incumbent on the Jordanian government, then, to do a better job of 
strengthening the domestic press system in order to help preserve—or, since Jordan is a 
relatively young country, to help build—a collective sense of national identity.  The media free 
zones that the Jordanian government has developed in order to let foreign media outlets operate 
in the kingdom censorship and tax free strengthen the role of the foreign press in Jordan, but the 
government has neglected to slide the same springboard beneath the feat of domestic 
newspeople. Joseph Pulitzer once remarked that a nation “and its press will rise and fall 
together,” (Milton, 1936) and, if this is even partly true, then the Jordanian government must 
help nourish, or at least agree to let live, a domestic press that will promote knowledge of 
domestic affairs and foster a sense of national purpose. If the political socialization goals of the 
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“Jordan First” campaign are to be realized, domestic news interest and consumption may need to 
increase.   
The heightened presence of foreign news in Jordan is the opposite of what is happening 
in the United States, where the space and time devoted to foreign news has been shrinking for 
many years (Hamilton & Jenner, 2004). Often, Americans must go online and actively seek out 
substantive coverage of international affairs not found in their newspaper or television 
broadcasts.  Jordanians, on the other hand, may have to actively seek out news about their own 
country beyond their natural media diets. Again, with the exception of newspapers and radio 
(nine of the top ten newspapers and six of the top nine radio stations listed originate in Jordan), 
young Jordanians in the sample mostly report getting their news from organizations that do not 
provide a great deal of news about their home country.  If newspaper consumption falls 
significantly in Jordan in the coming years, and if innovative televised news programming and 
online publishing does not emerge from within the country, the amount of domestic affairs 
coverage Jordanians access could be even less than that reported here.   
This becomes especially poignant when one considers the online sites from which 
respondents in the sample report retrieving news. Just four of the top ten sites listed originate 
from within the Arab world, and only two from within Jordan. Other top sites listed, such as 
Yahoo!, Facebook, Google News Arabic, CNN, BBC Arabic and Hotmail-MSN are all run by 
information companies headquartered in the U.S. and Great Britain. While online news 
consumption among young people in the sample was considerably lower than use of other media 
formats (66 percent of respondents report accessing news online at least once weekly), this 
percentage is expected to rise as Internet connectivity in Jordan strengthens and as broadband 
connections become more affordable. Respondents’ preference for international news is not 
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necessarily problematic and there is nothing inherently subversive about the online 
news/information outlets listed here. It is supposed here, though, that more active participation in 
Jordanian public affairs, elections, and greater interest in domestic events depends at least partly 
on an energetic domestic press to which Jordanians pay attention.  In the near future, however, 
greater access to online news could result in greater public alienation from domestic affairs.  
Political Socialization Measures 
 The results of the survey suggest that young Jordanians in the sample demonstrate 
relatively high levels of political cynicism, modest levels of political trust, and negative feelings 
toward the U.S. government. And overall, respondents’ written comments about domestic and 
global politics were overwhelmingly negative. One 27 year-old respondent described her 
cynicism in this way: “Politics is important, but not a lot can be done by youth in my country.” 
There were, however, a number of nuances and differences in the political socialization measures 
that need to be addressed.  Political cynicism and trust findings are discussed first, followed by 
findings on the U.S. government rating index.   
Political Cynicism & Trust: High ratings of Government, Poor Ratings of Public Officials                                     
 While individuals recording high levels of political cynicism typically demonstrate low 
levels of political trust, this was not necessarily the case in the current study. While the two 
measures were negatively correlated, on the whole respondents reported elevated levels of 
political cynicism and above-the-median scores on political trust. Respondents tended to be 
skeptical of the motives of political actors and officials but confident in the motives of the 
overall “government.” Consider for example the two following statements about politics written 
by respondents on one of the open-ended questions. One expresses cynicism about political 
actors, while the second statement alludes to entrustment of governments with the security of 
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their citizens: “Politics is an ocean, you will stay swimming in it but you won't be to reach the 
end of it; no person can know what goes on in the world of politics if he is not a swimmer,” and 
“Politics is the leader’s protection of his country.” 
There was a difference in how respondents rated the performance/characteristics of 
political individuals/officials in Jordan, and in how they rated the government as a whole. 
Consider the items on the political trust scale, for example. Respondents agreed with the 
statements “Most of the time I feel the government is doing what is right,” and “I’m confident in 
the government’s ability to run its national programs,” while also agreeing that “One cannot 
always trust what government officials say” and disagreeing that “One can be confident that 
politicians will always do the right thing.” Commenting on this split, one female respondent 
wrote on her questionnaire that “politics is good, when it serves the interest of countries, and it's 
bad when it serves just the interest of persons.” Addressing individual enrichment, another 
respondent wrote that “Politics is a good thing in terms of those who are in a good position in the 
government, but for the ordinary people, it is a waste of time.” 
 There may be an explanation for differences in respondents’ faith in government and 
their ratings of public officials. One of the interesting aspects of Jordanian politics involves the 
fact that, while many Jordanians do not think highly of many of the country’s ministers and 
politicians, the king and queen enjoy popular support in the country. King Abdullah is young, 
enthusiastic, and energetic (Csicsmann, 2007), and the international respect he has earned seems 
to be a source of pride for many Jordanians.  The king is one of the most visible Arab leaders at 
major international political and economic conferences. In 2003, for example, Abdullah was the 
only Arab head of state to address the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (Ryan, 
2004). While his father Hussein, Jordan’s ruler for 46 years, put Jordan on the map, Abdullah is 
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determined to keep it there. This may contribute to some of his government’s popularity and the 
political trust scores recorded in this study. “Jordan is a safe country,” opined one respondent, 
“because Jordan keeps friendly relationships with all the Arab and the western countries, so it's a 
safe country.” 
And Abdullah’s wife Rania, the world’s youngest queen (Valencia-Martinez, 2007), is 
beautiful and magnetic. Type the word “queen” into Google, and you’ll find that “Queen Rania” 
is the fifth prompt the search engine suggests—after “Queen Elizabeth,” “Queen Latifah,” 
“Queen Victoria” and “Queen Mary.” Many Jordanians beamed with pride when Rania traveled 
to Chicago in May 2006 and granted a lengthy interview to Oprah Winfrey on women’s issues in 
Jordan and the larger Arab world (Oprah Transcripts, 2006).  Due to the popularity of Jordan’s 
king and queen, it is possible that when Jordanians are asked to provide feelings toward their 
“government,” they consider the highest reaches of the government, atop of which sit a popular 
monarch and his wife.   
 Unpopular policy positions and declarations, however, are often left to the delivery of the 
country’s prime ministers, who are sometimes reviled and frequently replaced; since 1950, 
Jordan has had more than 50 different prime ministers. The country’s premiers are appointed by 
the king and serve at his pleasure, until, usually, something goes wrong and another prime 
minister is installed. When the country’s economics or political landscape are not to the public’s, 
or the king’s, liking, it is the Prime Minister, not the country’s head of state, who takes the public 
fall, and this has always been the case. Nigel Ashton’s (2008) new biography of Jordan’s late 
King Hussein documents in dizzying detail the frequency with which prime ministers were 
appointed and replaced in the first few decades of the country’s history.  
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This bifurcated political arena seems to be part of the government’s crafted plan at 
socializing citizens to revere the king and his official policies, while government ministers and 
politicians may serve as lightning rods for discontent. Based on respondents’ political trust 
scores, this strategy may be working.  Even if the differences in Abdullah’s and his prime 
minister’s public roles are not deliberate, however, we can at least say that the king’s public role 
and persona seem to be more comfortable and characterized by much more pomp than the public 
function assumed by Jordan’s premiers. While cynicism exists regarding the motives of 
government officials and politicians, Abdullah’s government and, perhaps, that of his father 
before him, have managed to socialize Jordanians to retain faith in the regime’s overall worth 
and competence.  
It bears repeating, though, that the cynicism scale was not internally consistent, so the 
implications of the findings regarding this measure should be considered with caution. As for 
speculating why this scale was not internally valid in a country like Jordan, a number of 
conjectures are worth mentioning. First, the cynicism scale used here overlaps somewhat with 
measures of external political efficacy, or one’s sense that (s)he bears some influence on the 
political system (Craig, Niemi & Silver, 1990). Two of the items (“Whether I vote or not has no 
influence on what politicians do,” and “People like me have a say about what the government 
does”) may be measuring more a sense of political efficacy as opposed to political cynicism. Of 
these two assertions, one item, “People like me have a say about what the government does,” 
correlated significantly with scores on the political trust scale, which was a valid measure. In 
future studies, then, it may be better to administer a measure of political efficacy in an Arab 
country like Jordan as opposed to a measure of political trust.  
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Culturally, there may be an explanation for this. In an authoritarian country like Jordan, 
political disaffection could be more related more to a sense of helplessness and of being 
politically ineffectual than a feeling of cynicism about politicians’ motives. In my conversations 
with Jordanians about their political system, I get the sense from many individuals their feeling 
that all things political are outside their sphere of influence. There seems to be the belief that 
major chasm in efficacy exists between themselves and elites in the country. One Jordanian 
college student told me that, he “studies political science in school because the theories are 
interesting to consider, not because [he] can make any important changes.” Unlike U.S. citizens, 
most Jordanians are not told from a young age that political power belongs to people like them. 
While Americans are taught from primary school on that to vote is to exert power, many 
Jordanians are told that staying out of politics, and therefore out of trouble, is wise.  In trying to 
measure political alienation in an environment like this, political efficacy may resonate more 
with respondents. Ultimately, though, a political efficacy scale might present some of the same 
validity problems in an Arab country that the political cynicism scale demonstrated. In that case, 
it is at least comforting that the political trust scale used in this study was shown to be acceptably 
internally valid and seems to be measuring a unified, underlying entity of Jordanians’ political 
disaffection/confidence.  
Gender, Ethnicity & Political Socialization Outcomes. Political cynicism and trust scales 
differed across demographics of the sample. Young women in the sample reported higher levels 
of cynicism and less trust than did male respondents. One 20 year-old woman in the sample 
summed up her feelings about politics in this way: “politics is a game that is hard to understand 
and I am an intellectually young lady. In all honesty I do not pay attention to this field at all, for 
the presence of a number of things aren’t satisfactory in politics.” 
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Jordanian women, while not summarily excluded from their country’s political scene, 
have achieved nothing close to political parity.  Just four of the country’s current 29 ministers, all 
royally appointed, are female (Web site of the Embassy of Jordan, Washington, D.C., 2009), and 
six of the 110 seats in the lower house of parliament are reserved for female candidates. Without 
this quota, Jordanian women have found it very difficult to get elected to parliament; before the 
quota was introduced, just two women had served in the lower house (Husseini, 2007a). And in 
the upper, more powerful, house of parliament, to which all 55 members are appointed by King 
Abdullah, seven women are currently serving (Husseini, 2007b). One Palestinian woman wrote 
that “politics is in a very difficult situation; it's filled with problems with no solutions. And it's 
getting worse slowly. Maybe the solution is that life should end on this earth.” 
While women in Jordan were given the right to vote in 1974 (Brand, 2003), it may be 
difficult to politically socialize women to a governmental system in which their participation 
remains quite limited 35 years after suffrage expanded. Queen Rania may be the beacon of the 
modern Arab woman, but her country is still a male-dominated one, where women’s 
participation in government is near minimal and their trust in government is ambivalent 
(female’s scores on the political trust were right around the scale’s median). To socialize more of 
its citizens to the current government, in addition to the “Jordan First” campaign, the regime 
might consider enacting a “Women, Too” initiative. One 20 year-old woman, expressing her 
alienation from Jordanian politics, wrote that “I don't like interfering in [politics] because it does 
not take my opinion.” 
Women weren’t the only demographic group that recorded lower levels of political trust, 
though. Palestinians, while not scoring far from the median of the trust scale, still scored more 
than half a standard deviation below ethnic Jordanians on the political trust index. One 
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Palestinian teenager wrote that “I do not approach [politics] and there is no place for me in 
them.” Sentiments like this may exist because Palestinians’ participation in the public sector is 
often limited by discriminatory policies. While Jordan is the only Arab country to grant 
Palestinians citizenship, and extend to them virtually all the political and economic rights 
enjoyed by East Bank Jordanians, in practice Palestinian participation in government is limited 
by a number of factors.  
Parliamentary districts in Jordan, for example, are gerrymandered to award fewer 
numbers of seats to districts high in Palestinian representation (Lust-Okar, 2006). And Reiter 
(2002) argued that Jordan’s public universities conduct lopsided admission competitions, in 
which more Transjordanians are offered spots than Palestinians and not on merit alone.  Nydell 
(2006) also points out that Jordanians, not Palestinians, hold most of the country’s administrative 
positions.  One 22 year-old Palestinian man in the sample expressed his frustration with what is, 
in his view, a nepotistic political system thusly: “A weak man cannot bypass the government or 
have an opinion, but the person who has connections in the government or politics can have an 
opinion.”  
For these reasons, it perhaps makes sense that Palestinians in Jordan would express lower 
levels of political trust than Jordanians. Jordan has opened up its borders to Palestinians, but not 
its public sector, something that may make it a challenge to politically socialize Palestinians to 
trust the ruling non-Palestinian elites. One Palestinian respondent summed up his feelings about 
Jordanian politics in this way: “Politics works lightly with the Jordanian mind because it is not 
clear and there is favoritism when working with current issues.”  
It may be important to point out that, while gender and ethnicity demographics were 
associated with some of the political attitudes measured in this study, age was not. The age of 
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respondents ranged from 18 to 35, and age did not explain significant amounts of variance in the 
outcome variables. It should be noted that although age of respondents did not play a role in this 
study, important generational differences could still exist, and generations of older Jordanians 
may have very different political views than their younger counterparts. Prior research suggests 
that the views of younger individuals in a political system are more malleable and pliant (see 
Jennings & Niemi, 1978)—which is one of the main premises of Hyman’s original thesis, and 
that older voters’ views are more entrenched. Of course, this is one of the implicit assumptions of 
this study—that young people differ somewhat from their elders in political attitudes—and this is 
why young voters are studied in isolation.  
It is important remind ourselves, though, that this study focuses on young Jordanians 
only, and that the political views of their parents and grandparents could be quite different. Pattie 
and Johnston (2001), for example, found that older British voters’ levels of political trust were 
higher than younger citizens. In an authoritarian Arab country Jordan, though, in which political 
participation has been limited and somewhat resistant to liberalization since the nation’s birth, 
we might see the reverse; that is, older Jordanians, who have lived through a number of wars, 
political coup attempts, and the almost yearly removal and installation of the country’s prime 
ministers, may demonstrate higher levels of political cynicism and lower levels of political trust 
than younger individuals. While age in the current study seems to be a non-factor in terms of 
political attitudes, I felt the need to point out that Jordanians older than 35 may still differ 
significantly from younger people in terms of political disaffection.  
Feelings toward the U.S. Government 
 Unlike political cynicism and political trust scales, there were no demographic 
differences in terms of feelings toward the U.S. government; the index reported, by and large, 
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negative feelings toward the U.S. Respondents were in strong agreement that other countries 
should not “use the U.S. as a role model,” and that “the U.S. could learn a lot about how to 
function from other countries in the world,” and that the U.S. “would be better off if it were more 
like other governments in the world.”  While young people in the sample appear to have been 
socialized to modestly trust their government, they demonstrated much less affinity for the U.S. 
This finding is in line with a number of public opinion polls that have gauged Arabs and 
Muslims’ negative feelings toward the United States (see Zogby, 2002; Pollack, 2007; Pew, 
2008).  One respondent viscerally wrote of how “other people suffer, of tragedies, hunger, death, 
and destruction in Arab countries, by America and Israel,” and another commented that politics 
“is America’s game.”  (Of course, Arab and Muslim opinion of the U.S. may improve now that a 
sea change in presidential administrations has occurred with the inauguration of Barack Obama. 
This, however, remains to be seen, and current overall opinions of the U.S. among Arabs and 
Muslims appear low).                                                                                                                                                           
 There was one exception on the U.S. government rating index, however.  On one of the 
items (“The U.S. is a poor example of how to run a country”), the sample was more divided. You 
can see in the histogram in Figure 4 that the distribution of the scale appears bimodal. Forty-
seven percent of respondents either disagreed with or were neutral toward this statement, and this 
represents an interesting distinction that many Arabs make when assessing America. Arabs are 
often likely to despise American foreign policies while simultaneously recognizing the U.S. as a 
model country in other ways. Summing up this distinction, one male respondent commented that 
“I like the [U.S.’] internal successes but I definitely do not agree with its foreign affairs and its 
blind allegiances to Zionists and Israel.” 
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Hoffman (2002, p.83) wrote that even though Arabs and Muslims “disagree with U.S. 
foreign policy, particularly toward the Middle East, they yearn for freedom of speech and access 
to information,” and they often recognize that these freedoms exist to a greater extent in the U.S. 
Frequently, while administering the completing the survey and coming across the assertion “The 
U.S. is a poor example of how to run a country,” I was asked to clarify the question. Respondents 
wanted to know if I was talking about foreign policy or domestic policy. The reason, they told 
me, is that they felt the U.S. was a successfully internally run country, but its external policies, in 
their minds, are greatly flawed.   
It is for this reason that many Arabs wish to move to the United States, despite the fact 
that they may strongly take issue with the president’s official foreign policies. Many feel that the 
U.S. is a place of economic opportunity and political liberty, especially in the minds of Arabs 
who are political or ethnic minorities. One Palestinian Christian woman who completed the 
survey, for example, told me that “even though I know the U.S. does much wrong, I still want to 
live there. Being Palestinian and Christian there matters less.” This is not to say that all Arabs 
feel American society is a success and wish to take part, but there is some evidence that a lack of 
political and religious freedoms in a number of Arab countries contributes to evaluations of the 
American model.  In American public diplomacy efforts aiming to improve Arabs’ attitudes 
toward the U.S., then, it may bear fruit to highlight individual religious and political freedoms in 
the U.S. when communicating with the region’s oppressed. While many Arabs have apparently 
been socialized to detest American foreign policies, their assessments of America’s internal 
value are more mixed.    
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Media Credibility 
 Although not a political attitude, media credibility findings are discussed here, as they 
pose some implications for the political socialization variables measured in the study. Overall, 
media credibility ratings were quite high (M=4.72 for domestic media credibility and 4.94 for 
foreign media credibility). Respondents have much more faith in the accuracy of foreign news 
outlets than in Jordanian sources. Foreign, particularly Western, media outlets have a long 
history in the Arab world. Well before the era of pan-Arab satellite TV, for example, many 
Arabs did not trust the media mouthpieces their governments offered and turned instead to 
stations like Voice of America or Radio Monte Carlo for news (Ghareeb, 2000). Even today, 
many Arabs trust the factual accuracy of foreign outlets more than those in their own countries, 
and this seems to be the case among respondents in the current sample.  
 As for demographic differences in media credibility, Palestinians recorded much lower 
levels of domestic media credibility than did East Bank Jordanians. Given similar demographic 
differences in political trust scores, this disparity is perhaps not shocking. Also, most major 
Jordanian news outlets are run or owned at least partly by the government, and most important 
government posts are held by Jordanians, not Palestinians. Additionally, the Jordan First 
campaign has encouraged Jordanians to focus public discourse on national issues other than 
Israeli-Palestinian disputes (as Greenwood, 2003, points out), which may contribute to 
Palestinians’ feelings that Jordanian media are not meeting the needs of their community. One 
Palestinian respondent indicated that she did not trust the news and instead relied on personal 
contacts, writing that “news does not play a big role in my life because it is not the reality and I 
get the news, in Palestine for example, by calling my relatives there.”   
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 As for this study’s regression models, inclusion of media credibility did not change things 
much. In the model predicting attitudes toward the U.S., though, media credibility’s presence in 
the model affected the conclusions made regarding the associations between interpersonal 
reliance and scores on the U.S. government rating index. For this reason, it is argued here that 
measures of media credibility should be included in studies assessing the relationship between 
news use and political attitudes in Arab countries.  The suggestion to include media credibility 
measures in studies examining news influence on public opinion in general is not a novel idea 
(see Tsfati, 2003), but, in a region such as the Arab world, where public distrust of government-
run news outlets may be intensified, including media credibility is particularly wise. In many 
cases, such as in the current study, media credibility may not lead to any major revelations, and 
the researcher can move on to his/her main concerns. But still, including media credibility in 
models examining media influence in a region where limited amounts have such scholarship 
have been undertaken is advised.   
Young Jordanians’ News Use & Political Socialization Measures 
 Now that respondents’ scores on the political attitude measures have been thoroughly 
detailed, we can begin the awaited discussion on news consumption and political socialization 
among young Jordanians in the sample. To sum up again, none of the news consumption 
variables were significantly associated with political cynicism or political trust, and just two 
variables, television news use and reliance on interpersonal sources, were associated with 
feelings toward the United States.  
 Were he alive, Hyman (1959) might say, “I told you so,” as it appears that few of the 
news consumption variables were associated with Jordanians’ political attitudes. Recall that 
Hyman and other early political socialization researchers that followed him (see Dawson & 
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Pruitt, 1969; Langton & Jennings, 1968) discounted the influence of mass media in politically 
socializing young individuals to their government, and instead focused on institutions such as the 
church, family, and schools.  Hyman, as well as Dawson and Pruitt, subscribed to the “two-step 
flow” theory of mass communication (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1948), whereby a limited 
number of “opinion leaders” access news information via mass media and communicate it to the 
masses through everyday conversations. They seemed to argue that media messages become 
influential only when communicated secondarily by friends or relatives.    
Before we sign on to the limited-effects view of Joseph Klapper (1960), however, let us 
take a look at the news consumption variables and speculate as to why these items may or may 
not be associated with the political socialization measures used in this study.  We have lists of 
specific news outlets respondents reported accessing, and these data may be able to tell us 
something about the observed relationships between news use and political sentiments. And 
ultimately, some of the news consumption/reliance variables assessed in this study were 
associated with views of the U.S. government, and these relationships have some things to tell us 
about media and political socialization processes in an Arab country.  
Foreign News & Political Socialization 
 One reason many of the media use variables measured in this study were not significantly 
associated with political cynicism and political trust could be due to respondents’ high 
consumption of foreign, as opposed to domestic, news. When Chaffee, Ward, Tipton (1970) and 
others began making the case in the seventies that mass media were politically socializing 
agents, they were referring mainly to mass mediated information that addresses one’s own 
government or country. After all, political socialization processes were conceived from the 
beginning by Hyman as country-specific outcome variables (interest in national politics among, 
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say, young Koreans or Americans). And indeed, the news consumption variables in Chaffee et 
al.’s seminal study assessed TV and newspaper use patterns in Wisconsin that were, we might 
assume, heavier on information about domestic affairs more so than foreign events.  For 
individuals whose news mostly comes from other countries, however, the politically socializing 
influence of mass media may be limited, and this may be partly why news use variables were not 
associated with political cynicism or political trust—both measures of domestic political 
contentment.    
For each media format assessed in this study (with the exception of interpersonal 
reliance, which did not include a gauge of domestic-vs.-foreign information), respondents 
reported that more than half of the news stories focused on events outside Jordan. Respondents 
even reported that most of the events they read about in newspapers—of which the top nine 
listed are published in Jordan—do not focus on issues in their country.   
Political socialization research theorizes political identity formation within a particular 
country. Reconsider Sigel’s (1965, p.1) definition of political socialization: “the learning process 
by which the political norms and behaviors acceptable to an ongoing political system are 
transmitted from generation to generation” (italics mine). It makes sense to speculate, then, that 
agents that socialize views toward an ongoing political system should come from within that 
system. Al-Jazeera reportage on violence in the Eastern Congo, for example, is not likely to be 
associated with changes in Jordanians’ political cynicism or trust levels. Jordanians in the sample 
access relatively little news about events/issues in their home country, and this may contribute to 
the non-influence of the news consumption variables in this study.  
Given respondents’ heavy reliance on foreign news and foreign news sources, it perhaps 
follows that when news consumption variables in the study were associated with political 
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attitudes, they correlated with attitudes toward a foreign country.  We now move to a discussion 
of the significant relationships between media use and ratings of the U.S. government.  
The Arab Street & the Satellite Dish: Respondents’ News Consumption & Ratings of the U.S. 
 Television news consumption and reliance on interpersonal sources were associated with 
feelings toward the U.S. government. As respondents’ levels of TV news use and reliance on 
interpersonal sources goes up, ratings of the U.S. government tended to be more negative. As 
alluded to previously, early political socialization researchers might take these findings as 
evidence that mass media influences play second fiddle in political socialization processes, since 
just one of five media use variables was significantly associated with political attitudes, while the 
only variable in this study examining influence of relatives and friends was significant. On the 
contrary, I interpret the findings differently.  
 First, in terms of interpersonal sources, the findings seem to point to evidence of the two-
step flow theory of mass communication. Most respondents in the sample said that they learn 
news information from friends and family at least once every week. Although we cannot be 
certain, we suspect here that these friends and relatives, or at least many of them, learned the 
news information they eventually communicated from some mass media outlet. It is possible 
that, in a more communally oriented country like Jordan, the two-step flow process works 
stronger than in Western societies, given the strength of familial and social ties in that culture. (It 
is important to note, though, that this is just conjecture; we have no way of knowing whether the 
friends/relatives from whom respondents learn current events information acquire that 
information from news outlets, or whether they, too, learned the information from a family 
member or acquaintance. While we might assume that, at some time prior, relayed current events 
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information that respondents reported learning was communicated via mass media, the survey 
tool could not measure this, and so the discussion below is speculative in nature.  
 For this reason, it might be helpful to add a measure to future studies which asks 
respondents to speculate where their friends/relatives usually acquire the current events 
information they relay. For example, one item might ask, “When your relatives communicate 
news information to you, where do they usually acquire that information?” The responses could 
be a. From other relatives/; b. From friends; c. From news outlets; d. I’m not sure. This would 
give us more information as to where this interpersonally communicated information originates).  
Interestingly, the two-step flow model of mass communication (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948) 
was originally interpreted as evidence of the limited effects of mass media (see Katz, 1957). It 
seems logical to argue, however, that the two-step model is actually evidence of powerful mass 
media effects. So compelling is a certain piece of news information to a media consumer, for 
example, that he or she shares the information with an acquaintance or relative. This piece of 
orally communicated news information, retaining its punch, then contributes to the opinion of the 
listener. In the current study, respondents receive large amounts of news information from 
relatives and friends, and this reception is significantly associated with negative views of the 
U.S. government.  
 However one interprets the two-step flow theory, i.e. as evidence of limited, indirect 
effects of media or of the extension of media effects beyond the original receiver, it seems 
reasonable to speculate that a two-step flow may be at work among young people in Jordan. 
Some political socialization of feelings toward the United States may be occurring, then, on the 
“Arab Street.”  The Arab Street, although an often problematic metaphor, refers to an amorphous 
but lively place where Arabs gather to discuss current events or protest, and where collective 
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opinions are formed. The “Arab Street” refers to the Arab public sphere (Eickelman, 2002).  
References to the Arab Street usually explicitly communicate the two-step flow process. You 
might hear a TV pundit opine, for example, that “Obama’s interview with al-Arabiya TV is 
likely to have reverberations on the Arab Street,” or “Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 
remarks in Cairo are not likely to generate positive feelings on the Arab Street.” The piece of 
news, Obama’s interview with al-Arabiya, is the first step which may have “reverberations” in 
interpersonal discussions on the Arab Street, step two in Lazarsfeld et al.’s model.  
The problems with the Arab Street metaphor have been thoroughly listed (see Lynch, 
2003), such as the fact that Arab public opinion is not unified and monolithic, and there is no 
single, Arab street; Arabs are independent minded and opinions differ on many public policy 
concerns. Still, the metaphor has staying power, if only for the more agreed-upon trends that 
Arabs are avid news consumers, they tend to be more collectively and communally oriented than 
Westerners, and they seem to get sizable portions of their news diets from interpersonal contacts.  
If we accept these provisos, then we may also accept the speculation that young Jordanians are 
being socialized to negative feelings toward the U.S. on one of the sidewalks of the Arab Street. 
Ultimately, of course, this study was correlative in nature and cannot establish temporal 
precedence necessary for concluding causality. Still, there is evidence here that how much news 
information young Jordanians learn from friends and relatives is related to how they rate the U.S. 
government.   
Not all the variance in respondents’ ratings of the U.S. was associated with activity on the 
Arab Street, though. The satellite dish appears to play a role, too. Jordanians in the sample who 
consume large amounts of televised news tended to rate the U.S. government more negatively.  
This is in line with the research of Nisbet et al. (2004), who found that television use was 
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negatively associated with ratings of the U.S. among Arabs/Muslims in nine different countries 
(TV use was their only media format variable, however, so there is no way of comparing 
respondents’ TV reliance to, say, radio), and also the work of Berman and Stokey (1980) who 
found that television news viewing was negatively associated with support for government. Nine 
of the top ten TV networks respondents listed were satellite news channels headquartered in 
other countries. Six of the nine networks are products of other Arab countries, and three outlets 
(CNN, BBC & BBC Arabic) are from the U.S. and U.K.  
When we look at the TV networks respondents watch the most, it is perhaps not hard to 
speculate where negative views of the U.S. are coming from. Al-Jazeera was by far the most-
cited network, and two other networks in the top ten, Hizballah’s al-Manar and Hamas’ al-Aqsa, 
are run by groups on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. Now, this is not 
to say that al-Jazeera’s news content is similar to that of al-Manar; in many ways it is not. But 
neither is al-Jazeera in open denial about the fact that much of its coverage is subjective. In a 
June 2008 press conference in Doha, Qatar, I asked the chief editor of the entire al-Jazeera 
network, Ahmad Sheikh, whether he felt it was necessary to cover the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
with attempted objectivity. He avoided my question, only saying that the Palestinians are 
oppressed and need journalistic support—not exactly a reporting strategy taught in an 
introductory news writing class.  
Few people doubt al-Jazeera’s global reach and influence, but the network’s objectivity 
and journalistic balance are indeed doubted, even by some Arab media scholars. Ayish (2002), 
for example, points out the sensational ways al-Jazeera treats Arab/Muslim issues as opposed to 
foreign affairs from South Africa or other non-Arab regions. Arab networks like al-Jazeera are 
also much more likely to broadcast gruesome war images than are Western news outlets (Fahmy 
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& Johnson, 2007), something which may contribute to respondents’ views toward the U.S. 
Respondents’ reliance on al-Jazeera and anti-American channels such as al-Manar and al-Aqsa 
may help account for respondents’ views toward the U.S.   
Nisbet et al. (2008), however, found that TV use predicted negative views of the U.S. 
even among respondents who listed Western channels like CNN or BBC as their primary 
network choice, so content specific to Arabic news channels alone might not explain negative 
attitudes toward the U.S.; instead, TV news that mentions the U.S. at all might be associated with 
negative ratings of the U.S. In other words, the nature of global television news the U.S. 
generates, not necessarily the presentation of it, may be driving Arab opinion.  Perhaps the 
“mean-world” phenomenon is at work; consumption of news about the U.S., regardless of 
presentation, is associated with increased skepticism of the U.S. government. This would be 
similar to what Romer, Jamieson and Aday (2003) observed when they found that local TV news 
viewing was positively associated with fear of crime.  This would suggest, though, that the 
portrayal of the U.S. was more threatening than is actually the case, causing Arab news 
consumers to disproportionately fear the U.S. government. This assertion is, of course, somewhat 
subjective.      
Regardless of the reasons for the relationship between TV use and evaluations of the U.S. 
among respondents in the sample, though, there seems to be evidence that satellite TV news may 
be a politically socializing agent in Arab countries. While some recent political socialization 
researchers point out the increasing dominance of Internet news over other traditional formats 
among young people in the U.S. (see McLeod & Shah, 2009), this study reminds us that 
televised news still matters in terms of political socialization, especially in a developing country 
like Jordan where Internet connectivity still has to grow for Internet news to assume the 
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dominant mantle.   Not that many political socialization researchers doubt television news as a 
politically socializing force, but TV news is naturally becoming less of a focal point in some new 
studies on media and political socialization in developed countries in the 21st Century.  This 
study suggests, though, that the lone media use variable associated with political socialization 
outcomes in a developing, Arab country is TV consumption—even in the Internet age and nearly 
a decade into the new millennium. The dominant role of television in socialization processes 
argued by Gerbner (1970) and colleagues nearly forty years ago still has much relevance, at least 
in Jordan.  
Implications for U.S. Public Diplomacy. The United States has, for some time, been 
concerned with Arabs’ attitudes toward her, and the government has undertaken a number of 
initiatives to increase public diplomacy efforts in the Arab/Muslim world in recent years (Graber, 
2009). This study, finding that young Jordanians’ interpersonal contacts are associated with 
negative feelings toward the U.S., suggests that direct diplomacy efforts may need to be 
increased further, replacing some of the negative interpersonal communications Jordanians share 
with their peers with more contact from Peace Corps representatives, Fulbright fellows, or other 
diplomatic missions. Of course, this is easily said and not-so easily done in a U.S. recession, but 
this is simply a recommendation on how the U.S. can improve its image, given the findings that 
interpersonal communication of news information in the Arab world may be hindering the U.S.’ 
image. Arab media scholar William Rugh agrees, and said the following in 2004 (p.3) before 
Congress: “The most effective public diplomacy for Arab audiences involves dialogue by 
Americans willing to listen and able to explain the United States and its policies…[W]e should 
increase the number of trained professional officers with Arabic language capabilities who can 
explain America and its policies.” 
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 In terms of mediated, as opposed to interpersonal, communication strategy, this study 
suggests that the U.S. might focus more on satellite TV news broadcasting in the Arab world as 
opposed to other forms of mass communication. By most measures, al-Hurra, the U.S. 
government’s satellite television network in the Middle East, is not at all a success (Rugh, 2004), 
suggesting that a government-run, Voice-of-America style TV network might not be the way to 
go. Al-Hurra has an incapacitating stigma in the Arab world of being a PR rag for the U.S. 
military. Going a different route, the U.S. government might grant a private media company a 
limited two or three year contract to form an Arabic news arm—perhaps an organization like 
CNN, which does not yet have an Arabic TV network. CNN’s English network was, after all, 
one of the top ten TV networks respondents listed. Ultimately, the U.S. has three options in terms 
of TV broadcasting in the Arab world: It can give up and shut down al-Hurra, continue down the 
same road with al-Hurra, or go in a new direction.  The latter option seems to be the only fruitful 
choice, as the U.S. is apparently being thoroughly outcommunicated on television in the Arab 
world.   
Conclusion 
So what of all this? What are the important theoretical concerns involving political 
socialization research that we should take away from this study? There appear to be three main 
points raised by this study that tell us about political socialization processes in a developing, 
Arab country.  
First, the ability of mass media in a developing country to socialize young adults to the 
domestic regime may be limited if most of the news citizens consume deals with events in other 
countries.  If Jordan’s media system grows, and if impediments to private media ownership in 
the country are reduced, this may change. But for now, mass media in Jordan may play a role 
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only in political socialization to foreign individuals, groups or governments, instead of domestic 
institutions.  
Second, the study is a reminder of the importance of interpersonal communication of 
news information in models exploring political socialization.  Especially in an Arab society, in 
which community and familial ties are paramount, researchers studying political socialization in 
Arab countries should include variables assessing the degree to which individuals acquire news 
information orally (or digitally, via the Internet) from friends and family.  
Finally, this study acknowledges the significant association between satellite TV news 
consumption and political attitudes.  Satellite news in the Arab world has been the focus of much 
commentary since the meteoric ascension of networks like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, and the far-
reaching influence of these outlets has been suggested by many commentators (see Miles, 2006, 
for an example). Fewer researchers, however, have examined the correlates of satellite TV news 
consumption through survey research in Arab countries. This study, in part, did. The 
assumptions by Miles and others (see El-Nawawy, Iskandar  and Farag, 2002), who have 
speculated about the influence of Arab satellite networks’ on Arab audiences, may have serious 
merit.  I am not sure I agree wholeheartedly with E.B. White’s prediction that society “shall 
stand or fall by television,” (Wasko, 2005, p.11), but some political opinions in a small Arab 
country may.   
Study Limitations & Future Research Outlook 
 While survey researchers can always take comfort in the fact that no study can avoid all 
methodological caveats, we are always trying to find, and put into practice, a better way to 
measure social phenomena. Naturally, then, I recognize that there are things I wish I could, or in 
hindsight wish I would, have done differently. Some of these issues can be addressed relatively 
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easily in future surveys in Jordan or other Arab countries, while others represent more immutable 
challenges of surveying in developing countries.  
Other Potential Explanations for the Variance in Political Attitudes.  Due to the fact that 
the media use variables in the study accounted for a relatively small portion of the variance in 
Jordanians’ political attitudes, it may be instructive to speculate for a moment regarding other 
cultural/societal factors in Jordan which were not explored in the study but might account for 
some of the variance.  
 Two possible contributors not considered in this study could be the influence of schools 
and religious communication (mosque sermons, study groups) on political attitudes. In future 
studies, it may be helpful to include some measure of religiosity, such as how frequently an 
individual attends religious services, as well as a measure asking respondents whether they 
attended a public or private school, as these institutions—just as Hyman pointed out—are 
important socializing forces. Just as I criticized early political socialization researchers for not 
considering mass media variables in their models exploring political attitudes, perhaps some 
criticism is due me for not including a measure of religious devotion or scholastic upbringing. 
 Religious sermons have the potential to be a powerful politically socializing force, and I 
witnessed this while collecting data in Jordan.  Humphrey (1987) argued that the mosque is one 
of the most dominant, if not the most dominant political force among Muslim populations. On 
two occasions, Jordanians staged protests to decry the war that Israel had waged in the Gaza 
Strip at the time, and at one point there were clashes with Jordanian police that made 
international headlines. Both protests occurred on Friday afternoons, after some Muslims in 
Amman had attended Mosque and absorbed firebrand sermons about the plight of the 
Palestinians who were being attacked. In a country which is considered, and considers itself, 
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Muslim, it may be important to include a measure of religious practices when trying to account 
for variance in political attitudes. In order to further study the influence of religion on young 
Jordanians’ political attitudes, it could be instructive to go back and analyze more carefully the 
open-ended responses to the question on political outlook, in order to search for religious 
references. This could shed some light on the role religious influences play in the formation of 
young Jordanians’ political sentiments.  
 In addition to a measure of religiosity, it could be useful to assess educational 
background beyond just years of schooling. This study, for example, asked respondents to 
indicate how much formal education they received, but did not address the type of schooling they 
completed. In terms of explaining greater amounts of variance in political attitudes among young 
Arabs, it may be necessary to determine whether an individual attended a public or private 
school, whether that school was run under a foreign model such as Montessori, or whether they 
were educated abroad. And of course, it would be useful to determine if a respondent attended a 
Christian or Muslim-affiliated school. It is also possible that an individual attended a sexually 
segregated or only a unisexual school, which is another variable that could influence political 
worldview (see Haw, 1994, for example, who provides an important discussion of Muslim girls’ 
schools and political attitudes in Great Britain).  
 Dispatching Arab Data Collectors. If the resources were available, I would have 
dispatched Arab individuals to assist with the data collection. Arab respondents may be skeptical 
that an American surveying political attitudes in an Arab country is working secretly for the U.S. 
government and, therefore, could use restraint when responding to political attitude questions, 
particularly open-ended questions. It is always better for survey administrators to bear a more 
similar likeness to the demographic group of interest, and for respondents to think about the 
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likeness of the researcher or data collector as little as possible. Having said this, it should be 
pointed out that data were collected via paper questionnaires, not through oral interviews, which 
can trigger impression management behavior and social desirability biases. Still, using Arab 
individuals to administer the surveys (as Tessler, 2002, has) could have elicited more honest 
answers on the questionnaires. It is possible that the utilization of Arab survey assistants could 
have resulted in the reportage of more negative attitudes toward the United States.   
 In order to explore this a bit further, a future examination of the data collected in this 
study might compare the open-ended responses to the forced-choice questions in the survey. It is 
possible that respondents could have felt freer on the forced-choice questions to provide the most 
negative ratings of the United States, but, given the fact that they were completing the 
questionnaire before a U.S. citizen, may have felt less inclined to provide the most visceral 
responses to the open-ended questions. A content analysis of the open-ended questions 
comparing the qualitative responses to the categorical items in this study could shed more light 
on this speculation.  
Non-probability Data. The data examined in this study are non-probability in nature, and 
are limited to the Jordanian capital, Amman. For this reason, the inferences suggested in this 
study should be taken with a grain of restraint. If I’d had my way financially, I would have 
collected probability data from each of Jordan’s twelve governates and obtained data more 
representative of the country. For future surveys I hope to obtain grant support to do this in 
Jordan and other Arab countries. Obtaining probability samples in developing countries, as 
demonstrated in this study, is difficult for a number of reasons. However, with proper grant 
support, it can, and should, be done. In the near future, I would like to replicate this survey in 
Egypt and Lebanon and collect data in a more representative way. Egypt and Lebanon are two 
122 
Arab countries with domestic media industries far more expansive than Jordan’s, and I would 
like to see if more media consumption patterns in these two countries correlate with feelings 
toward the governments in Cairo, Beirut, and the U.S.  
 When such replications are carried out, though, I would change a few things on the 
survey in terms of assessing Internet and new media use.  
 Greater Assessments of New Media. In hindsight, I wish I had included two more 
variables assessing Internet and new media use among young Jordanians: an item assessing 
Internet access and some measurement of social networking use. Naturally, the politically 
socializing influence of new media use in any country depends on levels of Internet connectivity 
in that country, and so, when this study is eventually replicated in Egypt and Lebanon, I will 
include a measure of Internet connectivity on a continuum ranging from “no Internet access 
whatsoever” to “broadband Internet access on a handheld device.” 
 Also, a replication of this study will include an assessment of social networking reliance. 
The Web site Facebook was the fourth most frequently listed Internet news site among 
respondents. Now, whether respondents receive news on Facebook via RSS feeds, news links 
from friends, or direct communication from relatives and acquaintances is not known, but 
respondents listed social networking sites as one of their main sources of online news 
information, and specific assessments of networking reliance should be considered in future 
studies.  
*** 
The current study is still not impervious to methodological criticism stemming from 
traditional definitions of political socialization. For example, the political attitudes examined in 
this study may not be the most intransient measures of political socialization, and they were 
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assessed at one point in time. And one of the political attitude scales administered in the survey 
was eventually shown to be an invalid, internally inconsistent measure of political 
socialization—which automatically disqualifies it as being the kind of stable affective variable 
political socialization researchers have favored.  
Ideally, the best way to measure mass media influences on political socialization would 
be to track specific individuals’ media use over a number of years, while intermittently assessing 
relatively non-ephemeral measures of political socialization, such as support for various 
governments, administrations, or government institutions.  The current study did not do this.  
Instead, this study assessed current patterns of news consumption among young Jordanians (a 
potentially ephemeral, short-term predictor variable) and feelings toward the U.S. and Jordanian 
governments.   
Still, due to the fact that relatively little is known about news consumption among Middle 
Eastern populations, and even less about how news consumption is or is not associated with 
opinions of governments in this region, this study seemingly has something to contribute to our 
understanding of the potential politically socializing influences in an Arab country.  This study 
attempted to add to literature on mass media and political socialization by assessing potential 
media influences on fairly stable measures of political socialization—feelings toward 
governments—in an Arab country.   
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Appendix C: Respondent Recruitment Script 
Title: News Consumption & Political Socialization among Young Jordanians 
Information sheet for IRB study #: 08 -2063 
Originating from: School of Journalism & Mass Communication 
Principal Investigator: Justin Martin; Ph: (919) 923-1789; martinjd@email.unc.edu 
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Anne Johnston; Ph: (919) 962-4286; amjohnst@email.unc.edu  
 
Researcher to passersby: Hello. My name is Justin Martin and I am a Ph.D. student in the School of 
Journalism at the University of North Carolina in the United States.  
I’m conducting a survey among young Jordanians’ news consumption and feelings about politics, and I’m 
wondering if you’d be willing to participate. Participation will take approximately 20 minutes.   
You will not be personally identified in this research in any way.  The researcher will be examining 
responses of groups, not individual people. There will be no link between you and the responses you 
provide.  
Participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to quit after you have begun to 
participate. You are free to leave at any time and are not required to provide the researcher with any 
reason.  Also, you may choose to skip any question(s) for any reason, if you feel you don’t want to 
respond.  
By completing the survey, you indicate that you agree to participate in this research. Would you like to 
participate in this project? 
You will receive two (2) Jordanian Dinars for participating in this research.  You must be above the age 
of 18 in order to participate in this study.  
Translation of Recruitment Script for “News Consumption and Political Socialization among Young, 
Urban Jordanians” 
IRB Number 08 -2063 
PI: Justin D. Martin, martinjd@email.unc.edu, (919)923-1789 
ابحرم ,نترم نتسج يمسا ,ةدحتملا ةيلاولا يف ةيلامشاا ةنيلاوراك ةعماج يف ةفاحصاا ةيلك يف ةارتكد بلاط انا و . نيب علاطتسا يرجا انا
كارتشا يف بغرا انا و ةسايساا و ملاعلاا لءاسو مادختسا ىلع زيكرت بابشاا .ابيرقت كارتشلاا تقو20 ةقيقد .  
 نوكت نل تناةدا ا ا	ه .حابلانيعم صخش نم دودر سيل و عومجملا دودر سرديس ث . طبار يأ نوكي نل
مدقت يتللا دودرلا نيب و كنيب  .  
بابسأ يلأ و تقو يأ يف علاطتسلاا فقوت كنا نكمم و امامت يعوط يھ كارتشلاا .بابسا يلأ لاوس يا بنجت كنكمي هيفاضا و .  
ثحبلا يف ةكراشملا للاج نم , كتقفاوم مدقتعورشملا يف ةكراشمللا .  ؟ةكراشملا ديرت لھ  
علاطتسلاا لك يھتنت نا مزلاا نم نكلا و ككارتشلال نيراند كعفديس ثحابلا . نم رثكا كرمع نا مزلاا نم و18  نم لقا و36 اضيأ .  
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Appendix D: English Version of the Survey 
Thank you for participating in this survey. First, please answer the following questions about where you 
get your news information.  
 
On average, how many days each week do read a print newspaper?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
 
Each time you read a print newspaper, approximately how much time do you spend doing so?  
 
 
Which newspaper(s) do you read the most? (Please list them in order of use, and please list up to three).  
 
 
Are any of these papers published weekly? If Yes, please list which papers are published weekly.  
No  
Yes; (Please list which papers are weekly papers)  
 
Please indicate which of the newspapers you listed are in Arabic as opposed to English. (Choose all that 
apply)  
The first paper I listed is in Arabic  
The second paper I listed is in Arabic.  
The third paper I listed is in Arabic  
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One or more of the papers I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list 
paper and language).  
 
Out of every 10 news articles you read in print newspapers, how many would you say focus on 
events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
On average, how many days each month do read a print magazine?  
 
 
Each time you read a print magazine, approximately how much time do you spend doing so?  
 
 
Which magazine(s) do you read the most? (Please list them in order of use, and list up to three).  
 
 
Are all of the magazines you listed published monthly? If no, please list the magazine and the frequency 
of publication.  
Yes, the magazine(s) I listed is/are published monthly.  
No, one or more of the magazines I listed are published at a different frequency (please list 
magazine and how often it is published)  
 
Please indicate which of the magazine(s) you listed are published in Arabic as opposed to English. 
(Choose all that apply)  
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The first magazine I listed is in Arabic  
The second magazine I listed is in Arabic  
The third magazine I listed is in Arabic  
One or more of the magazines I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list 
themagazine and language).  
 
Out of every 10 news articles you read in print magazines, how many would you say focus on 
events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
On average, how many days each week do you watch news broadcast on television?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Each time you watch a news broadcast on television, approximately how much time do you spend doing 
so?  
 
 
Which television networks/channels do you watch the most? (Please list them in order of use, and list 
up to three).  
 
 
Please indicate which of the television network(s) you listed broadcast in Arabic as opposed to English. 
(Choose all that apply)  
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The first network I listed is in Arabic  
The second network I listed is in Arabic  
The third network listed is in Arabic  
One or more of the networks I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list 
the network and language).  
 
Out of every 10 news stories you see on television, how many would you say focus on events/issues in 
Jordan, as opposed to other countries?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
On average, how many days each week do you listen to news on the radio?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Each time you listen to news on the radio, approximately how much time do you spend doing so?  
 
 
Which radio networks/channels do you listen to the most? (Please list them in order of use, and list up 
to three).  
 
 
Please indicate which of the television network(s) you listed are broadcast in Arabic as opposed to 
English. (Choose all that apply).  
The first network I listed is in Arabic  
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The second network I listed is in Arabic  
The third network listed is in Arabic  
One or more of the networks I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list 
network and language).  
 
Out of every 10 news radio stories you listen to on the radio, how many would you say focus on 
events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
On average, how many days each week do you access news on the Internet?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Each time you access news on the Internet, approximately how much time do you spend doing so?  
 
 
Which Internet news sites do you visit the most? (Please list them in order of use, and list up to three).  
 
 
Please indicate which of the Internet sites you listed are Arabic sites, as opposed to English. (Choose all 
that apply).  
The first site I listed is in Arabic  
The second site I listed is in Arabic  
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The third site I listed is in Arabic  
One or more of the sites I listed is in a language other than Arabic or English (If so, please list 
network and language).  
 
Out of every 10 news stories you access online, how many would you say focus on events/issues in 
Jordan, as opposed to other countries?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
Do you ever visit news sites on your mobile phone or other wireless device? (If no, skip the next 
question)  
Yes  
No  
 
 
On average, how many days each week do you access news sites on your mobile phone?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Are blogs among any of the Web sites you access online for information? If yes, please list the blogs you 
access the most, up to three. If no, please skip the next two questions involving blogs).  
No  
Yes  
Are these blogs published mainly in English or Arabic?  
  
Arabic  
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English  
Both Arabic and English  
Another language (if so, please report which language)  
 
Out of every 10 blog posts you read that comment on news/current events, how many would you say 
focus on events/issues in Jordan, as opposed to other countries?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
Do you ever receive news information via SMS text messaging? (If yes, please list the news organizations 
that send you text messages, up to three. If no, please skip the next two questions involving text 
messages).  
No (please skip next two questions)  
Yes (please list the organizations that send you text messages. List the news organizations in order 
of text frequency.)  
 
 
Are these text messages mainly in Arabic or English?  
Arabic  
English  
Both Arabic and English  
Another language (if so, please report which language)  
 
 
134 
Out of every 10 news text messages you receive, how many would you say focus on events/issues in 
Jordan, as opposed to other countries?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
Do you ever download audio or video news clips (Podcasts) to an iPod or other MP3 device? (If yes, 
please list the news Web sites from which you download podcasts. If no, please skip the next 2 
questions involving podcasts).  
No (please skip next two questions)  
Yes (please list the organizations from which you download podcasts)  
 
Are these podcasts mainly in Arabic or English?   
Arabic  
English  
Both Arabic and English  
Another language (if so, please report which language)  
 
Out of every 10 news podcasts you download, how many would you say focus on events/issues in 
Jordan, as opposed to other countries?  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
How often would you say you learn about news information from speaking with friends?  
Daily  
2-3 Times a 
Week  
Once a Week  
2-3 Times a 
Month  
Once a Month  
Less than 
Once a Month  
Never  
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How often would you say you learn about news information from speaking with family/relatives?  
Daily  
2-3 Times a 
Week  
Once a Week  
2-3 Times a 
Month  
Once a Month  
Less than 
Once a Month  
Never  
       
 
How often would you say you learn about news information by communicating with friends online?  
Daily  
2-3 Times a 
Week  
Once a Week  
2-3 Times a 
Month  
Once a Month  
Less than 
Once a Month  
Never  
       
 
How often would you say you learn about news information by communicating with family/relatives 
online?  
Daily  
2-3 Times a 
Week  
Once a Week  
2-3 Times a 
Month  
Once a Month  
Less than 
Once a Month  
Never  
       
 
Now, please respond to the following statements about elections and politics.  Please agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
 
Whether I vote or not has no influence on what politicians do.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
 
 
People like me have a say about what the government does.  
Strongly Agree Agree  Somewhat Neither Agree Somewhat Disagree  Strongly 
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Agree  nor Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
       
 
One never knows what governmental officials are thinking.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
 
Most of the time I feel the government is doing what is right.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
 
In general, I feel confident in the government's ability to run its national programs.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
 
One cannot always trust what governmental officials say.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
 
One can be confident that politicians will always do the right thing.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
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I feel the government generally uses the money we pay in taxes for the right things.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
 
Now, please respond to the following statements about the United States. Please disagree/agree with 
the following statements:  
 
The United States is a poor example of how to run a country.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
Other countries should model themselves after the United States.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
Countries really should  use the United States as a role model.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
The United States government would be better if it were more like other governments around the 
world.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
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The United States government could learn a lot about how to function from other countries in the world  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
Now, please respond to a few statements about how much you trust the information you receive from 
various news sources.  
 
I feel that information I receive from Jordanian news sources is factually accurate.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
I would say that I trust Jordanian news outlets that I access.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
I feel that information I receive from news sources outside Jordan is factually accurate.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
I would say that I trust foreign news sources that I access.  
Strongly Agree Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
       
In your own words, please explain how you feel about politics.  
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In your own words, please explain how news plays (or does not play) a role in your everday life.  
 
 
Do you feel the need to learn about news and current events on a daily basis? Please explain why or why 
not  
 
Now, please answer a few questions about yourself.  
How old are you?  
 
Gender:  
Male  
Female  
Ethnicity:  
Palestinian  
Jordanian  
Armenian  
Circassian  
Other (Please specify):  
Please indicate your religion:  
Muslim  
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Christian  
Other (please write)  
Nationality:  
Jordanian citizen  
Palestinian identity card holder  
Iraqi citizen  
Other (Please specify):  
Please indicate the last level of education you completed  
I did not finish high school  
I graduated from high school  
I graduated from college  
I finished a master's degree  
I finished a Ph.D. or other terminal degre 
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  بداية، من فضلك أجب على الأسئلة التالية عن المصادر التى تستقى منھا معلوماتك . شكرا على مشاركتك فى ھذا الاستبيان
 
  مطبوعة؟ فى المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الأسبوع تقرأ فيه صحيفة 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
 
 فى كل مرة تقرأ فيھا جريدة مطبوعة، تقريبا كم من الوقت تمضيه فى القراءة؟ 
 
 
  مرتبة حسب أولوية القراءة ( بحد أقصى ثلاث صحف)تقرأ فى أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء الصحف ( أو صحف)أى صحيفة  .
 
 
  كر أسماء الصحف الاسبوعية؟ھل أى من ھذه الصحف أسبوعية؟ اذا كانت الاجابة نعم، من فضلك اذ
 لا 
  ) اذكر أى من التى تقرأھا صحفا أسبوعية)نعم 
 
 
  ) اختر من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق)نجليزية من فضلك حدد أى من الصف التى ذكرتھا تصدر باللغة العربية وليس باللغة الا
 الجريدة الأولى التى ذكرتھا تصدر بالعربية 
 الجريدة الثانية التى ذكرتھا تصدر بالعربية 
 241
  ة الثالثة التى ذكرتھا تصدر بالعربية الجريد
 ) لھذا الاختيار، من فضلك اذكر الجريدة ولغة الصدور)جريدة أو أكثر مما ذكرت تصدر بلغة غير العربية أو الانجليزية 
 
 
  حداث والقضايا فى الاردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟ من كل عشر مقالات تقرأھا فى الصحف المطبوعة، فى رأيك كم منھا يتناول الأ
  01  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
 
 
 فى المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الشھر تقرأ فيه مجلة مطبوعة؟ .
 
 
 فى كل مرة تقرأ فيھا مجلة مطبوعة، تقريبا كم من الوقت تمضيه فى القراءة؟  .
 
 
  مرتبة حسب أولوية القراءة ( بحد أقصى ثلاث مجلات)تقرأ فى أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء المجلات ( أو مجلات)أى مجلة 
 
 
  .ھل كل المجلات التى ذكرتھا تصدر شھريا؟ اذا كانت الاجابة لا، من فضلك اذكر اسم المجلة ودورية الصدور
  التى ذكرتھا تصدر شھريا ( المجلات)نعم، المجلة 
  . من فضلك اذكر المجلة ودورية ودورية الصدور. لا، مجلة أو أكثر مما ذكرت غير شھرية
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  اختر من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق )من فضلك حدد أى من المجلات التى ذكرتھا تصدر باللغة العربية وليس باللغة الانجليزية 
  التى ذكرتھا تصدر بالعربية المجلة الأولى  -
 المجلة الثانية التى ذكرتھا تصدر بالعربية  -
 المجلة الثالثة التى ذكرتھا تصدر بالعربية 
  ) لھذا الاختيار، من فضلك اذكر المجلة ولغة الصدور)بلغة غير العربية أو الانجليزية  مجلة أو أكثر مما ذكرت تصدر
 
 من كل عشر مقالات تقرأھا فى المجلات المطبوعة، فى رأيك كم منھا يتناول الأحداث والقضايا فى الاردن و ليست في بلد آخر؟ 
  01  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
 
 فى المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الاسبوع تشاھد فيه نشرة أخبار التليفزيون؟ 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  كل مرة تشاھد فيھا نشرة أخبار التليفزيون، كم من الوقت تمضيه فى المشاھدة؟ فى 
 
مرتبة حسب أولوية ( بحد أقصى ثلاث قنوات)أى شبكة أو قناة تليفزيونية تشاھد فى أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء القنوات 
  .المشاھدة
 
 
  اختر من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق )رتھا ناطقة باللغة العربية وليس باللغة الانجليزية من فضلك حدد أى من القنوات التليفزيونية التى ذك
 القناة الأولى التى ذكرتھا ناطقة بالعربية 
 القناة الثانية التى ذكرتھا ناطقة بالعربية 
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 القناة الثالثة التى ذكرتھا ناطقة بالعربية 
  لھذا الاختيار، من فضلك اذكر القناة واللغة )قناة أو أكثر مما ذكرت ناطقة بلغة غير العربية أو الانجليزية 
 
  يفزيون، فى رأيك كم منھا يتناول الأحداث والقضايا فى الاردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟ من كل عشر قصص اخبارية تشاھد على التل
  01  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
 
 
 فى المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الاسبوع تستمع فيه الى نشرة اخبار الاذاعة؟
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
 فى كل مرة تستمع الى نشرة اخبار الاذاعة، كم من الوقت تمضيه فى الاستماع؟  
 
 
مرتبة حسب أولوية ( بحد أقصى ثلاث محطات)اعية تستمع اليھا فى أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء المحطات الاذاعية أى محطة اذ
  .الاستماع
 
 
  اختر من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق )من فضلك حدد أى من المحطات الاذاعية التى ذكرتھا ناطقة باللغة العربية وليس باللغة الانجليزية 
 المحطة الأولى التى ذكرتھا ناطقة بالعربية 
 المحطة الثانية التى ذكرتھا ناطقة بالعربية  -
 المحطة الثالثة التى ذكرتھا ناطقة بالعربية  -
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  لھذا الاختيار، من فضلك اذكر المحطة واللغة (محطة أو أكثر مما ذكرت ناطقة بلغة غير العربية أو الانجليزية  -
 
 من كل عشر قصص اخبارية تستمع اليھا فى الاذاعة، فى رأيك كم منھا يتناول الأحداث والقضايا فى الاردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟ 
  01  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
 
 فى المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الاسبوع تتصفح فيه الاخبار على شبكة الانترنت؟ 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
 
 
 كل مرة تتصفح فيھا الاخبار على شبكة الانترنت، كم من الوقت تمضيه فى التصفح؟  .
 
 
أولوية مرتبة حسب ( بحد أقصى ثلاثة مواقع)أى المواقع على شبكة الانترنت تتصفح فى أغلب الأوقات؟ من فضلك اذكر أسماء المواقع  .
  .التصفح
 
 
  اختر من القائمة التالية كل ما ينطبق )باللغة الانجليزية  من فضلك حدد أى من المواقع التى ذكرتھا مواقع تصدر باللغة العربية وليست
 الموقع الاول الذى ذكرته موقع عربى 
 الموقع الثانى الذى ذكرته موقع عربى 
 الموقع الثالث الذى ذكرته موقع عربى 
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  لھذا الاختيار، من فضلك اذكر اسم الموقع واللغة )موقع أو أكثر مما ذكرت غير عربى او انجليزى  -
 
  عشر قصص اخبارية تقرأ على شبكة الانترنت، فى رأيك كم منھا يتناول الأحداث والقضايا فى الاردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟من كل 
  01  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
 ھل تتصفح أى مواقع اخبارية من على تليفونك المحمول أو أى جھاز لاسلكى آخر؟ 
  احذف الأسئلة ذات الصلة  - لا
  اكمل الأسئلةذات الصلة  - نعم 
  واقع اخبارية على الانترنت من على تليفونك المحمول؟فى المتوسط، كم يوميا من أيام الاسبوع تتصفح فيھا م
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
 
 
ھل المدونات من ضمن المواقع التى تتصفحھا على شبكة الانترنت من اجل الحصول على المعلومات؟ اذا كانت الاجابة بنعم، من فضلك 
  .) بحد أقصى ثلاث مدونات)اذكر اسماء ھذه المدونات 
  حذف المسائل المتصلة بھا - لا
  بحد أقصى ثلاث مدونات )اذكر اسماء ھذه المدونات  - نعم 
 
 ھل اللغة الغالبة على ھذة المدونات العربية ام الانجليزية؟ 
 العربية 
  الانجليزية
 كلا اللغتين على حد سواء  -
  ) من فضلك اذكر اللغة الغالبة على المدونات التى تقرأھا)لغة آخرى 
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حداث الجارية على ھذه المدونات، فى رأيك كم منھا يتناول الأحداث والقضايا فى متعلقة بالاخبار او الا( مدخلات)من كل عشر تدوينات 
 الاردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟
  01  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
 
ھل تتلقى اخبار عبر خدمة الرسائل القصيرة على تليفونك المحمول؟ اذا كانت الاجابة نعم، من فضلك اذكر المؤسسات التى ترسل اليك ھذه 
  .) بحد أقصى ثلاث مؤسسات)الرسائل القصيرة 
  احذف المسائل المتصلة بھا  - لا
  ) اذكر المؤسسات التى ترسل اليك الرسائل مرتبة وفقا لتكرار تلقى الرسائل)نعم 
 
 ھل اللغة الغالبة على ھذه الرسائل العربية أم الانجليزية؟ 
 العربية 
 الانجليزية 
 كلا اللغتين على حد سواء 
  ) من فضلك اذكر اللغة الغالبة على الرسائل)لغة آخرى  -
 
 
  رأيك كم منھا يتناول الأحداث والقضايا فى الاردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟  من كل عشر رسائل قصيرة تتلقاھة، فى
  01  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
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ھل قمت ابدا بتحميل ملفات صوتية او مرئية على جھاز آى بود او ام بى ثرى؟ اذا كانت الاجابة بنعم، اذكر المواقع التى قمت بتحميل 
  .البودكاست منھا
  احذف الأسئلة ذات الصلة - لا
  اذكر المواقع التى تقوم بتحميل البودكاست منھا  - م نع
 
 
 ھل اللغة الغالبة على ھذه البودكاست العربية أم الانجليزية؟  .
 العربية 
 الانجليزية 
 كلا اللغتين على حد سواء 
  ) من فضلك اذكر اللغة الغالبة على البودكاست التى تقوم بتحميلھا)لغة آخرى  -
 
 
  ول الأحداث والقضايا فى الاردن و ليس في بلد آخر؟ من كل عشر بودكاست تقوم بتحميلھا، فى رأيك كم منھا يتنا
  01  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
 
 
 فى رأيك، كم عدد المرات التى يمكن أن تقول انك علمت أو تعرفت على معلومات اخبارية من حديثك مع اصدقائك؟ 
 يوميا 
مرات  3الى  2
 اسبوعيا 
 مرة كل اسبوع 
مرات  3الى  2
 شھريا 
 مرة كل شھر 
اقل من مرة فى 
 الشھر الواحد 
لا اتعلم او اعرف 
 شيئا منھم مطلقا 
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 فى رأيك، كم عدد المرات التى يمكن أن تقول انك علمت أو تعرفت على معلومات اخبارية من حديثك مع العائلة؟ 
 يوميا 
مرات  3الى  2
 اسبوعيا 
 مرة كل اسبوع 
مرات  3الى  2
 شھريا 
 مرة كل شھر 
اقل من مرة فى 
 الشھر الواحد 
لا اتعلم او اعرف 
 شيئا منھم مطلقا 
       
 
 
 فى رأيك، كم عدد المرات التى يمكن أن تقول انك علمت أو تعرفت على معلومات اخبارية من حديثك مع اصدقاء على شبكة الانترنت؟ 
 يوميا 
مرات  3الى  2
 اسبوعيا 
 مرة كل اسبوع 
مرات  3الى  2
 شھريا 
 مرة كل شھر 
اقل من مرة فى 
 الشھر الواحد 
لا اتعلم او اعرف 
 شيئا منھم مطلقا 
       
 
 
فى رأيك، كم عدد المرات التى يمكن أن تقول انك علمت أو تعرفت على معلومات اخبارية من حديثك مع العائلة او الاقرباء على شبكة 
 الانترنت؟ 
 يوميا 
مرات  3الى  2
 اسبوعيا 
 مرة كل اسبوع 
مرات  3الى  2
 شھريا 
 مرة كل شھر 
اقل من مرة فى 
 الشھر الواحد 
لم او اعرف لا اتع
 شيئا منھم مطلقا 
       
 
 
  . من فضلك حدد درجة موافقتك أو رفضك لكل جملة. والان، من فضلك اذكر رأيك فى الجمل التالية حول الانتخابات والسياسة
 
  .الادلاء بصوتى من عدمه ليس له اى تأثير على ما يفعله السياسيون
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 الناس أمثالى لھم كلمة فيما تفعله الحكومة 
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 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 لا يعرف الفرد أبدا ما يفكر فيه المسئولون الحكوميون 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 فى أغلب الاوقات، أشعر ان الحكومة تفعل الشىء الصواب 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 بصفة عامة، أشعر بثقة فى قدرة الحكومة على ادارة البرامج القومية 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 لا يمكن للفرد أن يثق فيما يقوله المسئولون الحكوميون 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
  .للفرد أن يثق أن السياسيون سيفعلون دائما الشىء الصائب
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 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
  .أشعر أن الحكومة بصفة عامة تسخر أموال الضرائب للمشروعات الصائبة
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 .من فضلك حدد درجة موافقتك أو رفضك لكل جملة .والان، من فضلك اذكر رأيك فى الجمل التالية حول الولايات المتحدة الامريكية
 
 الولايات المتحدة مثل سىء لكيفية ادارة دولة 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 يجب أن تحتذى الدول الاخرى بالولايات المتحدة 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 يجب أن تنظر الدول الى الولايات المتحدة كمثل اعلى 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
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 ممكن أن تصبح حكومة الولايات المتحدة أفضل اذا كانت اكثر شبھا بحكومات اخرى حول العالم 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 حكومة الولايات المتحدة يمكن ان تتعلم الكثير حول كيفية ادارة الدولة من دول اخرى حول العالم 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
  .والان، عبر عن رأيك فى الجمل التالية حول مدى ثقتك فى المعلومات التى تحصل عليھا من مصادر الاخبار المختلفة
 
 أشعر ان المعلومات التى اتلقاھا من مصادر الاخبار الاردنية دقيقة من حيث الحقائق المذكورة  .
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 يمكن أن اقول اننى اثق فى الاخبار الاردنية التى احصل عليھا 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 اشعر ان المعلومات التى احصل عليھا من مصادر اخبارية غير اردنية دقيقة من حيث الحقائق المذكورة 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
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 يمكن ان اقول اننى اثق بمصادر الاخبار الاجنبية التى الجأ اليھا 
 معارض بشدة  معارض معارض الى حد ما  محايد  موافق الى حد ما  موافق  موافق بشدة 
       
 
 
 صف لى كيف تشعر حيال السياسة 
 
 
  .) او لا تلعب دورا فى حياتك اليومية)صف لى كيف تلعب الاخبار دورا فى حياتك اليومية 
 
 
  .ھل تشعر بالحاجة لمعرفة الاخبار والاحداث الجارية بشكل يومى؟ من فضلك اشرح لماذا ايا كانت الاجابة نعم ام لا
 
 
 الان، اجب عن ھذه الاسئلة عن نفسك 
 
 كم عمرك؟ 
 451
 
 
 الجنس 
 ذكر 
 انثى 
 
 
 العرق 
 فلسطينى 
 اردنى 
 ارمنى 
 جركسى 
  من فضلك اذكر العرق )اخرى 
 
 
 من فضلك حدد ديانتك 
 مسلم  :
 مسيحى 
  من فضلك اذكر الديانة )اخرى 
 
 
 الجنسية 
 551
 اردنى الجنسية 
 فلسطينى حامل بطاقة ھوية  -
 عراقي الجنسية 
  من فضلك اذكر الجنسية )اخرى 
 
 
 من فضلك حدد اعلى درجة علمية حصلت عليھا 
 لم انه المرحلة الثانوية 
 انھيت المرحلة الثانوية 
 احمل شھادة جامعية 
 احمل شھادة الماجستير  -
 احمل شھادة الدكتوراه او درجة م -
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Table 1 
  
Recruitment Statistics by City District 
 
  
District   No. of Respondents   µ Age   Sex-M/F
 Palest./Jordanian* 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
     
Sweileh    44     22  22/23  17/22 
 
 
Shmeisani    41   23.7  27/12  18/20 
 
 
Jebel al-Webdeh   39   25.1  21/19  17/21 
     
 
Jebel Amman    40   23.6  15/25  13/22 
 
 
Swefiyeh    41   23.2  18/23  14/23 
 
 
Abdoun**    38   **  **  ** 
  
 
 
Abdali/Wast al-Balid**  39   **  **  ** 
  
 
 
Rabieh     39   25.2  23/15  19/16 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Totals      321   23.91  169/152
 134/159* 
*Summed, these two numbers do not equal 321, as they do not include Armenians, Circassians, Iraqis, etc. in 
the survey.  Numbers of Palestinians and Jordanians, however, represent the main two ethnic groups and are, 
for this reason, provided here.  
**Individual district statistics could not be compiled for Abdoun and Abdali, as 13 surveys which should have 
been categorized as Abdali were mistakenly marked as being from Abdoun.   
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Table 2 
  
Refusal Statistics by City District 
  
District     No. of refusals  µ Age             Sex  
(M/F) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
     
Sweileh        25  22.2   11/14  
 
 
Shmeisani      10  23.3   6/4 
 
 
Jebel al-Webdeh     9  22.8   8/1 
 
 
Jebel Amman      2  23   1/1 
 
 
Swefiyeh      11  23.1   5/6 
 
 
Abdoun      7  23.6   2/5 
 
 
Abdali/Wast al-Balid     13  22.6   7/6 
 
 
Rabieh       14  25.4   10/4 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Totals        81   23.28   50/31 
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Table 3 
 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
            
_____________________________________________________________________________________  
Gender 
  Male      52.6%     
  Female      47.4    
 
Ethnicity1 
  Jordanian     49.5%    
  Palestinian     41.7     
  Arab other than Jord./Palest.     6.2 
  Circassian       1.2 
  Armenian       0.3 
  Kurdish          0.3      
  Latin American descent       0.3 
  European descent      0.3 
Religion 
  Muslim      89.4%    
  Christian     10.6     
  Other       0.0     
 
Nationality  
  Jordanian Citizen    85.9%    
  Non-Jordanian Citizen    14.1    
 
  Palestinian Identity Card Holder      7.5 
  Iraqi Citizen       1.9 
  Syrian Citizen       2.2 
  Egyptian Citizen       0.6 
  Yemeni Citizen         0.3 
  Saudi Arabian Citizen      0.3  
  Jordanian/American Citizenship        0.9 
  British Citizen       0.3 
 
Age 
  Median      23.00 Years 
  Mean      23.97 
  Inter-quartile Range    21-26 
 
Education 
  Did Not Finish High School     7.2% 
  Obtained High School Diploma   29.8% 
  Finished College (including 2-year college) 57.4% 
  Obtained Post-Graduate Degree     5.3% 
  Doctorate/Other Terminal Degree      0.0%      
 
N =321 
                                                           
1
 All individuals in the sample are either Jordanian citizens living in Jordan, or permanent residents of Jordan. Some 
respondents, though, may have one parent of Latin American or European descent, however, and reported this as 
their lineage.  
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Table 4 
  
Population-Respondent Figures 
 
       Respondents   
 Population  
 
Gender  Male    52.6%     51.4%ª 
Female   47.4%     48.6%ª 
 
Citizenship  Jordanian Citizen  85.9%     88.8%ª 
  
Other Nationality  14.1%     11.2%ª 
 
Ethnicity  East Bank Jordanian  49.5%     <40%*  
Palestinian Ethnicity  41.7%     ~56%* 
 
Religion  Muslim   89.4%     92%ⁿ 
  
Christian   10.6%        7% ⁿ 
Other      0.0%        1% ⁿ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=321 
 
ª These figures come from the 2004 national Jordan census figures published by the Jordanian Department of 
Statistics. Figures reported here are for the Amman governate only, not for the entire country: 
http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home/census2004/cen04_3.pdf/table_3_12.pdf   
 
* These figures represent estimates based on Ryan (2002), Nydell (2006) and Lust-Okar (2006), but are not 
official census figures. Such figures could not be obtained from the Jordan Department of Statistics.  
 
ⁿ These figures come from Nydell (2006), the CIA World Factbook, as well as the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-north-
africa/jordan/. The latter two references are only as recent as 2001, however. This figure reports percentages of 
Muslims/Christians for the entire country, not just the capital.     
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Table 5  
Overall News Consumption Patterns 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Print Newspapers  
% Read Print Newspaper       90.8% 
Days Per Week Newspaper Use      3.17 
Median Time Spent Reading       30 min. 
% Newspapers in Arabic       97.8% 
% Individuals Listing Weekly Newspapers    30.2  
~% Stories Focusing on Jordan      42% 
Print Magazines 
   % Read Print Magazine       81.6% 
   Days Per Month Magazine Use      3.86 
   Median. Time spent Reading       60 min. 
   % Magazines in Arabic       82.3% 
   % Stories focusing on Jordan      22.2% 
Television 
   % Watch Televised News      96.8% 
   Days Per Week Television Use      5.34 
   Median Time Spent Viewing       45 min. 
   % Networks in Arabic        88.9%  
   % Stories focusing on Jordan      24% 
Radio 
   % Listen to Radio News Broadcasts     80.9% 
   Days Per Week Television Use      3.15 
   Median Time Spent Listening       24 min. 
   % Radio Stations in Arabic      95.2% 
   % Stories Focusing on Jordan      40% 
Internet News 
   % Access News Online       66.1% 
   Days Per Week Internet News Use     2.75 
   Median Time Spent Using News Online      60 min.   
   % Web sites in Arabic       77% 
   % Stories Focusing on Jordan      25% 
   % Accessing Blogs (% of total  N / % of subjects who seek news online)   2.2%/9.2% 
   % Accessing News online via Handheld Devices     2.8%  
SMS Texts 
   % Receiving SMS Texts from News Organizations    10.6% 
   %News Texts in Arabic       88.2% 
   % Text Messages Focusing on Jordan     37.9% 
 
Podcasts 
   %Accessing News via Podcasting/MP3 Downloads    6.0%  
   %Podcasts in Arabic       85.7% 
   %Podcasts Focusing on Jordan        9.0% 
   
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 6 
Top News Sources Listed By Respondents 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Source (% of total users listing that source)2 
 
Newspapers 
  1. Al Rai (82.9%)  5. Al-Arab Al-Yawm (10.8)  9. Al-Quds (1.7)  
  2. Ah-Dustour (53.7)  6. The Jordan Times (4.9) 10. Shihan (0.4) 
  3. Al-Ghad (52.3)  7. Al-Medina (4.2) 
  4. Al-Waseet (24)  8. Al-Mumtaz (3.1) 
 
Magazines 
  1. Layalina (30.6%)  5. Haya (4)   9. Living Well (2.4) 
  2. Sayidaty (27)   6. Viva (4)   10. JO (2) 
  3. Rotana (19)   7. Laha (3.6) 
  4. Zahrat Al-Khaleej (15.9 8. Jurs (2.8)  
TV Networks 
  1. Al-Jazeera (83.9%)  5. Al-Manar (13.8)  9. BBC English (1.9) 
  2. Al-Arabiya (39.9)  6. Al-Aqsa TV (10.7)   10. BBC Arabic (1.4) 
  3. MBC (27.9)    7. CNN (2.6) 
  4. Jordan TV (18.5)  8. Rotana (2.2) 
 
Radio Stations 
  1. Fan FM (33.9%)  5. BBC Arabic (13.8)  9. Sawt Al-Ghad (6.7) 
  2. Rotana (24)   6. Mazaj (13.8)   10. “FM” (6.7)3  
  3. Amman Radio (17.7)  7. Sawa (8.7) 
  4. Amn FM (16.9)  8. Hayat (8.7) 
 
Online Sources 
  1. Al-Jazeera.net (38.8%) 5. Google News Arabic (6.7) 9. CNN English (4.3) 
  2. Yahoo! (17.7)   6. Al-Ghad (6.2)   10. Hotmail—MSN (3.8)  
  3. Al-Rai (11)   7. BBC Arabic (5.3) 
  4. Facebook (6.7)  8. Al-Arabiya (4.8) 
 
SMS Text Sources4 
  1. Zain (29.4%) 
  2. Orange (14.4) 
  3. Umnia (14.4) 
  4. Al-Jazeera Mobile (5.9) 
  5. All other news sources, i.e. non-cell phone providers (14.7) 
 
                                                           
2
 These percentages were calculated in the following way: 287 respondents reported they read a print newspaper at 
least once each week. Of those reporting at least some newspaper use, 238 reported reading Al-Rai. Of the 287 
individuals reporting at least some newspaper use, 82.9 % listed Al-Rai as one of the three papers they read.   
3
 About 6 percent of respondents listed “FM” as one of the radio stations from which they acquire news. While 
“FM” is listed here, it is not clear if this reference refers to “Amman FM” or some other station. Enough people 
listed simply “FM,” however, for it to be included here, despite the fact that the specific station could not be 
identified.  
4
 The reason only five SMS sources are listed here is because too few respondents reported receiving news text 
messages to make more than four rankings meaningful.  
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Table 7 
Respondents Receiving News Information from Interpersonal Sources 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
News Information from Friends 
  
   Daily    36.1% 
   2-3 Times/Week  33.2 
   Once a Week   14.5 
   2-3 Times/Month  5.2 
   Once a Month   3.9 
   Less than Once/Month  2.9 
   Never    3.9 
 
  
News Information from Relatives 
 
Daily    46.3% 
   2-3 Times/Week  25.1 
   Once a Week   12.4 
   2-3 Times/Month  5.4 
   Once a Month   4.1 
   Less than Once/Month  3.2 
Never    5.5 
 
 
News Information Online from Friends 
 
Daily    12.8%    
   2-3 Times/Week  15.4 
   Once a Week   15.7 
   2-3 Times/Month  9.9  
   Once a Month   9.6 
   Less than Once/Month  9.9 
Never    26.6 
 
 
News Information Online from Relatives 
 
Daily    16.4%   
   2-3 Times/Week  15.8 
   Once a Week   10.3 
   2-3 Times/Month  8.7 
   Once a Month   7.7 
   Less than Once/Month  10.6 
Never    30.5 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 
  
Composite Scales of Political Trust, Political Cynicism & Media Credibility 
 
  
           By Ethnicity 
Index   N  Mean  SD  By Sex (M/F)
 (Palest./Jord./Other Arab) 
 
Political Cynicism 313  4.63  1.28  4.42/4.87** 4.70/4.61/4.38 
 
 
Political Trust  315  4.14  1.14  4.30/3.98*    3.77/4.45/4.17*** 
 
 
U.S. Gov. Ratings5 311  4.77  1.26  4.80/4.74 4.92/4.66/4.82 
 
 
 
Domestic Media  318  4.72  1.50  4.76/4.67 4.42/5.00/4.45ⁿ 
Credibility 
 
   Belief in Accuracy  319  4.65  1.56  4.76/4.53 4.38/4.95/4.15 ⁿ 
   of Domestic News 
 
   Trust in Domestic 320  4.81  1.59   4.80/4.82 4.47/5.09/4.75 ⁿ 
   News Outlets 
 
 
 
Foreign Media   319  4.94  1.05  4.93/4.94 4.97/4.93/4.95 
Credibility 
 
   Belief in Accuracy  320  5.31  1.27  5.26/5.36 5.41/5.22/5.50 
   of Foreign News 
 
   Trust in Foreign 319  4.57  1.46   4.60/4.54 4.52/4.65/4.40 
   News Outlets 
  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*  Difference is significant at alpha level of p<.05, according to an independent samples t-tests 
** Difference is significant at alpha level of p<.01, according to independent samples t-tests  
***Difference is significant at alpha level of p<.001, according to One Way ANOVA 
ⁿ Difference is significant at alpha level of p<.01, according to One Way ANOVA.  
                                                           
5
 Please recall that 1 item in the original 5-item scale was removed (“U.S. govt. would be better off if were more like 
other govts. in the world,”) to increase internal consistency, leaving a total of four items in the scale.  
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Table 9 
Respondents’ Reported Levels of Political Cynicism, Political Trust & U.S. Government Ratings 
 
      %Agree 6  Mean7   SD 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Political Cynicism 
 
“Whether I vote or not has no influence   52.1   4.70   1.91  
on what politicians do.”  
 
“People like me have a say about    39.6   3.97   1.79 
what the government does.”  
 
“One never knows what governmental   68.6    5.13   1.65  
officials are thinking.”  
 
Political Trust 
 
“Most of the time I feel the government   55.5   4.55   1.62 
is doing what is right.”  
 
“One cannot always trust what    51.9   4.52   1.46 
governmental officials say.”  
 
“One can be confident that politicians   32.6   3.73   1.40 
will always do the right thing.” 
 
“I feel the government generally uses the  45.0   4.19   1.59 
money we pay in taxes for the right things.” 
 
“In general, I’m confident in the government's  56.4   4.73   1.52 
ability to run its national programs.” 
 
U.S. Government Ratings 
 
“The U.S. is a poor example of how   52.8   4.53   1.92 
to run a country.” 
 
“Other countries should model themselves   25.9   3.30   1.80 
after the U.S.” 
 
“Countries really should use the U.S.   23.0   2.90   1.77 
as a role model.” 
 
“The U.S. government would be better off if it  58.4   4.60   1.49 
were more like other governments in the world.” 
 
“The U.S. government could learn a lot about  62.1   4.74   1.40 
how to function from other countries in the world.”    
 
                                                           
6
 % of respondents that agree somewhat, agree, or strongly agree with the listed assertions.  
7
 Political Cynicism, Political Trust and U.S. govt. ratings were assessed on a 1-to-7 strongly disagree-strongly agree 
scale. Strongly disagree was coded as a ‘1’ and strongly agree a ‘7.’ The n for each item ranged from 313-320. 
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Table 10 
Regression Model Using Demographic & News Consumption Variables to Predict Political Cynicism 
        
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Model 1: Demographic & News Consumption Variables Predicting Political Cynicism 
     
           Standardized Betas      Significance 
Demographics   
Gender         -.172       .025*      
  Ethnicity        .105       .192     
  Religion       -.120       .117      
  Nationality        .117       .131 
  Age         .071       .370      
  Education       -.004       .959 
 
News Consumption Variables 
  Newspapers       -.031       .690      
  Magazines       -.131       .090 
  Radio News        .010        .897 
  Televised News        .065       .414 
  Internet News       -.013       .927  
  Interpersonal Sources       .043           .565 
 
Model’s R² =.102  
 
Model 2: Demographics, News Consumption & Media Credibility Predicting Political Cynicism 
 
    Standardized Betas      Significance 
Demographics   
Gender     -.171       .023*         
  Ethnicity     .093       .240       
  Religion    -.130       .087            
  Nationality     .135       .079        
  Age      .044       .580             
  Education    -.007       .932         
 
News Consumption Variables 
  Newspapers    -.017       .827            
  Magazines    -.098       .201     
  Radio News     .013       .866         
  Televised News     .068       .384        
  Internet News    -.010       .892 
  Interpersonal Sources    .018                                 .814  
 
Media Credibility   
  Domestic Media Credibility  -.188       .011*         
   
Model’s R² =.136 
*= significant at the p<.05 level 
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Table 11 
Regression Model Using Demographic & News Consumption Variables to Predict Political Trust  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Model 1: Demographic & News Consumption Variables Predicting Political Trust 
     
           Standardized Betas      Significance 
Demographics   
Gender     .148      .050*         
  Ethnicity   -.295     <.001**           
  Religion    .058     .439            
  Nationality    .044     .565         
  Age    -.125     .109              
  Education   -.008     .915        
 
News Consumption Variables 
  Newspapers   -.039   .608            
  Magazines    .060   .426        
  Radio News    .029   .715         
  Televised News   -.021   .786         
  Internet News   -.007   .925 
  Interpersonal Sources   .027    .711       
 
Model’s R² =.127  
 
Model 2: Demographics, News Consumption & Media Credibility Predicting Political Trust 
 
    Standardized Betas      Significance 
Demographics   
Gender    .141     .027*         
  Ethnicity   -.235     .001**      
  Religion   .077     .229            
  Nationality   -.006     .930           
  Age    -.070     .295                
  Education   -.009     .888         
 
News Consumption Variables 
  Newspapers   -.053     .409             
  Magazines   -.023     .718        
  Radio News    .025     .708           
  Televised News   -.027     .681            
  Internet News    .010     .870 
  Interpersonal Sources   .076     .227     
 
Media Credibility   
  Domestic Media Credibility .527   <.001*** 
          
  Model’s R² =.387 
 
*= significant at the p<.05 level 
**=significant at the p<.01 
***=significant at the p<.001 level 
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Table 12 
Regression Model with Demographic & News Consumption Variables Predicting Feelings toward the U.S. 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Model 1: Demographic & News Consumption Variables Predicting Feelings toward U.S. 
     
           Standardized Betas      Significance 
Demographics   
Gender    .014       .854        
  Ethnicity   .068       .393           
  Religion   .053       .488           
  Nationality   -.108       .163         
  Age     .067       .397             
  Education   -.071       .360        
 
News Consumption Variables 
 
  Newspapers   .059       .442            
  Magazines   .142       .066        
  Radio News   -.084       .288         
  Televised News   .205       .010*         
  Internet News               -.129       .088 
  Interpersonal Sources  .132       .078         
 
Model’s R² =.128 
 
Model 2: Demographics, News Consumption & Media Credibility Predicting feelings toward U.S. 
 
    Standardized Betas      Significance 
Demographics   
Gender    .024     .746         
  Ethnicity   .053     .497       
  Religion   .044     .562            
  Nationality   -.098     .198           
  Age    .084     .285                
  Education   -.069     .369         
 
News Consumption Variables 
 
  Newspapers   .053     .482             
  Magazines   .136     .073         
  Radio News   -.084     .284         
  Televised News   .181     .022*            
  Internet News   -.113     .129 
  Interpersonal Sources  .147     .047*       
 
Media Credibility 
   
  Foreign Media Credibility -.177     .015*  
          
  Model’s R² =.397 
*= significant at the p<.05 level  
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Figure 1: “Jordan First” Emblem 
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Figure 2: Histogram of Political Cynicism Scores 
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Figure 3: Histogram of Political Trust Scores 
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Figure 4: Histogram of U.S. Government Rating Index 
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1
 In 2007, however, Freedom House reported that the Jordanian government had not, in fact, abolished the 
requirement that all Jordanian journalists belong to the Journalists Union. Either way, the Union does still exist 
online, and the English site can be found at http://jpa.easycgi.com/english/.  
 
2
 Al-Hurra is not included in this analysis, because its Web site serves as a guide to its televised programming, not as 
a separate online news source as does the BBC.  
 
3
 In hindsight, it probably would have been best to ask respondents not only if they had finished college, but also if 
their degree was from a two-year community college or vocational school. Also, I got the sense that some 
respondents who were still in college were reporting that they had in fact graduated. In fact, I had to correct a few 
individuals on this. In friendly conversations, some respondents told me they were university students, and then 
reported on the survey that they had finished college. When this happened, I clarified the question and asked them to 
reconsider it. Due to some of the issues reported here, the numbers of college graduates reported may be inflated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
